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ARTICLES
BIOETHICAL MALPRACTICE: RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY IN
HUMAN RESEARCH
BARBARA A. NOAH·

If we knew what it was we were doing,

it would not be called

research, would it?
-Albert Einstein (1879-1955)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the pace of medical research involving human subjects has
accelerated substantially, I promising the development of new treatments that
extend life, improve its quality, and prevent disease. Estimates suggest that about
seven million people participate in clinical trials funded by the National Institutes
of Health (NIH) and another twelve million subjects participate in private trials
annually.2 Looking ahead into the new millennium, the rapidly evolving sciences
of genetics and proteomics, along with the continued development of traditional
therapies, offer the hope of treatment or cure for currently untreatable illnesses,
and ultimately may transform the practice ofmedicine. 3

• Research Associate, Health Law & Policy, University of Florida Levin College of Law; Adjunct
Professor, University of Florida College of Medicine; Member, University of Florida Health Center
Institutional Review Board (lRB-OI) (1997-2003); J.D., Harvard Law School, 1990. An earlier version
of this paper was presented at a symposium on health care litigation sponsored by the University of
Texas School of Law. I would like to thank Antonia Smillova for her helpful research assistance. The
views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not reflect the position of the University of
Florida or its Institutional Review Boards. [Contact information: University of Florida College of Law,
P.O. Box I 17629, Gainesville, FL 3261 1-7629, (352) 392-2237, noahb@law.ufl.edu].
I See Editorial, Fifty Years of Randomized Controlled Trials, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 1165 (1998)
(describing the history and evolution of the clinical trial); Susan Okie, u.s. Oversight Urgedfor Human
Research, WASH. POST, May 16,2001, at AID (noting the "explosive growth" of biomedical research,
including an increase in federal spending for health research from $6.9 billion to $ 13.4 billion between
1986 and 1995 and an increase in industry research spending from $6.2 billion to $18.6 billion during
the same time period). Estimates suggest that between 45,000 and 50,000 researchers currently conduct
clinical trials in the United States. Id; see also Eve E. Slater, IRE Reform, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1402
(2002) (noting that federal funding for clinical research has more than doubled since 1995).
2 Dan Vergano, Drug-Trial Deaths 'Go Unreported.' USA TODAY, Nov. 8, 2000, at 012.
3 Lars Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients' Genetic
Profiles, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 1,2-3,7-10 (2002).
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Clinical research provides the necessary bridge from scientific theory to
practical medical application,4 but research involving human subjects sometimes
exacts a high price from those who participate. Patients who enroll in therapeutic
research protocols take risks, sometimes unwittingly, that they might not ordinarily
tolerate in the clinical setting. Healthy volunteers, motivated by altruism or a
desire to make money, also encounter risks when they agree to participate in non
therapeutic research designed to advance scientific understanding. The medical
community often assumes, perhaps over-optimistically, that clinical research
enhances scientific knowledge in ways that ultimately will benefit many patients. s
Sometimes, experimental protocols actually benefit research subjects directly.
Other times, however, as with the recent deaths of several research participants,
hindsight suggests that no amount of improved scientific understanding or medical
benefit appears to justifY the risks of a particular research plan.
Recent events have drawn public attention to flaws in the regulatory system
that is designed to protect human research subjects and have prompted demands
for reform. 6 Although calculating the number of research-related deaths and
injuries has proven difficult, one expert suggests that as many as 5,000 people die
annually in federally-funded research protocols, while tens of thousands more
suffer injuries. 7 Injuries in privately-funded research remain even more difficult
to estimate due to the lack of any unified tracking system.
Institutional review boards (lRBs), the entities charged with the task of
protecting human research subjects from coercion and unreasonable risk, suffer
from significant limitations that impede their mission. The United States General
Accounting Office (GAO) and the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) have sounded the alarm, issuing highly critical reports about the
ineffectiveness of IRBs.8 Federal regulatory agencies and state health policy

4 See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the
Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REv. 373, 382-95 (2002).
5 See Roger N. Rosenberg, Translating Biomedical Research to the Bedside, 289 JAMA 1305, 1305
(2003) (questioning the "assumption that the recent exponential growth of scientific information about
disease ... heralds a rapid move to improve human health").
6 See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Committee Considers Change in Reporting on Gene Therapies,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. II, 1999, at Al3.
7 Tom Pelton, Medical Experiment Disclosure Hinges on a Flawed Honor System, BALT. SUN, Aug.
12, 2001, at A I (reporting the conclusions of Adil E. Shamoo, a University of Maryland biochemist
who edits the journal Accountability in Research, and noting that other experts disagree with Shamoo's
estimates because of the difficulty of measuring underreporting).
8 The HHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) recently issued a series of reports that criticized
the operation oflRBs and Office of Human Research Protection's supervision of human research more
generally. The reports focused on several problems endemic to IRB operations, such as overwhelming
workload, lack of expertise, and conflicts of interest that interfered with proper review of research
protocols. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUB. No. OEI-O 1-97-00 193, HHS, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS: A TIME FOR REFORM (1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00l93.pdf
(last visited July 1,2004) [hereinafter "HHS Report"]; GAO, PUB. No. GAOIHEHS-96-72, SCIENTIFIC
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bodies also have increased their scrutiny ofresearch activities. 9 HHS's Office for
Human Research Protections (OHRP) temporarily suspended research under the
supervision of IRBs at more than a dozen research institutions because of non
compliance with regulatory requirements, 10 and it continues to criticize the conduct
of specified trials. I I In several of these cases, the suspension followed the death or
serious injury of a patient or healthy volunteer.
In 1999, eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger, a young man with a fairly mild
form of an inherited liver disease, volunteered for a gene therapy protocol at the
University of Pennsylvania, hoping to improve his condition and to provide
scientific information that might be useful in treating infants born with a more
severe form of the disease. 12 After receiving a massive dose of a viral vector
designed to deliver healthy genes to his liver cells, Mr. Gelsinger developed
multiple-organ failure and died. 13 Subsequent investigation revealed that the
Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC), an NIH committee charged with
the oversight of all federally-funded gene therapy research, had approved the study
notwithstanding some reservations about performing the risky procedure on
patients who were coping relatively well with the disorder. 14 Worse still, it later
became apparent that the consent form given to Mr. Gelsinger failed to reveal that
similar studies had caused deaths in monkeys, or that two other people who had
received the viral vector treatment experienced serious side effects.ls In addition
to these gaps in the information conveyed to subjects, the principal investigator

RESEARCH: CONTINUED VIGILANCE CRITICAL TO PROTECTING HUMAN SUBJECTS 17-19 (1996),
available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/he96072.pdf (last visited July I, 2004) [hereinafter
"GAO Report"]. The Department followed up with another report that analyzed the extent of
implementation of its recommendations. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUB. No. OEI-01-97-00197, HHS,
PROTECTING HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS 2-3 (2000), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00197.pdf (last visited July 1,2004) [hereinafter "HHS Status
Report"] (concluding that IRBs had made little progress in implementing the recommendations).
9 See, e.g., Elisabeth Rosenthal, New York Seeks to Tighten Rules on Medical Research, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 27, 1996, at B4 (describing the case of a 19-year-old healthy student volunteer at the University of
Rochester who died during a study designed to measure the effects of pollutants on the lungs).
10 Donald F. Phillips, IRBs SearchJor Answers and Support During a Time oj Institutional Change,
283 JAMA 729, 729 (2000).
11 See Robert Steinbrook, Trial Design and Patient SaJety-The Debate Continues, 349 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 629, 629 (2003).
12 Joanne Silberner, A Gene Therapy Death, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 2000, at 6
(explaining that Mr. Gelsinger suffered from ornithine transcarbamylase deficiency, a metabolic
disorder that interferes with the normal processing and elimination of ammonia from the body).
13 Id.; see also Joan Stephenson, Studies Illuminate Cause oj Fatal Reaction in Gene-Therapy Trial,
285 JAMA 2570, 2570 (2001) (describing later research that identified the immune system's reaction to
the vector).
14 See Silberner, supra note 12, at 6 (noting that Penn's own IRB had rejected the alternative of
performing the research on infants afflicted with a fatal form of the disease because of concerns that
parents of such infants would be unable to make an informed decision about the risks and benefits of
participating in the experimental protocol).
15 Silbemer, supra note 12, at 6.

178

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LA W & POLICY

[VOL. 7:2: 175

(PI) in the study neglected to disclose the fact that he was the founder of the
company with rights to all treatments developed by his research laboratory,16 a
potential conflict of interest that very well may have affected the family's decision
to participate in the study.
The Gelsinger family eventually sued the University of Pennsylvania, the
director of the university's bioethics program, and the PI, among others, claiming
that the information provided in the informed consent documents was incomplete
and that the research team deliberately misled the family about the safety of the
protocol by withholding information about previous adverse events associated with
the gene therapy procedure. 17 The lawsuit also alleged that the IRB should never
have approved the protocol and claimed that the University and the PI
inappropriately held equity stakes in a company with a financial interest in the
investigational therapy. The suit settled for an undisclosed amount. IS
In 2001, Ellen Roche, a 24-year old healthy volunteer, died while
participating in an NIH-funded study at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Medicine designed to understand the physiologic mechanisms of asthma. 19 The
non-therapeutic research protocol required volunteers to inhale an unapproved drug

16 Silbemer, supra note 12, at 6. The FDA later debarred the principal investigator, James Wilson,
from conducting research with FDA-regulated products on human subjects. Rick Weiss, FDA Seeks to
Penalize Gene Scientist, WASH. POST, Dec. 12,2000, at A14; see also Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson,
Methods Faulted in Gene Test Death; Teen Too !II for Therapy, Probe Finds, WASH. POST, Dec. 8,
1999, at A I; Letter from Steven A. Masiello, Director, FDA Office of Compliance and Biologics
Quality, to James M. Wilson, M.D., Ph.D. (Nov. 30, 2000), available at http://www.fda.gov
Ifoi/nidpoe/nl2l.pdf (last visited July I, 2004) (initiating proceeding to disqualifY Wilson from
receiving investigational products for research, and listing violations of FDA regulations including
failure to abide by protocol inclusion criteria, failure to protect rights of subjects, failure to adhere to the
approved research protocol, failure to obtain approval for protocol modifications, failing to submit
accurate reports regarding adverse events, failure to obtain proper informed consent, and record keeping
violations).
17 See Complaint for Estate of Jesse Gelsinger, Gelsinger v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, No.
000901885 (Ct. Com. PI., Phila. Cty., filed Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.sskrplaw.com
Ilinks/healthcare2.html (last visited July 1,2004).
18 Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson, Penn Settles Gene Therapy Suit, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2000, at
A4. Certain named parties in the suit were released from liability under the terms of the settlement. Id.
Other injured research subjects or their families have filed lawsuits against research institutions. See,
e.g., Debbie Goldberg, Artificial Heart Implant Leads to Suit Over Consent Process, WASH. POST, Nov.
30, 2002, at A3 (describing a suit by the widow of the fifth recipient of the AbioCor artificial heart
against the manufacturer, the hospital and medical school where it was implanted, and the patient
advocate who was designated to assist the couple with the consent process); Associated Press, '39
Experiment on Stuttering Draws Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2003, at AI3 (describing a suit by a
group of orphans who were "relentlessly belittled" in order to determine whether stuttering was a
learned behavior); Susan Carhart, Woman Contends Manufacturer Liable in Study of Fecal
Incontinence Control Device, 30 PRODUCT SAFETY & LIABILITY REP. (BNA) 542, 542-43 (2002)
(describing a lawsuit against a clinical investigator, IRB members, the hospital, and a medical device
manufacturer).
19 Jonathan Bor & Gary Cohn, Research Volunteer Dies in Hopkins Asthma Study, BALT. SUN, June
14,2001, at AI.
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called hexamethonium into their lungs to irritate the bronchiallinings. 20 After the
PI's search of a medical literature database failed to turn up any serious risks
associated with the chemical, the university's IRB approved the research. It later
became apparent that the investigator's research efforts had missed older published
research reporting serious side effects associated with inhalation of the
compound. 21
In addition, although at least one previous study volunteer developed a
persistent cough and shortness of breath, the investigator had failed to report the
adverse event and continued the research. 22 OHRP suspended all federally-funded
research at the Johns Hopkins University/3 citing numerous deficiencies in the
institution's IRB processes in general, and particular problems with the IRB's
approval and oversight of the asthma study.24 Although research subsequently
resumed at Hopkins, critics continue to find fault with the University's protection
of human subjects. 25

20 Gina Kolata, Johns Hopkins Death Brings Halt to U.S.-Financed Human Studies, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2001, at AI. After inhaling the chemical, Ms. Roche developed a fever, severe inflammation of
the lungs, and organ failure. ld. Upon notification of the death, Hopkins suspended the protocol and
notified NIH. See Bor & Cohn, supra note 19, at A I. NIH sent out an e-mail alert to alliRBs about the
death, along with a request that IRBs immediately reassess any protocols under their supervision
See Posting of Michael Carome, caromem@od.nih.gov to
involving hexamethonium.
mcwirb@mcwirb.org(June 14,2001) (copy on file with the author).
21 See Jonathan Bor & Tom Pelton, Hopkins Faults Safety Lapses, BALT. SUN, July 17, 2001, at A I
(reporting that a routine Internet search would have located the older studies). A search for
"hexamethonium" on Google, conducted by the author on July 5, 2003, produced the following citation
as the first search result: B. Morrison, Parenteral Hexamethonium in Hypertension, I BRIT. MED. J.
1291 (1953).
22 See Bor & Pelton, supra note 21, at A I (noting that the consent form for the study failed to
mention that the drug was not approved by the FDA and had no currently accepted clinical uses).
23 See Kolata, supra note 20, at A I (reporting that Hopkins received $310 million in 2000-more
federal research funding than any other university). The OHRP later lifted the suspension, but it
imposed additional restrictions on research at Hopkins. See Jonathan Bor & Tom Peiton, U.S. Eases
Constraints on Hopkins, BALT. SUN, July 24, 2001, at AI (reporting that OHRP conditioned the
reinstatement on a thorough re-review of all approved research protocols and required non-therapeutic
protocols to remain suspended until the IRB completed the review).
24 Letter from Patrick J. McNeilly, Compliance Oversight Coordinator and Michael Carome,
Director, Office for Human Research Portections (OHRP), to Edward D. Miller and Chi Van Dang,
Johns Hopkins Univ. School of Medicine, and Gregory F. Schaffer, John Hopkins Bayview Medical
Center (July 19, 200 I), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/detrmJetrs/juIOla.pdf(last visited July I,
2004). OHRP lifted the suspension after it received a corrective action plan from the University. ld.
25 See Shankar Vedantam, Johns Hopkins Faults Researcher in Human Drug Trial, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13,2001, at A6 (describing violations of human subjects protections in a cancer research protocol
in India conducted by a Johns Hopkins researcher); see also Robert Steinbrook, Protecting Research
Subjects: The Crisis at Johns Hopkins, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 716 (2002); Jonathan Bor, Hopkins
Defends Two Studies, BALT. SUN, Dec. 29, 2001, at BI (describing criticism of a study of cocaine
addiction in which Hopkins paid $600 - $700 to cocaine addicts for participation, and a study of
childhood hormonal problems in which researchers failed to inform participants of side effects of
medications used in the study). In a less-publicized but equally deadly recent event, Elaine Holden
Able, a 70-year-old healthy volunteer suffered cardiac and respiratory arrest and eventually died after
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In still another recent incident, patients in a clinical trial of a melanoma
vaccine at the University of Oklahoma sued the principal investigator, the
manufacturer of the experimental vaccine, and the members of the IRB that
approved the study, alleging that the researchers had failed to inform the
participants of relevant risks and had misrepresented information in order to obtain
government permission to conduct the trial. 26 The nurse coordinator for the study
became concerned when she realized that the PI continually enrolled subjects who
did not meet the medical inclusion criteria for the approved protocol and that the
chair of the IRB routinely approved major deviations from the study procedures
retroactively, in clear violation of federal regulations. When the University
conducted an audit of the research, it discovered serious safety problems with the
manufacture and testing ofthe vaccine and it shut down the research. 27
This accumulation of events has real consequences for the future of
biomedical research. Already, researchers are encountering growing suspicion
from prospective trial participants, and are experiencing increased difficulty in
recruiting subjects. 28 Moreover, as these examples illustrate, inappropriate
research conduct and flaws in oversight pose risks to human subjects that may

receiving an apparent overdose ofa dietary supplement in a trial at Case Western Reserve University to
test its effectiveness in treating Alzheimer's disease. Susan Okie, A Death During Research: Apparent
Supplement Overdose Killed Healthy Volunteer, WASH. POST, Jan. 12,2002, at A3 (explaining that a
dietary aide working with nurses in the study may have inadvertently given the subject 83 grams rather
than 8,300 milligrams of the supplement). Although the University immediately halted the research and
conducted an internal review, it did not notifY OHRP of the participant's death until four months later.
After reviewing the University's report, OHRP closed its investigation without imposing any kind of
penalty. Michael Kranish, System for Protecting Humans in Research Faulted, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
25, 2002, at A I; see also Okie, supra, at A3 (noting that Case Western withheld a public announcement
of the death for nine months pending an OHRP investigation, which ultimately absolved the University
of any wrongdoing). The death in this case appears to have resulted from human error rather than faulty
oversight, though perhaps the IRB could have required additional safety measures that would have
prevented the accidental overdose. Jd.
26 See Edward T. Pound, Cancer Study Participants Sue Researcher, USA TODAY, Jan. 30,2001, at
A4. The lawsuit claims that the investigator repeatedly violated federal research regulations, and this
appears to be the first suit to name individual members of the IRB as defendants. See Complaint for
Dawanna Robertson et aI., Robertson v. McGee, (N.D. Okla. 2001) (No. 01-CV-60), available at 2002
WL 535045. The University fired the PI and the chair of the IRB, and it received resignations from the
dean of the college of medicine and the director of the office of research at the health science center in
response to the litigation. Researchers Face Terminations in Scandal, CHI. TRIB., July 22, 2000, at
A17. The OHRP temporarily shut down all research at the University of Oklahoma. Edward T. Pound
& Jessie Halladay, Tulsa Trials Conditionally Reinstated, USA TODAY, July 14,2000, at A3.
27 Jennifer Washburn, Informed Consent, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2001, at WI6 (reporting that
litigation against the University of Oklahoma and its IRB is pending).
28 Linda Marsa, Clinical Trials Are Suffering; Suspicious of Medical Research, Volunteers Spurn
Tests ofPossibly Lifesaving Advances, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at FI (reporting that, in 2001, 86% of
clinical trials failed to meet enrollment goals, an increase from 80% of under enrolled trials in 1999).
Of course, some research protocols simply lack appeal. See, e.g., Marlene Cimons, Finally, Science
Weighs In, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 18,2002, at SI (describing a five-year, $1.4 million study to evaluate the
effectiveness of an experimental pancreatic cancer regimen that requires two coffee enemas a day).
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fonn the basis for liability actions against IRBs and the institutions that house
them. Institutional and investigator failures to comply with basic research
regulations certainly contributed to some of the recent injuries, but other less easily
remedied flaws in the system of human subjects protection pose even greater
challenges. Conscientious compliance with the minimal standards in the federal
rules satisfies only a portion of the legal and ethical obligations in clinical research.
Because the regulations only provide basic parameters for acceptable research,
IRBs and investigators must work harder to interpret and implement the rules
appropriately for the myriad individual research plans that they consider.
The changing climate of medical research - particularly pressures arising
from increased research volume, the lack of effective training mechanisms, lack of
expertise on IRBs in highly specialized fields of medicine, and complex
relationships between academic researchers and private funding sources 
increases the likelihood that these boards will fail in their mission to protect human
subjects. In addition to failures to comply with explicit human subjects protection
regulations, IRBs may underestimate risks, miss ethical or scientific deficiencies in
the design of research protocols, or make other similar errors ofjudgment, thereby
subjecting unwitting research participants to inappropriate and avoidable jeopardy.
IRBs increasingly may face tort liability for what I will call "bioethical
malpractice" - a failure to exercise reasonable judgment within the confines of the
regulatory scheme governing human subjects research. Although tort claims
brought by injured research subjects remain rare, recent events suggest that this
type of litigation will increase in frequency.29 Several lawsuits against IREs are
pending and more will surely follow.
This Article provides an overview of IRB operations, reviews the sources of
regulatory guidance, and examines the weaknesses of the existing system for the
protection of human research SUbjects. It then discusses the scant case law relating
to IRB negligence in the protection of human research subjects and explores some
hypothetical circumstances under which it may be appropriate to hold a board
accountable for injuries to clinical trial participants. Finally, this Article considers
the potential consequences of expanded IRB liability, concluding that tort law
sometimes may serve an important function as a catalyst to regulatory reform when
professional self-regulation and governmental supervision fail.
II.

IRE OPERATIONS

Existing federal regulations delegate to IRBs the responsibility to safeguard
research subjects who participate in clinical trials of experimental treatments and in
non-therapeutic trials designed to gain generalizable scientific knowiedge. In order

See Maureen Milford, Lawsuits Attack Medical Trials, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 27, 2001, at Al (describing
how several recent wrongful death actions against well-known medical research institutions have
"opened the door" for more accountability in human research).
29
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to protect human research subjects effectively, IRBs must use their combined
expertise to assess the scientific, ethical, and legal validity of every proposed
research protocol and must continue vigilant monitoring of approved protocols.
This Part describes the IRB review and supervision process, and it identifies
weaknesses inherent in the regulatory system, exploring the pressures and
complexities in IRB operations that may increase the likelihood of avoidable injury
to research subjects.

A.

The Regulatory Framework

The existing system of human research regulation evolved over time In
reaction to a series of publicized incidents of research abuse. The Nuremburg
Code, which emerged out of the trials of Nazi physicians after the Second World
War,30 sets out essential principles for permissible medical experiments. 31 In 1964,
the World Medical Association adopted the Declaration of Helsinki, which
provides additional commentary on the Nuremburg Code. 32 In 1979, in response
to several notorious research abuses in the United States, such as the Tuskegee
syphilis study,33 the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects

30 For information on the development of the Nuremburg Code, see generally ROBERT JAY LIFTON,
THE NAZI DOCTORS: MEDICAL KILLING AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF GENOCIDE (1986); THE NAZI
DOCTORS AND THE NUREMBERG CODE: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION (George J.
Annas & Michael A. Grodin eds., 1992); Jeffrey H. Barker, Human Experimentation and the Double
Facelessness ofa Merciless Epoch, 25 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 603 (1999); see also Harold
Edgar & David J. Rothman, The Institutional Review Board and Beyond: Future Challenges to the
Ethics of Human Experimentation, 73 MILBANK Q. 489, 494-97 (1995) (describing the political
evolution of the research regulations in the context of the Nuremberg trials and the revelation of various
American research abuses).
31 The Nuremberg Code emphasizes the necessity that research design and conduct assure a genuine
quest for societal good and that the patient be fully informed at all times during participation, and at
complete liberty to remove him or herself from participation. See DIRECTIVES FOR HUMAN
EXPERIMENTATION: NUREMBERG CODE, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG
MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, Vol. 2, at 181-182 (Gov't Printing
Office 1949); see also Jay Katz, Human Sacrifice and Human Experimentation: Reflections at
Nuremburg, 22 YALE J. INT'L L. 401, 413-17 (1997) (commenting on problematic aspects of the Code's
implementation).
32 WORLD MED. ASS'N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH
INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002), available at hnp://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm (last visited
July I, 2004). See also COUNCIL FOR INT'L ORGS. OF MED. SCIENCES, INTERNATIONAL ETHICAL
GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2002), available at
http://www.cioms.ch/frame~uidelines_nov_2002.htm (last visited July 1,2004); Beverly Woodward,
Challenges to Human Subject Protections in US Medical Research, 282 JAMA 1947, 1948-49 (1999)
(describing ongoing efforts to revise international guidelines, sometimes in ways that emphasize
scientific progress over the individual interests of human subjects).
33 See generally FRED D. GRAY, THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS STUDY: THE REAL STORY AND BEYOND
(1998); JAMES H. JONES, BAD BLOOD: THE TUSKEGEE SYPHILIS EXPERIMENT (1993).
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issued the Belmont Report. 34 Finally, the American Medical Association (AM A)
has published a variety of opinions dealing with ethical issues in clinical
research. 35
These ethical codes and guidelines provided the underpinnings for today's
federal oversight regime. In 1974, the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW, the predecessor of HHS) promulgated the first formal regulations
governing human research. 36 Seven years later, the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) issued its own regulations. 37 Both the OHRP and the FDA have the
authority to inspect records and suspend research activities at institutions that
receive federal funding. 38 IRBs represent a central feature of this system, and they
have become widespread, with an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 such boards now
operating in academic medical centers, hospitals, and at government agencies like
NIH. 39 More recently, independent boards that review and monitor research for a

34 See Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Research, Report of the National Commission for the Protection of Human SUbjects of Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (1979) (emphasizing and expanding on principles of
informed consent and protection of vulnerable research subjects).
35 See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass'n, Subject Selection for Clinical Trials (E-2.071), available at
http://www.ama-assn.orgiamaipub/category/8423.html(last visited July 1,2004); Am. Med. Ass'n, The
Use of Placebo Controls in Clinical Trials (E-2.075), available at http://www.ama
assn.orglarnalpub/category/8424.html (last visited July 1,2004); Am. Med. Ass'n, Managing Conflicts
of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical Trials (E-8.0315), available at http://www.ama
assn.orglarnalpub/category/847l.html (last visited July 1,2004).
36
39 Fed. Reg. 18914 (May 30, 1974) (codified as amended at 45 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2003)). These
regulations were later extended to apply to other federal agency supported research. The research
community now commonly refers to the HHS regulations as the "Common Rule." See NAT'L
BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN
PARTICIPANTS VOL. I, 156 (2001), available at http://www.georgetown.edulresearch/nrcbl/
nbac/humanlovervoll.pdf (last visited July 1,2004).
37 Protection of Human Subjects; Informed Consent, 46 Fed. Reg. 8942 (Jan. 27, 1981) (codified as
amended at 21 C.F.R. pts. 50 & 56 (2003); see also 46 Fed. Reg. 8366 (Jan. 26, 1981) (codified as
amended at 54 C.F.R. pt. 46 (2003)(amending HHS regulations to expand upon the original research
policy and exempt certain types of minimal risk research from IRB review). In addition to the two sets
of federal regulations, several states have promulgated laws to protect human research subjects. See,
e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 24170-24179 (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 381.026(4)(e) (2001);
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2440-2446 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.16 to .20 (2001); see also
Maria Woltjen, Regulation ofInformed Consent to Human Experimentation, 17 Loy. U. LJ. 507, 518
23 (1986) (surveying earlier state statutes).
38
21 C.F.R. § 56.115(b) (2003) (permitting FDA inspection, review, and copying of IRB records).
When FDA inspectors disqualify a researcher or a research institution, the regulations permit the
suspension of ongoing research protocols. Id. at § 56.121. The FDA has the authority to disqualify
clinical investigators from receiving investigational products for research purposes. See id. pt. 16.1.
When an institution or its investigators fail to comply with HHS human subject policies, the funding
agency may terminate or suspend research support. 45 C.F.R. § 46.123(a) (2003).
39 HHS Report, supra note 8, at 3; Robert Stein brook, Improving Protection for Research Subjects,
346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1425, 1425 (2002). The fact that the Office of the Inspector General, which
prepared the HHS reports, was unable to produce a more accurate estimate of the total number of IRBs
in operation nicely illustrates the lack of systematic oversight of their activities.
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fee have emerged. 40 The discussion that follows focuses primarily on IRBs in
academic medical centers and hospitals, though independent IRBs suffer from
many of the same problems as well as some additional complexities peculiar to the
for-profit model. 41
The federal rules apply to most, though not all, clinical research conducted in
the United States. The FDA regulations apply to all human subjects research
involving articles such as drugs, medical devices, and biological products that
eventually will support a licensing application to the agency,42 while the HHS
regulations cover all research conducted or supported by the federal govemment. 43
All institutions receiving HHS funding must provide the Department with
assurances that every project conducted at the institution, regardless of the source
of funding, will abide by the human subjects protection regulations. 44
These two overlapping sets of federal research regulations provide a wealth
of detail about standards for approval and supervision of human research.45

40 HHS regulations require that all federally-sponsored research be monitored by local boards. See 45
C.F.R. §46. 102-. I 03 (2003). Thus, these freestanding IRBs usually monitor privately-sponsored
research. The fact that the review is fee-based raises questions about the level of scrutiny accorded to
such research. See Karine Morin et aI., Managing Conflicts of Interest in the Conduct of Clinical
Trials, 287 JAMA 78, 79 (2002) (observing that, "[aJlthough some commentators have argued that
independent boards conduct their reviews more efficiently than IRBs affiliated with academic medical
centers, others have expressed concerns that independent boards face financial conflicts of interest since
their very existence depends on the continuous flow of protocols to review, which may lead them to use
less stringent standards"); see also Trudo Lemmens & Benjamin Freedman, Ethics Review for Sale?
C01iflict of Interest and Commercial Research Review Boards, 78 MILBANK Q. 547, 548-49 (2000)
(describing how the rapid growth in drug and other medical research led to the proliferation of
commercial boards, which purport to provide "efficient" IRB review).
41 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., PUB. No. OEI-01-97-00192, HHS, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW
BOARDS:
THE
EMERGENCE
OF
INDEPENDENT
BOARDS
(1998),
available
at
http://www.researchroundtable.com/pdfiles/irbemergence.pdf (last visited July 1,2004) (describing the
role of independent institutional review boards in ensuring protections for human subjects of clinical
research).
4221 C.F.R. § 50.1 (2003).
43 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 (2003). Many sections of the FDA and HHS regulations are nearly identical.
For a useful comparison between the two sets of regulations, see FDA, COMPARISON OF FDA AND HHS
HUMAN SUBJECT PROTECTION REGULATIONS, available at www.fda.gov/oc/gcp/comparison.html(last
visited July I, 2004). This Article will cite the HHS regulations except in cases where the FDA
regulations differ significantly; in those cases, both sets of regulations will be cited.
4445 C.F.R. § 46.103 (2003).
45 IRBs cannot monitor research unless the investigator requests approval and performs the research
activities within the bounds of the approved protocol. In one case, the investigator bypassed the IRB
review process altogether and used his corneal transplant surgical device on several patients without
informing them that the device and the procedure were experimental and not approved by the FDA.
Two of those patients whose surgery was unsuccessful sued, alleging that the investigator breached his
duty to obtain their informed consent. The experimental surgeries, conducted by the chair of the
University of South Florida's Department of Ophthamology, were not supervised by the University's
IRB, although the board had approved a separate clinical trial with an informed consent document that
described the investigational device and explained that the trial was intended to test its safety and
effectiveness. Instead, the investigator operated on patients outside of the approved protocol, claiming
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Nevertheless, the regulations leave some of the most difficult scientific issues
unresolved, and they leave important ethical questions to the discretion of IRBs,
which may vary substantially in their interpretation and application of the
regulatory requirements. In effect, the federal government has deputized these
boards, delegating to private groups composed of relevant experts primary
responsibility for applying the rules. 46 Thus, variations in IRB workload,
institutional support and resources, and attitudes towards the infonned consent
process can lead to significant differences in the implementation of the federal
regulations among boards, thereby potentially compromising this core mission. 47

1. Review ofNew Research Protocols
With few exceptions, all new research protocols involving human subjects
require full board review. 48 The regulations which set out criteria for approval
require the IRB to assess a variety of scientific and ethical factors. First, the study
design must minimize the risks to the subjects by using sound research procedures
and, in the case of therapeutic research, by preferring procedures that typically

that he was providing standard therapy. Ultimately, doctors in the investigator's department brought
the case to the attention of the University's administration, expressing concern that the investigator had
violated human subjects protections regulations. See Edward T. Pound, Federal Rules/or Research on
People Often Fail, USA TODAY, Feb. 26, 2001, at A I.
46 See Lars Noah, Deputizing Institutional Review Boards to Police (Audit?) Biomedical Research,
25 J. LEGAL MED. (forthcoming Sept., 2004). For a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of this
strategy in other contexts, see Lars Noah, Scientific "Republicanism:" Expert Peer Review and the
Quest/or Regulatory Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033 (2000).
47 See JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 259
(2d ed. 2001); Carl H. Coleman, Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subjects Research, 46 ARIz.
L. REv. I (2004). See also Jerry Goldman & Martin D. Katz, Inconsistency and Institutional Review
Boards, 248 JAMA 197, 198-99 (1982) (analyzing how 22 different IRBs reviewed identical research
protocols; and reporting substantial inconsistency among boards in the application of both regulatory
requirements for informed consent and ethical principles); Rita McWilliams et a!., Problematic
Variation in Local Institutional Review 0/ a Multicenter Genetic Epidemiology Study, 290 JAMA 360,
364-65 (2003) (evaluating the review by 31 different IRBs of a multicenter cystic fibrosis genetic study,
and concluding that the highly variable approaches of different boards compromised human subjects
protection and created inefficiencies).
48 The regulations exempt certain types of human subjects research from IRB review. See 45 C.F.R.
§46.101(b) (2003) (exempting educational research, surveys, interviews, observation of public
behavior, educational aptitude tests, and certain types of research designed to evaluate public benefit
programs). The regulations exempt taste and food quality evaluations and consumer acceptance studies
of foods. /d.; see also Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food
Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L. REv. 329, 376-77 (1998). Another regulation permits expedited
review of certain research involving no more than minimal risk and of minor changes in approved
research protocols. 45 C.F.R. § 46.110 (2003). The regulations define "research" as "a systematic
investigation, including research development, testing and evaluation, designed to develop or contribute
to generalizable knowledge." Id. at § 46.102(d). The regulations define "human subject" as "a living
individual about whom an investigator ... conducting research obtains (I) data through intervention or
interaction with the individual, or (2) identifiable private information." Id. at § 46.1 02(f).

186

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LA W & POLICY

(VOL. 7:2:175

would comprise standard diagnostic tests or treatment. 49 In addition to ensuring
that risks to subjects are minimized, the IRB must evaluate whether those risks,
whatever their magnitude, are reasonable in relation to the probable benefits to the
subjects and the importance of the anticipated scientific knowledge. 50 Thus, the
IRB must weigh potential risks and benefits to subjects who participate in the
research. 51
This inquiry is necessarily complex and fact-intensive. In the case of
therapeutic research, where the subjects suffer from the condition under
investigation, there are both potential risks and direct benefits to participation. In
non-therapeutic research, however, there is no prospect of direct benefit to the
participants and concerns about coercion loom large. 52 In such cases, the IRB
evaluates whether the possible benefit to society in the form of improved scientific

49

45 C.F.R. § 46.11 I(a)(l ) (2003).
Id. at § 46.111 (a)(2). IRBs do not, as a general matter, consider the ultimate cost of an
experimental therapy, though perhaps they should. After all, if the experimental product will be very
expensive compared with other available, efficacious therapies and thus will not constitute an important
addition to the treatment arsenal for a particular condition, perhaps the benefits of the research may not
justifY its risks. Because the cost of some new therapies appears justified in patients who do not
respond well to cheaper alternatives, however, and because IRBs have no crystal ball to determine
which new therapies will fill such a niche, this cost generally remains irrelevant to the IRB's assessment
of the value of the potential scientific knowledge being sought. Compare Jean-Michel Gaspoz et aI.,
Cost Effectiveness of Aspirin, Clopidogrel, or Both for Secondary Prevention of Coronary Heart
Disease, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1800, 1803 (2002) (concluding that the use of aspirin alone was the
most cost-effective treatment for cardiac patients despite the fact that adding the more expensive drug
clopidogrel increased therapeutic benefit), with Alastair J.1. Wood, When Increased Therapeutic Benefit
Comes at Increased Cost, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1819 (2002) (criticizing the study authors'
recommendations, and arguing that the search for improved drug therapies should not be abandoned
based on concerns about what they characterized as "unattractive" cost).
51 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 I (a)(2) (2003) ("In evaluating risks and benefits, the IRB should consider
only those risks and benefits that may result from the research [as distinguished from the risks and
benefits of therapies subjects would receive even if not participating in the research]."). Not
surprisingly, it is sometimes difficult for the subjects themselves to separate research-related treatments
from standard therapies, especially if they are receiving both simultaneously and, therefore, difficult for
prospective research subjects to weigh risk and benefit in deciding whether to participate. See infra
notes 65-70 and accompanying text. Although the regulations only require IRBs to categorize risk for
research involving children, see 45 C.F.R. § 46.403-.407 (2003), it is common practice for IRBs to
categorize risk in all research protocols. In the context of research on adults, the federal regulations
only define "minimal risk." Id. at § 46.1 02(i). Thus, IRBs must use their own judgment in determining
what research activities constitute greater than minimal risk.
52 Observers may find it difficult to believe that altruism alone motivates participants in non
therapeutic research. Investigators may find it very difficult to recruit volunteers to participate in
research with no prospect of therapeutic benefit in the absence of a monetary incentive, unless the
investigator seeks "volunteers" in an arguably coercive type of setting like the educational or
employment context. For example, an expert panel that reviewed research protections at Johns Hopkins
after Ellen Roche's death expressed concern that the University pressured employees into volunteering
for research studies. See Tom Pelton, Experts Fault Study Review at Hopkins, BALT. SUN, Aug. 30,
2001, at Al (adding that the outside review panel had concluded that an "adversarial relationship"
existed between Hopkins and federal regulators and that the Hopkins human subjects protection system
was weaker than at other research institutions).
50
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understanding justifies the risks to individual research participants. For example,
Phase I clinical trials to assess the safety and appropriate dosing levels of an
investigational new drug provide no direct benefit to the study subjects but
represent a necessary step in the development of potentially useful drug therapies
that ultimately may benefit large numbers of patients. An IRB may conclude that
such research, if appropriately designed, meets the ethical standards implicit in the
regulations.
IRBs also must assess the broader scientific merit of each research proposal, a
task that includes risk-benefit analysis but also considers the place of a particular
research plan in the broader field of scientific inquiry. Research that lacks
scientific merit is per se unethical and must not receive IRB approval. The
assessment of scientific merit may prove difficult, however, even for a board of
scientists and physicians. 53 For example, if a protocol is designed to assess the
safety and efficacy of a drug that will be the tenth in its therapeutic class and the
study involves significant risk of side effects, the IRB may opt against approval.
Similarly, IRBs may reject placebo-controlled studies that deny participants access
to available standard therapy. 54 In contrast, the IRB may more willingly tolerate a
significant degree of risk to participants in a drug study involving a new molecular
entity or other novel therapy intended to treat a serious or life-threatening
condition for which available treatments are inadequate, even when the
investigator provides only limited pre-clinical and clinical data about safety and
effectiveness. 55 The regulations offer little guidance to IRBs in making these kinds
of ethical assessments, yet IRBs tend to spend proportionately less time on the
analysis of risk and benefit than on other matters such as informed consent and
confidentiality. 56
The informed consent process is designed to reduce the knowledge gap
between physician and patient by mandating the communication of sufficient

53 On the contingency of these sorts of judgments, see Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical
Diagnosis as a Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGS L.1. 241 (1999).
54 See infra notes 252-260 and accompanying text.
55 See Karen Antman et aI., Designing and Funding Clinical Trials of Novel Therapies, 344 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 762, 762 (2001) (observing that "[t]here are no clear criteria for determining when a
procedure is optimally developed and when it is ready for randomized testing").
56 See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and Experimental
Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 384 (2002) ("IRBs may become preoccupied with reviewing the
niceties of the consent form and perhaps less concerned about their separate obligation to make
independent risk-benefit assessments about the research protocol, confident that potential subjects can
'vote with their feet' so long as the consent form contains all of the necessary information."); see also
Charles Weijer, The Ethical Analysis ofRisk, 28 1.L. MED. & ETHICS 344, 344 (2000) (explaining that
IRBs have the obligation to ensure that research subjects for both therapeutic and non-therapeutic
research "are presented with the option of entering a research study only when agreeing to do so would
be a reasonable choice").
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infonnation to allow the patient to make meaningful decisions about health care. 57
It serves much the same purpose for potential subjects in their dealings with
investigators. Infonned consent represents a necessary, though insufficient,
requirement for ethically appropriate research. 58 The regulations require that
investigators obtain and document infonned consent from each research subject. 59
The consent fonn must use language that the subject can comprehend. 6o Both sets
of regulations demand essentially identical elements in the disclosure of research
procedures and risks to potential participants, including a description of the
procedures to be followed, identification of any procedures which are
experimental, a description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to
the subject, a description of any prospective benefits to the subject or to others, a
discussion of alternative procedures or courses of treatment, if any, that might be
advantageous to the subject, and a statement that participation is voluntary and that
the subject may discontinue participation at any time without penalty.61

57 See generally Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty ofPhysician Inquiry,
31 Loy. U. CHI. LJ. 557 (2000) (analyzing the requirements of informed consent and arguing that it
should require the physician to know personal information regarding the patient as a prerequisite to
legally sufficient consent); Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health
Care Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 267 (1999).
58 See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et aI., What Makes Clinical Research Ethical?, 283 JAMA 2701, 2701-04
(2000) (discussing seven requirements, including informed consent, essential to the conduct of truly
ethical research); see also Richard W. Garnett, Why Informed Consent? Human Experimentation and
the Ethics of Autonomy, 36 CATH. LAW. 455, 476-77 (1996) (explaining that informed consent in
research pays "comparatively little attention" to whether the experiment itself is ethical).
59
45 C.F.R. § 46.1 I I (a)(4)-(5) (2003). If the research subject is unable to understand the research
and give informed consent, the investigators must obtain consent from the individual's legally
authorized representative. Id.
60 Despite the fact that many IRBs have interpreted the "language understandable to the subject"
clause in this regulation to require informed consent forms to be written at an 8th grade reading level,
comprehension problems remain. An IRB might direct an investigator to redraft the following
statement of risks: "You will be asked to undergo bi-weekly venipuncture during which 10 ccs of blood
will be collected. The risks of venipuncture include syncope and infection, but these risks occur only
sporadically." The redrafted statement might read as follows: "You will have 2 teaspoons of your blood
drawn every other week from a vein. There is a small chance that you could faint during the blood
draw or get an infection at the site of the needle stick." See Stanley Blenkinsop, Whatever Happened to
Plain English? The Gobbledygook Smokescreen that Baffles Research Subjects, in VOLUNTEERS IN
RESEARCH AND TESTING 89-93 (Bryony Close et al. eds., 1997) (observing that "[tJhere must be some
suspicions that those unable to organise a clear, effective written explanation are equally unable to
organise a clear, effective research programme," and providing some egregious examples of consent
form "gobbledygook" with translations); Dale E. Hammerschmidt & Moira A. Keane, Institutional
Review Board (IRE) Review Lacks Impact on the Readability ofConsent Formsfor Research, 304 AM.
J. MED. SCI. 348, 349-50 (1992) (concluding that the IRB review process only improved consent form
readability by an average of one-tenth of a grade level); Michael K. Paasche-Orlow et aI., Readability
Standards for Informed-Consent Forms as Compared with Actual Readability, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED.
721, 723-24 (2003) (providing examples of informed consent text at a variety of reading levels, and
concluding that most medical schools did not comply with their own internal readability requirements).
61 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2003).
In certain cases, the regulations require additional consent
information, including statements about the risk to the fetus where the research involves pregnant
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Once the IRB approves the protocol and the consent fonn, the process of
obtaining consent is left to the principal investigator or, more often, to his or her
staff. 62 Unfortunately, the actual process of obtaining consent in research often
emphasizes fonn over substance and thus falls short of promoting the ethical ideal
of patient autonomy in making medical decisions. 63
Although HHS has
recommended the use of ombudsmen or other third parties to monitor the consent
process in unusually sensitive or risky protocols, it has imposed no specific
requirements to encourage consent monitoring, and IRBs continue to lack the
resources to perfonn this function. 64
Research designed primarily to advance medical knowledge, with only a
speculative possibility of some secondary benefit to the research subjects,
heightens these concerns and makes meaningful infonned consent essential. 65
Even when the IRB and the principal investigator manage to draft an easy-to-read
infonned consent document and provide the potential research participant with an
oral explanation of the research and an opportunity to ask questions, research
subjects sometimes fail to understand the distinction between the standard therapy
that they would ordinarily receive for their condition and the experimental
therapy.66
The confusion multiplies when patients receive standard and

women, circumstances under which the subject's participation may be terminated by the investigator,
additional costs to the subject, and the number of subjects involved in the study. Id. at § 46.lI6(b).
The IRB may elect to approve a consent process that alters some of the elements described above in
cases where the research "could not practicably be carried out without the waiver or alteration." Id. at §
46.1 16(b)(2), (d).
62 The IRB has the option of appointing a "consent monitor" to oversee this process. See id. at §
46. \09(e). 1RBs rarely have the resources to exercise this authority. See BERG ET AL., supra note 47, at
260 (recommending that IRBs pay less attention to informed consent forms and "make efforts to
evaluate the actual consent interaction").
63 See BERG ET AL., supra note 47, at 200. According to Franz Ingelfinger, "[t]he patient, asked to
sign countless releases or consents, may respond with a ... pro forma signature. The physician,
immersed in a profusion of unimportant detail, will lose sight of, and resp.ect for the important issues...
. For medical ethics, in short, trivialization is self-defeating." Id. For a detailed discussion of these
points, including a critique of the practice of obtaining consent in the research context, see Richard
Delgado & Helen Leskovac, Informed Consent in Human Experimentation: Bridging the Gap Between
Ethical Thought and Current Practice, 34 UCLA L. REv. 67, 75-80 (1986).
64 See HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 12-13.
65 See Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 41-51 (1993)
(describing a study designed to evaluate rates and mechanisms of schizophrenic relapse in patients who
were withdrawn from all antipsychotic medications in which participants were informed that their
condition "may improve, worsen, or remain unchanged" despite the fact that the rate of serious relapse
among patients who ceased medications was 88%).
66 See Paul S. Appelbaum et aI., False Hopes and Best Data: Consent to Research and the
Therapeutic Misconception, HASTINGS CTR. REp., Apr. 1987, at 20, 21 (explaining the difficulty that
many patient/subjects experience in understanding that the design of a research study generally focuses
on generating useful scientific data rather than on delivering the best therapeutic option for the
individual participant); see also Paul S. Appelbaum, ClarifYing the Ethics ofClinical Research: A Path
Toward Avoiding the Therapeutic Misconception, 2 AM. J. BIOETHICS 22 (2002); Sarah J.L. Edwards et
aI., The Ethics of Randomised Controlled Trials from the Perspectives of Patients, the Public, and
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experimental interventions simultaneously.67
These problems compromise
research subjects' ability to weigh the risks and benefits of participation
effectively.
In addition, even in protocols that offer some real possibility of prospective
benefit, informed consent seldom includes information about the likelihood that
such benefit will occur for anyone research subject. Moreover, consent forms
rarely discuss the possibility that the experimental intervention under study may
not work as well as standard therapy for a given condition,68 or remind research
subjects of their option not to participate based on concerns that experimental
therapy entails additional and often unpredictable risks compared with standard

Healthcare Professionals, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 1209, 1209 (1998) (finding that many participants in
clinical trials enroll because they hope to benefit personally rather than for altruistic reasons); Katie
Featherstone & Jenny L. Donovan, Random Allocation or Allocation at Random? Patients'
Perspectives of Participation in a Randomised Controlled Trial, 317 BRIT. MED. J. 1177, 1179-80
(1998) (concluding that many trial participants found the concept ofrandomization confusing); Samuel
Hellman & Deborah S, Hellman, OfMice but Not Men: Problems ofthe Randomized Clinical Trial, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1585, 1585-86 (1991) (explaining that medical research is designed to verity
scientific hypotheses, not to treat ill patients).
67 Many patients apparently fail to understand that they have agreed to participate in a research
protocol rather than (or in addition to) receiving standard therapy, and many cannot adequately balance
the risks and benefits of participation even after completing the informed consent process. A 1995
survey of371 research subjects found that nearly 20% of those questioned incorrectly believed that they
were not and never had been research SUbjects. See Laura C. McBride & Mark R. Yessian, IRBs and
Continuing Review: Regulatory Interference or Vital Safeguard?, 16 FOOD DRUG COSMo & MED. DEV.
L. DIG. 13, 15 (1999); see also George J. Annas, Questing for Grails: Duplicity, Betrayal and Self
Deception in Postmodern Medical Research, 12 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 297, 319-21 (1996)
(reviewing evidence of trial participants' inability to distinguish research interventions from standard
therapy and the contribution of inadequate consent forms to this confusion); Franklin G. Miller &
Donald L. Rosenstein, The Therapeutic Orientation to Clinical Trials, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1383,
1384 (2003) (explaining that a variety of research practices, including referring to subjects as "patients"
and advertising for trial participants who are suffering from the disease and need treatment, perpetuates
the therapeutic misconception, and emphasizing that the traditional ethics of the doctor-patient
relationship cannot govern the investigator-subject relationship); cf Steven Joffe et aI., Quality of
Informed Consent in Cancer Clinical Trials: A Cross-Sectional Survey, 358 THE LANCET 1772, 1774
75 (2001) (finding that 71% of adult cancer patients enrolled in clinical trials at a cancer institute
understood that they might not benefit directly from the trials, but that less than 40% understood that
the trial procedures might involve additional risk or discomfort compared with standard therapies for
their conditions).
68 Commentators have observed that consent forms mislead when they fail to explain the degree of
uncertainty of therapeutic benefit from an investigational intervention. If, for example, a protocol offers
less than a 10% chance of benefit, merely explaining in the consent form that therapeutic benefit is
"uncertain" may mislead some patients to overestimate their chance of benefit. See Sam Horng et aI.,
Descriptions of Benefits and Risks in Consent Forms for Phase I Oncology Trials, 347 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 2134 (2002) (surveying consent forms in Phase I oncology trials, and finding that, although 94%
of forms communicated some uncertainty about benefit, 51 % of forms "alluded to the possibility of
benefit in a section other than the designated benefit section-usually in the statement of purpose-by
including statements such as 'some patients have benefited from treatment with this drug' or 'this drug
has shown some promise in this disease"'). The same study concluded that most consent forms did not
distinguish between standard and experimental procedures and nearly all of the forms referred to the
investigational drug under study as a "treatment." Id. at 2136, 2139.
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medical interventions. 69 Finally, in their zeal to answer a challenging scientific
question, researchers sometimes deliberately downplay or omit information about
the medical uncertainty inherent in such research in order to optimize emollment in
the protoco1. 70
In addition to requiring meaningful informed consent, the regulations prohibit
research that employs "coercive" tactics/ 1 but IREs sometimes struggle to
determine what sorts of recruitment techniques would constitute coercion. For
many years, recruitment of research subjects has involved payment for
participation, although most IREs agree that this practice poses difficult ethical
problems. 72 Depending on how they are structured, such incentives clearly can
pose a risk of coercion, particularly because low-income or uninsured individuals
are more likely to emoll in a research study in order to obtain otherwise

See Delgado & Leskovac, supra note 63, at 88.
See BERG ET AL., supra note 47, at 287 (describing observational studies and FDA infonned
consent audits that found distortion or concealment of important infonnation in the infonned consent
process in research, including a failure to disclose the experimental nature of the proposed research
intervention 53% of the time). One physician recently described a study he conducted early in his
career in which he paid healthy medical students to participate, one of whom experienced a serious
adverse effect from the study intervention, despite the fact that he had described the risks involved as
"nominal." The physician discussed the factors that motivated him to perfonn the research, explaining
that his "primary motive was ... the desire to advance knowledge about an important physiological
mechanism" but that "[a] potent secondary motive was to advance [his] career by publishing the results
of the research and maintaining grant support - academic currency that buys prestige and promotion."
Nonnan G. Levinsky, Nonfinancial Conflicts of Interest in Research, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 759, 759
(2002).
71 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2003) (providing that the "investigator shall seek ... consent only under
circumstances that provide the prospective subject ... sufficient opportunity to consider whether or not
to participate and that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence"). See also Sharona
Hoffman, Regulating Clinical Research: Informed Consent, Privacy, and IREs, 31 CAP. U. L. REv. 71,
85 (2003) (observing that "[g]enuine infonned consent is particularly difficult to obtain when the
patients ... suffer from life-threatening diseases," and suggesting that "those who have the most to gain
or lose from receiving experimental treatment are also those who are least able to provide meaningful
infonned consent").
72 See Neal Dickert & Christine Grady, What's the Price of a Research Subject? Approaches to
Payment for Research Participation, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 198, 198 (1999). Payments may include
non-monetary incentives as well. Recently, some protocols to test drugs in pediatric populations have
offered gift certificates to toy stores in addition to cash and free study medications. See Alice Dembner,
Teddy Bears and Veiled Threats to Attract Children into Medical Experiments, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar.
20, 2001, at CI (describing the practice of offering gift certificates to McDonalds and Toys 'R' Us
stores as "an ethical gray zone"). IRBs also worry about the impact of catchy but potentially
misleading trial acronyms, such as BRAVO and GUSTO. See Michael Berkwits, Capture! Shock!
Excite! Clinical Trial Acronyms and the "Branding" of Clinical Research, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 755, 757-58 (2000) (explaining that the use of such acronyms functions like a clinical trial
advertisement and may convey a misleading impression to trial participants about the studied therapy's
safety and effectiveness).
69

70
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unavailable treatment and are more likely to underestimate the risks. 73 Federal
guidelines offer little assistance in dealing with this thorny issue, and the research
community so far has failed to reach a consensus about it. 74 Nevertheless,
researchers, patient advocates, and ethicists appear to agree on some basic
principles such as preferring payments that compensate for travel expenses and lost
time at work, but that are not so large as to be unduly influential. Many IRBs also
require pro-rated payments rather than permitting the withholding of all payment
until a research participant completes all of the study interventions. Some
commentators have suggested several alternative models of compensation for both
patients and healthy volunteers who participate in research protocols,75 but, for
now, IRBs continue to debate whether financial compensation in any protocol
presents an inappropriate inducement that could render consent invalid.

2. Ongoing Supervision ofApproved Protocols
IRBs must revisit approved protocols at least annually, and more frequently if
the degree of risk demands it, in a process called "continuing review.,,76 In such a
review, the board examines adverse events (with particular attention to serious,
unexpected events) and should ensure that the investigator has complied with
informed consent requirements by obtaining consent from each subject,
documenting that consent, and providing the subject with a copy of the consent
document and information about whom to contact in case of problems. The IRB

13 See HHS Report, supra note 8, at A-2; Dickert & Grady, supra note 72, at 198-99; see also
Barbara A. Noah, The Participation of Underrepresented Minorities in Clinical Research. 29 AM. J.L.
& MED. 221 (2003).
74 The HHS regulations do not address the issue of payment, and the OHRP and FDA guidelines on
the subject leave the controversy unresolved, noting, unhelpfully, that "[t]he IRB should review both
the amount of payment and the proposed method of timing of disbursement to assure that neither are
coercive or present undue influence." FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS AND
CLINICAL INVESTIGATORS (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/ohrtlirbs/toc4.html#payment (last
visited July 1,2004).
7S See Dickert & Grady, supra note 72, at 199-201 (discussing the relative merits of the market
model, the wage-payment model, and the reimbursement model for compensating research subjects, and
concluding that the wage-payment model most effectively reduces concerns about undue inducement).
76 45 C.F.R. § 46.109(e) (2003) ("An IRB shall conduct continuing review of research . . . at
intervals appropriate to the degree of risk . . . ."). The NIH's web-based training course for IRB
members offers the following example of a situation in which an IRB might require updated reports
more frequently than annually: a Phase I clinical trial to study increasingly higher doses of a new
chemotherapeutic drug will take a year to complete and will enroll twenty subjects-five sets of four
with each set receiving increasing doses. Under these circumstances, the IRB might require the
investigator to report evidence of toxicity or other adverse events after each dosing set. NIH,
COMPUTER-BASED TRAINING COURSE FOR NIH IRB MEMBERS (1999), (on file with the Journal of
Health Care Law & Policy). Information about the NIH's web-based training course can be accessed
online at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/cbtlcbt.html(last visited July I, 2004). See generally Sharona Hoffman,
Continued Concern: Human Subject Protection, the Institutional Review Board. and Continuing
Review, 68 TENN. L. REv. 725 (2001) (providing an overview and critique of the continuing review
process, and recommending avenues for reform).
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also must inquire whether there have been any deviations from the approved
protocol, such as enrolling more than the approved number of subjects or changing
study procedures. 77 If an IRB discovers that clinical investigators are not
complying with the board's requirements, or have deviated from an approved
protocol, it has the authority to suspend or terminate approval of the project. 78
Unfortunately, continuing review remains a "paper-based" activity at most IRBs,
which generally lack the resources to visit study sites or to interview principal
investigators or research subjects. Instead, IRBs usually rely on self-reporting
from researchers as the basis for continuing review. 79
In addition, some protocols include a provision requiring ongoing supervision
of approved research (between continuing reviews by the IRB) by an oversight
committee such as a data safety monitoring board (DSMB).8o The IRB may rely
on the promised additional supervision of the oversight committee when making
the initial determination of whether the risks to potential human subjects are
appropriate in relation to the benefits of participation in the research. If, however,
the oversight committee fails to meet, or fails to submit reports to the IRB, it
thwarts the purpose for including such a provision in the protocol. The NIH
requires that all NIH-funded trials have an appropriate oversight system, including
DSMBs for certain types of clinical trials. The FDA and NIH also have announced
that they will require sponsors of all gene therapy protocols to submit their
monitoring plans in advance for review. 8l These requirements apply only to a
small proportion of clinical research, however, and HHS continues to urge more
careful supervision of research in progress. 82
The minimum annual continuing review represents only a part of the IRB's
supervisory responsibilities. Boards also must review reports of adverse events
associated with approved research in order to determine whether any immediate
action is needed. Each IRB must provide assurances to federal funding agencies
that it has written internal procedures detailing the circumstances under which

77 Such protocol changes generally require full board approval before the investigator implements
them, "except when necessary to eliminate apparent immediate hazards to the subject." 45 C.F.R. §
46.1 03(b)(4)(iii) (2003).
78 Id. at § 46.113.
If the board suspends or terminates an approved protocol under these
circumstances, it must report its actions immediately to the investigator, appropriate institution officials,
and to the relevant federal department or agency (iffederal funding is involved). Id. at § 46.103(b)(5).
The FDA's regulations require a similar report. 21 C.F.R. § 56.113 (2003).
79 See HHS Report, supra note 8, at 6-7.
80 See Jay Herson, Data Monitoring Boards in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 12 STAT. MED. 555
(1993) (describing the duties of these boards in different contexts such as NIH clinical trials and
industry-sponsored trials); Michael A. Morse et aI., Monitoring and Ensuring Safety During Clinical
Research, 285 JAMA 120 I, 1202 (200 I) (describing the role of these boards in analyzing data from
trials in progress).
81 See HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 13.
82 See HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 12-13.
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investigators must report unanticipated risks or problems with the research or
deviations from the approved protocol prior to the continuing review. 83 Whenever
the board receives reports of adverse events, it must determine whether a particular
event (or an accumulation of adverse events) indicates a change in the risk-benefit
calculus that requires some type of corrective action. 84
The recent increase in the pace of clinical research has left IRBs inundated
with adverse event reports. OHRP has noted a tripling of research-related injury
reports between 1997 and 2000, which it attributes in part to an increased
awareness of federal reporting regulations among researchers. 85 Not surprisingly,
boards find it difficult to devote serious attention to reviewing and addressing these
reports. 86 The effectiveness of the adverse event monitoring system for human
subjects depends heavily on voluntary compliance with IRB and federal regulatory
reporting guidelines,87 but recent reports suggest that many researchers routinely
fail to report injuries and deaths among their study patients. 88 Increasingly, large,

83 45 C.F.R. § 46.\03(b)(5) (2003) (requiring that boards create "written procedures for ensuring
prompt reporting to the IRB ... of any unanticipated problems involving risks to subjects or ... any
serious or continuing noncompliance with ... the requirements or determinations of the IRB"). In these
circumstances, IRBs have the authority to halt research. Id. at § 46.113.
84 IRB action in response to serious adverse events might include requiring additional warnings in
the informed consent form (and obtaining new consent from subjects enrolled in the trial), requiring
changes to the protocol to guard against future adverse events if such changes will prevent or reduce the
incidence of such events, or suspending or terminating the protocol altogether.
85 Peiton, supra note 7, at A I.
86 See HHS Report, supra note 8, at 7 (describing one IRB that received 200 adverse event reports
per month).
87 See Pelton, supra note 7, at AI (explaining the difficulties of implementing the federal law, which
requires only reports of regulatory violations and of unexpected adverse events that are probably
connected with the experimental treatment); cf Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug Reactions: Harnessing
Experiential Data to Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 449,469-70 (2000) (describing the
curious system of "mandatory" manufacturer reporting of adverse events associated with approved drug
products, and observing that, because the system relies on voluntary reports of adverse events from
physicians to manufacturers, the system is only as effective as the degree of voluntary physician
participation permits).
88 One study examined reporting practices in NIH-sponsored research. Noting that the NIH has an
estimated 7 million participants in current clinical trials, the study of NIH-sponsored researchers
uncovered only 878 reports of injuries and deaths in research over a ten year period and concluded that
this reporting rate was "absurdly low" because the normal death rate in a population of 7 million is
5000 deaths, "each of which should have triggered a report about whether the death was related to a
drug under investigation." See Vergano, supra note 2, at 012 (adding that the 878 reports triggered
only 41 investigations by OHRP). Another study concluded that OHRP's predecessor received a total
of only 386 reports of unexpected adverse events from academic research institutions during the 1990s,
158 of which were from a single university that now describes itself as "overzealous." See Kranish,
supra note 25, at A I (reporting that, in contrast, the pharmaceutical industry regularly provides adverse
events to the FDA: approximately 241,000 reports between 1987 and 200 I); see also John P .A.
loannidis & Joseph Lau, Completeness ofSafety Reporting in Randomized Trials, 285 JAMA 437, 440
41 (200 I) (finding deficiencies in both the quality and quantity of adverse event reporting in RCTs, and
concluding that adverse event reports frequently fail to define the severity of the event adequately).
Finally, just after Jesse Geisinger'S death, the NIH sent a reminder notice to all gene therapy
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multi-center trials place even greater stress on the adverse event reporting system,
which was initially developed when most research was performed at single sites. 89
The problems inherent in the current adverse event reporting scheme have become
so alarming that some observers have commented that research animals often
receive better protection than human guinea pigs. 9o
Both the FDA and NIH have issued guidelines dealing with adverse event
reporting in the clinical research setting,91 though some of the NIH guidelines
address only gene therapy research. 92 The FDA standards for expedited reporting
call for the immediate notification about serious, unexpected adverse drug
reactions in clinical trials. 93 The NIH recently finalized a new adverse event
reporting guideline for gene therapy research protocols that loosens its prior
requirement that all serious adverse events be reported immediately, whether
apparently related to the experimental therapy or to the patient's underlying

investigators that they were required to submit reports of adverse events and deaths in gene therapy
protocols, after which it received an astounding 652 new adverse event reports, including seven prior
deaths that had gone unreported. See Washburn, supra note 27, at W16; see also Deborah Nelson &
Rick Weiss, Earlier Gene Test Deaths Not Reported: NIH Was Unaware of "Adverse Events." WASH.
POST, Jan. 31,2000, at A I.
89 See McWilliams et aI., supra note 47, at 363-64 (describing the growth of multicenter studies
since the early 1980s as "dramatic"); Morse et aI., supra note 80, at 1202 (outlining the problems with
research oversight and adverse event reporting, and making recommendations for reforms).
90 See Kranish, supra note 25, at A I (explaining that regulations require private researchers to report
adverse events in research involving cats and dogs, but not necessarily events involving human
sUbjects); see also R. Alta Charo, Human Subjects Have It Worse Than Guinea Pigs, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., June 25, 1999, at A64.
91 FDA, CLINICAL SAFETY DATA MANAGEMENT: DEFINITIONS AND STANDARDS FOR EXPEDITED
REpORTING (1995), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/iche2a.pdf(last visited July 1,2004)
[hereinafter "FDA Reporting Guideline"]; see also 21 C.F.R. § 312.32 (c)(1) (2003) (requiring sponsors
of drug studies using investigational new drugs to notifY FDA of "[a]ny adverse experience associated
with the use of the drug that is both serious and unexpected" and "[a]ny finding from tests in laboratory
animals that suggests a significant risk for human subjects including . . . teratogenicity or
carcinogenicity" within 15 calendar days of the sponsor's initial receipt of the information).
92 See NIH, GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES (2002),
available at http://www4.od.nih.gov/obalrac/guidelines/guidelines.html(last modified July I, 2002).
The guidelines apply to all NIH-funded research involving recombinant DNA processes and to all non
NIH-funded research involving recombinant DNA conducted at institutions receiving NIH funding for
projects that involve these gene therapy techniques.
93 See FDA Reporting Guideline, supra note 91, at 4-5 (explaining that a serious adverse event is
"any untoward medical occurrence that at any dose results in death; is life threatening; ... requires
inpatient hospitalization or prolongation of existing hospitalization; results in persistent or significant
disability/incapacity or; is a congenital anomaly/birth defect"). The reporting standards also require
investigators to make a causality assessment to determine whether the serious, unexpected adverse
event is related to the study product before making an expedited report to the agency. The guideline
states that "[a]1I cases judged by either the reporting health care professional or the sponsor as having a
reasonable suspected causal relationship to the [study drug]" should be reported on an expedited basis.
Id. at 6-7.
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disease. 94 The guideline requires public reporting of all gene therapy adverse
events but requires immediate reporting only of adverse events that are both
serious and related to the experimental therapy.95
Theoretically, these more limited reporting requirements will permit both
NIH and the FDA to subject this category of serious, unexpected, study-related
events to more careful scrutiny.96 The new NIH guideline may work more
efficiently with existing FDA adverse event reporting requirements, but patient
advocates are concerned that the proposed changes leave researchers with even
more room for error in deciding whether particular adverse events require
immediate reporting. 97 All of these recent developments in turn necessitate
appropriate changes in IRB operations in order to achieve meaningful and efficient
implementation.
B.

Changes in the Climate ofBiomedical Research

A variety of recent developments in clinical research may contribute to the
likelihood of regulatory violations or errors in supervisory judgments by IRBs.
Although research administrators have acknowledged problems in the clinical
research environment, not all of the problematic aspects of academic medical
research receive the same degree of attention. 98 As the pace of medical research
increases, many IRBs are staggering under the weight of their oversight
responsibilities. One recent survey found that requests for initial protocol reviews
increased 42% between 1993 and 1998 and that some IRBs supervise up to 2,000

94 66 Fed. Reg. 57,970 (2001) (final notice of actions under guidelines to "[hJannonize NIH
requirements for expedited reporting of serious adverse events in gene transfer trials with those of
FDA").
95Id. (stating that "[eJxpedited reporting will now be required for those serious adverse events that
are unexpected and associated with the use of the gene transfer product (i.e., there is a reasonable
possibility that the experience may have been caused by the gene transfer product)").
96 See Rick Weiss, Gene Research Rule Proposed, WASH. POST, Dec. 13,2000, at A2.
97 See id. (reporting that patient advocates worry that researchers will make biased decisions about
whether the serious adverse events are related to the experimental therapy); see also Morse et aI., supra
note 80, at 1203 (describing the confusion IRBs and investigators experience when attempting to
detennine which adverse events must be reported, by whom, and to whom); Jeffrey Brainard, NIH
Proposes Shift in Rules on Reporting Deaths ofGene- Therapy Patients, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 5,
200 I, at 33, 35 (reporting that critics of the new rule recommend that the RAC analyze all available
adverse event infonnation where the "overwhelming concern is the health and safety of the
volunteers").
98 See Eric G. Campbell et aI., Status of Clinical Research in Academic Health Centers, 286 JAMA
800, 804-05 (200 I) (concluding that clinical research leadership perceived the following as the primary
contributors to declining quality in the clinical research enterprise: pressure on clinical faculty to see
patients, insufficient clinical revenues, difficulty in recruiting trained researchers, lack of external
research support, competition from contract research organizations, problems with the IRB process, and
problems with finding research participants).
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ongoing research plans. 99 The burgeoning load of protocols requIrIng initial
review and continuing supervision, combined with lack of adequate institutional
support for IRBs,IOO can create a situation where an overworked IRB may be forced
to do only the bare minimum required by the regulations. 101 Despite governmental
recommendations that institutions supply their IRBs with adequate staff, funding,
space, and equipment,102 many boards continue to muddle along with insufficient
support. 103
Frequently, IRB members also lack the necessary training and expertise in the
regulatory requirements, ethics, and relevant scientific principles to perform their
duties optimally.l04 One recent study of IRB practices concluded that a quarter of
the boards provide no training to their new members, while the remaining boards
require only minimal training - an average of four hours for each new member,
along with "a stack of material to read."I05 Moreover, as medical research
becomes more complex and specialized, even larger IRBs at major medical centers
may lack expertise in particular scientific specialties such as gene therapy.106

99 HHS Report, supra note 8, at 5-6 (adding that IRB budgets and staffing have failed to keep pace
with the expanding workload); see also Donald F. Phillips, Institutional Review Boards Under Stress:
Will They Explode or Change?, 276 JAMA 1623, 1624 (1996) (explaining that his IRB reviews
between 40 and 80 new protocols at its monthly meetings, which last up to six hours). The University
of Florida's 20-member Health Center IRB is no exception: it meets twice monthly for up to six hours
and supervises 2\1, times as much sponsored research as it did ten years ago. In 2000, this IRB
reviewed 331 new protocols and conducted 816 continuing reviews. In addition, it managed 211 new
expedited reviews of protocols not requiring full board consideration. See UNIV. OF FLA.,
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD (IRB-OI), ANNUAL REpORT (2000) (report on file with the Journal of
Health Care Law & Policy).
100 See Okie, supra note I, at A I 0 (reporting that most government agencies allocate only I or 2
percent of their research budget to research oversight and that the biggest sponsor of clinical research
(NIH) allocates less than 0.05 percent of its research budget to oversee trials involving human subjects).
101 HHS Report, supra note 8, at 6 (noting that, at the IRB sites visited, meetings lasted an average of
2\1, hours, and included an average of 18 new protocols, 9 expedited reviews, 43 amendments, and 21
adverse event reports).
102 HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 15 (discussing the importance of reinforcing "to institutions
and investigators that a well-supported IRB is a necessary cost of doing business").
103 It is also important to recognize that IRB activities comprise only a small proportion of most
board members' professional obligations. Many IRB members have full-time duties that include
teaching, clinical services, and their own research, and they must juggle IRB-related responsibilities
with all of these other tasks.
104 See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 736-37.
105 See HHS Report, supra note 8, at 8.
106 Recognizing that IRBs lack critical expertise to review certain types of highly complex medical
research, the NIH recently issued guidelines requiring that all research involving recombinant DNA that
receives NIH funding be approved by an Institutional Biosafety Committee with relevant expertise.
Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 64 Fed. Reg. 25361 (May 11, 1999);
see also Mark Barnes & Patrick Florencio, IREs Tend to Grow Short ofNeeded Skills, NAT'L L.J. Sept.
4, 2000, at B9 ("[I]nstitutions that are the locations of cutting-edge biotechnology research often do not
have staff members with the professional expertise to scrutinize these research proposals . . .. For
instance, an IRB composed primarily of surgeons, pathologists and psychiatrists these days may well be
asked to review complicated cutting-edge gene therapy protocols for cardiac or pulmonary illnesses.").
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Despite recommendations from government reports calling for significant
improvements in funding and training, none of the relevant federal agencies has
imposed educational requirements for investigators or IRB members. 107
IRBs face various pressures that can compromise their effectiveness. For
example, PIs may demand quick approvals or renewals of protocols in order to
maintain a steady flow of research funds because many public and private financial
sponsors of biomedical research condition the transfer of grant funds to research
institutions on IRB review and approval. To make matters worse, because
academic medical centers that receive large research grants enjoy enhanced
reputations in the scientific and academic communities, an IRB may feel pressure
to approve research in order to secure funding and the academic prestige that
accompanies it. 108
Most IRBs are comprised primarily of physicians and other health
professionals employed at the research institution. 109 IRBs have an obligation to
subject every protocol to the same level of scrutiny, whether the principal
investigator is a stranger or a close colleague, but complete evenhandedness is
probably unrealistic. Although board members must recuse themselves from
voting on protocols in which they are listed as investigators,IIO IRB members
frequently review their colleagues' protocols and, understandably, may find it
difficult to avoid bias in favor of approval. III As one pair of commentators has
observed, "there are very few provisions in the regulations that protect against
bodies that might be sloppy, venal, or subservient to the institution. "Put another
way, the quality of an IRB's work depends to an inordinate degree on the
conscience and commitment of its volunteer members." I12

107 See HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 14 (adding, however, that NIH intramural researchers
must complete training, and recommending that NIH extend the training requirement to its extramural
researchers); see also INST. OF MED., PRESERVING PUBLIC TRUST: ACCREDITATION AND HUMAN
RESEARCH PARTICIPANT PROTECTION PROGRAMS 2-4 (2001), available at http://www.nap.edulhtml
/public _ trust/reportbrief.pdf (last visited July I, 2004) (describing a model accreditation process for
human research participant protection programs).
108 See Janet Fleetwood, Conflicts ofinterest in Clinical Research: Advocating for Patient-Subjects,
8 WIDENER L. SVMP. J. 105, III (2001).
109 The regulations describing the composition of the IRB require "at least one member who is not
otherwise affiliated with the institution and who is not part of the immediate family of a person who is
affiliated with the institution." 45 C.F.R. § 46. I 07(d) (2003). This "community member" theoretically
will serve as a bulwark against decisions that place institutional interests above research subject
interests.
110 See id. § 46.1 07( e).
111 See Fleet~ood, supra note 108, at III; see also Katz, supra note 65 at 41 (arguing that,
"particularly in the murky area of informed consent, it is unlikely that members of IRBs will hold
investigators to a standard of disclosure and consent that would protect the subjects of research if doing
so would place impediments on the conduct of research and, in tum, affect the well being of their
colleagues").
112 See Edgar & Rothman, supra note 30, at 493.
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The federal regulations forbid institutional reversals of IRB decisions to
reject a protocol, I I3 but they do little to prevent lobbying of board members.
Junior faculty at academic institutions who serve on the IRB may fear reprisals in
the form of delayed promotion or tenure, or subtler forms of "shunning," if they
fail to support their senior colleagues' research. 114 Some IRB members have quit
their boards in response to internal pressure to approve and continue ethically
questionable studies that bring in significant research funding. lIS Although HHS
has recommended that IRBs include more non-institutional members and that
institutions protect their IRBs from inappropriate pressure by ensuring that boards
remain segregated in the institutional hierarchy from divisions responsible for
securing research funds, there has been scant progress in the past few years toward
meeting these goals. 116 The FDA recently floated a proposal designed in part to
prevent researchers whose protocols receive negative reviews from shopping
around for a friendlier forum, but these measures probably will do little to reduce
the pressure on the IRB conducting the initial review. 117
Financial conflicts of interest are disturbingly prevalent in biomedical
research. I IS Every year, more dollars flow into the clinical trials business. The
pharmaceutical industry spends approximately $9 billion annually on research,
while the NIH and other government programs provide $5 billion yearly in

113 Once an IRB has approved a research protocol, the parent institution has the authority to subject
the protocol to additional review, if desired, but the institution may not approve research that already
has been rejected by the IRB. 45 C.F .R. § 46.112 (2003).
114 See Edgar & Rothman, supra note 30, at 492 (observing that "powerful people within an
institution have a myriad oflargely untraceable ways for punishing an obstructionist IRB member: from
withholding or delaying promotion to blocking his or her access to other grants-a fact that no IRB
member can fail to recognize"); see also Bartolo, Tales of Informed Consent: Four Years on an
Institutional Review Board, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 193 (1992); Dale Keiger & Sue De Pasquale, Trials and
Tribulation, JOHNS HOPKINS MAG., Feb. 2002, at 15 (describing IRB and institutional politics at
Hopkins).
115 See David Heath & Duff Wilson, System's Serious Flaws Have Led Many to Call for Regulatory
Reform, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 15,2001, at All (quoting one of the ten members of the IRB at the
University of Illinois at Chicago who quit: "They thought we were overly scrupulous, nitpicking
obstructionists who were spoiling the research-enterprise system").
116 See HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 15.
117 See 67 Fed. Reg. 10115 (2002) (proposing an amendment to the FDA's regulations that would
require sponsors and investigators to report prior IRB reviews of a protocol to "ensure that sponsors and
clinical investigators who submit protocols to more than one IRB will not be able to ignore an
unfavorable IRB review decision and that IRBs reviewing a protocol will be aware of what other IRBs .
. . have concluded"); HHS Report, supra note 8, at 14 (explaining that the OIG had "heard of a few
situations where sponsors and/or research investigators who were unhappy with one IRB's reviews
switched to another without the new IRB being aware of the other's prior involvement," and
recommending mandatory disclosure of prior IRB reviews).
118 See Justin E. Bekelman et aI., Scope and Impact ofFinancial Conflicts ofInterest in Biomedical
Research, 289 JAMA 454, 463 (2003) (reviewing over 1600 published studies, and finding that one
fourth of clinical researchers had industry affiliations and about two-thirds of academic institutions held
equity in companies that sponsored research at the same institutions).
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research funding. I 19
Financial arrangements between medical technology
companies and academic researchers, community physicians, and private contract
research organizations (CROS)120 have captured the attention of regulatory
agencies and the academic and medical communities. 121 These increasingly
common collaborative research agreements between private corporations and
universities, which can include stock options, profitable research subject
enrollment bonuses, and generous consulting fees,122 have the potential to generate
immense profits for both types of entities. 123 At the same time, however, such

119 See Pound, supra note 45, at Al (reporting one lawyer's characterization of the research system
as "Nasdaq medicine"); cf Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance-Clinical Investigators and the
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1539, 1539 (2000) (estimating that pharmaceutical
and biotechnology companies provide 70% of funding for clinical trials); Washburn, supra note 27, at
WI6 (citing a source that suggests that private industry funds 80% of clinical trials).
120 CROs are for-profit research centers that conduct clinical trials for pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies. The emergence ofCROs has created a shift in private research funding away
from academic medical centers. Whereas academic medical centers received 80% of industry funding
for clinical trials in the early I 990s, they received only 40% of this funding by 1998 as CROs took over
much of the clinical trials business. See Bodenheimer, supra note 119, at 1540.
121 See Marcia Angell, Is Academic Medicine for Sale?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1516 (2000); Karen
A. Jordan, Financial Conflicts ofInterest in Human Subjects Research: Proposals for a More Effective
Regulatory Scheme, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 15, 35 (2003); Frances H. Miller, Trusting Doctors:
Tricky Business When It Comes to Clinical Research, 81 B.U. L. REv. 423, 425-27 (2001) (describing
the erosion of trust between physician and patient when the physician plays the dual role of clinician
and researcher); David S. Shimm & Roy G. Spece, Conflict of Interest and Informed Consent in
Industry-Sponsored Clinical Trials, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 477 (1991); Rick Weiss & Deborah Nelson,
Gene Therapy's Troubling Crossroads, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 1999, at A3; Harvard Keeps Strict Rules
on Outside Research Work, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2000, at A9 (describing decision by the Harvard
Medical School to retain strict conflict-of-interest rules that prevent their researchers from earning
significant additional income via outside work); see also Goldie Blumenstyk & David L. Wheeler,
Academic Medical Centers Race to Compete in the $3.2-Billion Drug-Testing Market, CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC., Mar. 20, 1998, at A39 (describing university efforts to attract drug industry funding to conduct
clinical trials at their institutions). Commentators correctly have pointed out that a ban on industry
funding remains impractical in the absence of equivalent funding from other sources. See, e.g., Mark
Friedberg et ai., Evaluation of Conflict of Interest in Economic Analyses of New Drugs Used in
Oncology, 282 JAMA 1453, 1456 (1999). Cutting industry funding without some sort of practical
substitute would undoubtedly have a negative impact on the progress of pharmaceutical research.
122 See Washburn, supra note 27, at WI6 (describing examples of academic-industry ties, such as the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology's five-year, $15 million agreement with Merck & Co. that grants
the corporation patent rights for all jointly discovered products).
123 In 1980, Congress enacted the Bayh-Dole Act which permits universities to patent inventions and
products arising out of federally-funded research. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 6(a), 94 Stat. 3019 (1980)
(codified as amended at 35 V.S.c. §§ 200-212 (2000)). See generally Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public
Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored
Research, 82 VA. L. REv. 1663 (1996) (discussing the affect offederallegislation granting patent rights
on federally-sponsored research efforts). From that point forward, industry-academic collaborations
have become increasingly common. See Washburn, supra note 27, at W16.
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arrangements complicate the process of IRB review and supervision because they
increase the potential for inappropriate research conduct. 124
IRBs can serve as a bulwark against the potentially negative consequences of
academic-industry partnerships. By overseeing research protocols designed to test
the safety and effectiveness of investigational drugs, medical devices, and
biotechnology products, IRBs enable sponsors to collect the data necessary for
FDA review of potentially profitable products. Despite the fact that most clinical
research receives extramural funding support, the IRB must resist a pattern of
presumptive cooperation with investigators who rely on board approval to facilitate
the receipt of research grants for the institution.125
Unfortunately, financial connections between researchers and sponsors may
cause deliberate or unintentional distortion of the risks and benefits of research in
ways that IRBs may find difficult to detect and correct. When investigators
receive substantial grant money from study sponsors in the form of consulting fees,
subject enrollment fees, corporate equity interests, or honoraria, these payments
can increase the risk of subjecting the research participants to avoidable harm. 126
The IRB ordinarily relies on the promise of generating sound scientific data as part
of the justification for placing human subjects at risk in research. Financial
connections between industry and clinical investigators can make a mockery of
these assumptions or at least can add complexity to the risk-benefit calculus. 127
Even if the conflict of interest does not cause direct harm to research subjects, the
very fact that individuals are enrolled in a clinical trial (with its additional

124 See HHS Report, supra note 8, at 7 (explaining how these arrangements threaten the
independence of IRBs).
125 See David M. Cocchetto, Practical Considerations in Direct Interactions Between Sponsors and
Institutional Review Boards, 49 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 77 (1994) (urging IRBs to reject inappropriate
financial relationships between investigators and sponsors in order to protect the primary interests of the
research subjects). Independent, for-profit IRBs present another wrinkle in the financial conflict of
interest debate. These IRBs review new protocols and supervise ongoing, approved research in
exchange for a hefty fee. For more about "commercial" IRBs, see Lemmens & Freedman, supra note
40, at 547-49.
126 See. e.g., Jesse A. Goldner, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research: IRE
Oversight as the Next Best Solution to the Abolitionist Approach, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 379, 379
(2000) (describing a research protocol in which the PI received an enrollment fee of $1 ,61 0 per subject,
which apparently created an incentive to enroll subjects in the protocol who should have been excluded
due to co-existing health problems); see also id. at 382-85 (describing a variety of common financial
conflicts of interest that may interfere with the researcher's and IRB's ability to promote the best
interests of subjects); Paul E. Kalb & Kristin Graham Koehler, Legal Issues in Scientific Research, 287
JAMA 85 (2002); Miller, supra note 121, at 433-35 (describing a similar conflict of interest in research
conducted by a Boston cardiologist with a substantial financial interest in a company that he co-founded
and whose products he was testing in clinical trials).
127 See HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 15 (recommending that equity owners be prohibited from
taking part in the IRB review process because "[s]uch a practice ... establishes a situation that can
undermine a perception of impartiality").
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attendant risks compared to standard treatment) may be ethically objectionable if
the study design lacks scientific merit.
IREs may find it difficult, however, to persuade investigators to strike an
appropriate balance between the medical needs of their subjects and the demands
of the corporate sponsor whose product they are testing. 128 Simple disclosure of
financial relationships in consent forms, for example, may not adequately address
more complex issues such as the effects of sponsor-driven protocol design on risks
to subjects. When an IRE approves a protocol that fails to disclose financial
conflicts of interest or permits a funding entity's financial stake in the outcome of
the research to distort the design or conduct of a clinical trial, the IRB fails in its
primary obligations to research subjects.
These concerns about biases and conflicts are not merely speCUlative. Recent
studies have documented a relationship between industry sponsorship and
favorable outcomes. Although it is difficult to prove bias in any particular study,
these analyses suggest that industry sponsorship of research influences
conclusions. 129 The authors of one such review recommend disclosure in
published work of all financial relationships so that medical professionals can more
effectively evaluate the significance of the research findings,130 but disclosure
alone may prove inadequate in tempering the bias towards favorable

128 Obviously, the welfare of the subject deserves priority. The question then becomes whether any
financial ties between researcher and company should preclude human subjects research on the
company's products, or whether it is possible to obtain sufficient "transparency" in the relationships
between researcher and company through disclosure requirements to protect subjects' interests. See
Robert P. Kelch, Maintaining the Public Trust in Clinical Research, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 285 (2002).
129 See, e.g., Richard A. Davidson, Source of Funding and Outcome of Clinical Trials, I J. GEN.
INTERNAL MED. ISS, 156-57 (1986) (concluding that research comparing new therapies to traditional
therapies was more likely to find the new therapy superior if funded by the new therapy's
manufacturer); Friedberg et aI., supra note 121, at 1453 (concluding that studies sponsored by
pharmaceutical companies resulted in unfavorable conclusions only 5% of the time, compared with
non-profit-sponsored studies which reached unfavorable cost-effectiveness conclusions 38% of the
time); Henry Thomas Stelfox et aI., Conflict of Interest in the Debate Over Calcium-Channel
Antagonists, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 101, 101 (1998) (concluding that, in studies examining the
controversial question of the safety of calcium-channel blockers (CCBs) in treating cardiovascular
disease, 96% of authors who supported the use of CCBs had financial ties with CCB manufacturers,
compared with 60% of those who reached "neutral" conclusions about CCB safety and 37% who
reached unfavorable safety conclusions); id. at 104 (adding that the authors of the studies disclosed their
potential conflicts of interest in only 2 out of the 70 articles analyzed). It is interesting to speculate
about how this apparent bias operates. Do industry sponsors select researchers for receipt of funding
based on the researchers' having previously expressed positions on an issue of controversy that are
consistent with the sponsor's point of view? Or does the mere fact of the industry sponsorship
somehow subtly influence the researcher's decisions about study design or interpretation of results?
See Friedberg et aI., supra note 121, at 1456 (speculating about mechanisms of influence including bias
towards publication of positive results, weeding out and abandoning unpromising studies early in the
research process, and sponsor influence on study design).
130 See Stelfox et aI., supra note 129, at 104-05.
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conclusions. 131 Industry also may seek to suppress publication of unfavorable
sponsored research results or to "sanitize" data in a way that exaggerates the
perceived success of the studied intervention. 132 The different manifestations of
sponsorship bias may confound IRB attempts to assess accurately the scientific
merit of proposed research and its risk-benefit ratio. Although IRBs generally
have information about sources of sponsorship at the time of initial protocol
review, it is difficult for boards to predict which industry-funded protocols may
pose problems. IRBs must rely to some degree on the researcher's assertion that
the research plan is designed to generate unbiased data while at the same time
protecting the interests of the subjects.
The federal regulations do little to insulate the integrity of the initial IRB
review from internal or external pressures. Although the FDA and HHS
regulations do contain provisions that address financial conflicts of interest, these
rules focus primarily on disclosure of conflicts to government agencies rather than
to IRBs and research subjects. The HHS regulations require investigators
receiving funding under the Public Health Service Act (such as NIH grants) to
disclose "significant financial conflicts of interest."I33 FDA regulations require
that sponsors disclose to the agency their investigators' financial interests in

131 Kay Dickersin, The Existence of Publication Bias and Risk Factors for Its Occurrence, 263
JAMA 1385, 1386-88 (1990) (explaining that researchers are more likely to submit positive research
results for publication); Monika K. Krzyzanowska et aI., Factors Associated with Failure to Publish
Large Randomized Trials Presented at an Oncology Meeting, 290 JAMA 495, 500 (2003) (concluding
that bias against publishing nonsignificant study results exists even for large randomized trials and that
"lack of publication of some studies, especially those with nonsignificant results, can lead to
overestimation of treatment effects"); Lars Noah, SanctifYing Scientific Peer Review: Publication as a
Proxy for Regulatory Decisionmaking, 59 U. PITT. L. REv. 677, 705-09 (1998); cf Carin M. Olson et
aI., Publication Bias in Editorial Decision Making, 287 JAMA 2825 (2002) (concluding that, although
authors with positive results are more likely to submit them for publication, journals were not
significantly more likely to publish positive findings compared with negative or neutral findings).
132 See Drummond Rennie, Editorial, Thyroid Storm, 277 JAMA 1238 (1997) (lambasting the
pharmaceutical industry for its attempts to control publication of research results); see also David
Blumenthal et aI., Withholding Research Results in Academic Life Sciences: Evidencefrom a National
Survey of Faculty, 277 JAMA 1224, 1226 (1997); James O. Kahn et aI., Evaluation of HIV-J
Immunogen, an Immunologic Modifier, Administered to Patients Infected with HIV Having 300 to 549 x
/06/L CD4 Cell Counts, 284 JAMA 2193 (2000) (reporting unfavorable results from an industry
sponsored trial of an AIDS drug over the sponsor's objections); David Moher et aI., The CONSORT
Statement: Revised Recommendations for Improving the Quality of Reports of Parallel-Group
Randomized Trials, 285 JAMA 1987 (200 I) (providing advice to medical study authors on how to
avoid pitfalls in trial reporting); David Brown, Scientists Report Bid to Block Publication of an AIDS
Study, WASH. POST, Nov. 1,2000, at AIO.
133 42 C.F.R. § 50.601-.605 (2003); see also Jeffrey Brainard, U.S. Offers Guidelines on
Researchers' Conflicts of Interest, eHRON. HIGHER EouC., Feb. 16, 2001, at A33 (describing new
proposed HHS guidelines designed to encourage universities to "police" financial arrangements
between investigators and private sponsors and "to reduce or eliminate their own conflicts of interest,
including stock ownership in companies that support research on the campus").
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products that are the subject of research protocols. 134 These rules do not require
IRBs to address conflicts of interest or require their disclosure to research subjects
in consent documents. Nevertheless, some IRBs debate these issues, consider
them as part of the risk-benefit discussion, and require the disclosure of conflicts to
research subjects. 135 Individual academic institutions also enforce varying policies
regarding the management or disclosure of conflicts of interest, some more
stringent than federal regulations, but the lack of consensus on this issue remains
problematic. 136
In addition to institutional and industry pressures on IRB performance,
changing expectations among research subjects and a rapidly developing
consumerist attitude towards medical services (including experimental therapies)

134
21 C.F.R. § 54.4 (2003); see also Nina M. Gussack & Karen McDonnell Suddath, Clinical Trial
Conflicts Apply to Investigators, Too, NAT'L LJ., May 14, 2001, at C3. Companies submitting

marketing applications for approval of drugs, devices, and biological products must identifY all clinical
investigators who conducted clinical trials of the product (including employees and non-employees of
the company) and must submit a certification that discloses any of the following financial
arrangements: compensation affected by the outcome of the study, significant equity interest in the
sponsor of the study, proprietary interest in the tested product, and significant payments of other types
from the sponsor. 21 C.F.R. § 54.4(a)(3)(i-v).
135 See Brainard, supra note 133, at A33 (noting that only one-quarter of IRBs regularly address
conflict-of-interest questions as part of research protocol review).
136 See Bernard Lo et aI., Conflict-ol-Interest Policies for Investigators in Clinical Trials, 343 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1616 (2000) (surveying such policies at ten universities); S. Van McCrary et aI., A
National Survey of Policies on Disclosure of Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 343 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1621, 1624-25 (2000) (finding that only 7% of medical schools and research institutions
required disclosure of financial interests in published research reports); Hamilton Moses III & Joseph B.
Martin, Academic Relationships with Industry: A New Modelfor Biomedical Research, 285 JAMA 933
(2001); Justin Gillis, Panel Targets Conflicts in Medical Research, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2002, at A9
(summarizing recommendations from the Association of American Medical Colleges). Several
professional organizations also have proposed or adopted standards dealing with conflicts of interest.
See, e.g., AM. SOC'y OF GENE THERAPY, POLICY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF GENE THERAPY ON
FINANCIAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL RESEARCH (2000), available at http://www.asgt.org
Iposition_statements/conflict_oCinterest.html (last visited July I, 2004); ASS'N OF AM. MED.
COLLEGES (AAMC), PROTECTING SUBJECTS, PRESERVING TRUST, PROMOTING PROGRESS-POLICY AND
GUIDELINES FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL FINANCIAL INTERESTS IN HUMAN SUBJECTS
RESEARCH (2001), available at http://www.aamc.org/members/coitf/ (last visited July 1,2004); Kelch,
supra note 128, at 285-86; Conflict Rules Urged for Doctor Research, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8,2001, at
A21. Medical journals also have attempted to reign in the negative effects of conflicts of interest,
usually by requiring disclosure of relevant financial and professional relationships. See, e.g., Frank
Davidoff et aI., Sponsorship, A uthorship, and Accountability, 286 JAMA 1232, 1233 (200 I ) (discussing
publication ethics, and emphasizing that journals will not publish "studies that are conducted under
conditions that allow the sponsor to have sole control of the data or to withhold publication"); Catherine
D. DeAngelis et aI., Reporting Financial Conflicts of Interest and Relationships Between Investigators
and Research Sponsors, 286 JAMA 89 (2001); Jeffrey M. Drazen & Gregory D. Curfman, Financial
Associations of Authors, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1901 (2002) (reversing the Journal's previous policy
of prohibiting authors with financial connections to a company from writing review articles or editorials
about that company's products, and defending this reversal by asserting that a complete prohibition on
financial connections unduly constrains the Journal's ability to provide the best information on novel
therapies).
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add to the complexities of IRE review. In 1997, Congress required that NIH
establish a publicly-accessible database of all clinical trials for drugs designed to
treat serious or life-threatening conditions,137 and private websites with names like
"Hopelink.com" and "Emergingmed.com" continue to proliferate. 138 Increased
advertising of research protocols in print media and on television and radio
improves clinical trial enrollment but may contribute to unrealistic expectations
about prospective benefit. 139 With easy access to information about clinical trials,
many patients now question their physicians about experimental therapies or
pursue such opportunities independently. 140
Patients enroll in clinical trials with high expectations and often in
desperate medical circumstances. As explained above, however, many patients
may not fully understand the distinction between standard medical treatment and
experimental procedures, and they may not adequately appreciate the risks of
forgoing the former in favor of the latter. 141 Litigation likely will increase in a
climate of unrealistic patient expectations regarding experimental therapies for

137 42 U.S.C. § 2820} (2000).
This database is now available through the Internet. See NIH,
GOVERNMENT FUNDED CLINICAL TRIALS, available at www.c1inicaltrials.gov (last visited July I,
2004); see also NAT'L CANCER INST., GOVERNMENT FUNDED CANCER TRIALS, available at
http://www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials (last visited July I, 2004). In addition, several privately-funded
clinical trials databases provide information about clinical trials that focuses as much on recruiting
participants as on conveying information. See, e.g., MUSELLA FDN., CLINICAL TRIALS AND
NOTEWORTHY TREATMENTS FOR BRAIN TUMORS, available at http://www.virtualtrials.org (last visited
July I, 2004); CENTERWATCH, CLINICAL TRIALS LISTING SERVICE, available at www.centerwatch.com
(last visited July 1,2004).
138 These websites, financed by venture capital companies, provide free information to patients but
charge pharmaceutical companies up to several thousand dollars per individual for locating research
candidates with rare diseases. See Judith Newman, Drug Trials Reach out for Patients (and Vice
Versa) on the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at D5 (describing the rise of websites designed to help
pharmaceutical and biotech companies locate patients afflicted with particular medical conditions for
clinical trials). Web site advertising remains free of any direct oversight, for now. Id.
139 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, HHS, RECRUITING HUMAN SUBJECTS: PRESSURES IN
INDUSTRy-SPONSORED CLINICAL RESEARCH, OEI-01-97-00195, 17 (2000), available at
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-00I95.pdf (last visited July I, 2004) (describing and criticizing
current trends in research subject recruitment, including enrollment incentives to physicians and patient
directed advertising that promotes the therapeutic misconception). The media's tendency to overstate
the significance of research results may further fuel patient optimism about the prospective therapeutic
benefit of experimental therapies. Id. at 21. More generally, the media and the lay public often struggle
to comprehend the published results of clinical research. See Ray Moynihan et aI., Coverage by the
News Media of the Benefits and Risks of Medications, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1645, 1647-49 (2000)
(finding that the lay media often provided incomplete information about research on new drug
products); Jane E. Brody, Separating Goldfrom Junk in Medical Studies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2002, at
F7.
140 See Newman, supra note 138, at D5 (noting that some physicians "may ... perceive [the web
sites] as threats to their authority").
141 See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
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serious disease,142 particularly when patients simultaneously fail to appreciate that
physicians may play dual roles as clinicians and researchers. 143
These
developments reinforce the importance of meaningful informed consent, which in
turn adds to the IRB's review and supervisory burdens.
Finally, IRBs and clinical researchers are no longer viewed as above
reproach. The recent surge in media coverage of injuries and deaths at prominent
research institutions and the concurrent decision by regulatory entities to re
examine existing research protections suggest that significant changes lay ahead. 144
Ethicists and health care providers have begun to express concern about individual
and institutional preoccupation with the financial and professional rewards of
scientific discovery, conflicts of interest, problems with disclosure of risks to
research subjects, and coercive recruiting tactics. Recent evaluations have
identified a disturbing pattern of researcher noncompliance with important human
subjects protections and a concomitant failure by IRBs to detect and correct
deficiencies. 145 In the past two years, the FDA and OHRP have temporarily shut
down research programs in at least seven institutions while they remediated a host
of compliance problems. 146 In response to these and other apparent deficiencies in
research oversight, the FDA and OHRP have begun to scrutinize more closely
research institutions with a spotty history of regulatory compliance, while the
media has brought these issues to the public's attention.

142 See Christopher K. Daugherty et aI., Quantitative Analysis of Ethical Issues in Phase I Trials: A
Survey Interview Study of 144 Advanced Cancer Patients, IRB, May-June, 2000 at 6, 10 (finding that
90% of advanced cancer patients believed that the Phase I trials in which they were enrolled would
provide some medical benefit to them); see also Newman, supra note 138, at D5 (quoting a professor of
medicine whose research suggests that cancer patients agree to participate in clinical trials '''primarily
for therapeutic benefit ... [a]nd the trials are not designed that way"').
143 See Miller, supra note 12 I, at 425-26.
144 See, e.g., HHS, PUB. No. OEI-01-91-00191, INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARDS: PROMISING
ApPROACHES (1998), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-01-97-0019I.pdf (last visited July
1,2004); HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 16-17 (discussing a proposed "reengineering" of the
federal research oversight process); cf Michaele C. Christian et aI., A Central Institutional Review
Boardfor Multi-Institutional Trials, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405-07 (2002) (describing a pilot
project utilizing a centralized IRB to expedite the local review of multi-center trials for the National
Cancer Institute).
145A recent study reviewed 1,000 spot checks carried out by the FDA. In the protocols examined,
2 J3 researchers failed to obtain informed consent from research subjects; 364 researchers deviated from
their approved research protocols; and 140 failed to report adverse reactions in their study subjects.
George J. Annas, Regs Ignored in Research, NAT'L LJ., Nov. 15, 1999, at A20; Jon Cohen, Clinical
Trial Monitoring: Hit or Miss?, 264 SCIENCE 1534, 1536 (1994); Sheila Kaplan & Shannon Brownlee,
Dying for a Cure, u.s. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. II, 1999, at 36. Other surveys also have found
major deficiencies in IRB review and oversight at major research institutions. See HHS Report, supra
note 8, at 4-9.
146 For example, the IRBs and research operations at Duke University, the University of
Pennsylvania, Johns Hopkins University, and other prestigious institutions have been shut down
recently due to noncompliance with regulatory requirements governing human research. See David
Heath, Medical-Research Reform Gains Support, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, at AI.
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III.

CONSTRUCTING A LIABILITY CLAIM AGAINST AN IRB

The failure of IRBs to exercise reasonable care in the review and supervision
of clinical research sometimes results in injury to human subjects. In addition to
satisfYing the minimal standards set forth in the research regulations described in
Part II, IRBs must exercise substantial judgment about complex ethical and
scientific issues and opportunities for negligence abound.

Some research injury

lawsuits are still framed as traditional malpractice claims against physicians using
147
Although lawsuits naming IRBs as defendants remain

experimental procedures.

relatively rare,148 the inclusion of boards as parties has begun to increase. After
examining the arguments supporting the recognition of an IRB duty of care to
research subjects, this Part will review the sparse existing case law dealing with
tort claims against these boards, consider the consequences of increased liability,
and preview some of the future complexities of such litigation.

147 See, e.g., Edward T. Pound, Federal RulesJor Research on People Often Fail, USA TODAY, Feb.
26, 2001, at AI (describing a case in which two patients in Florida sued an ophthalmic surgeon
claiming that his use of an experimental medical device to perform their corneal transplant surgery
without their knowledge or consent constituted negligence). Although this particular suit does not
appear to include a claim against the institution where the surgeries were performed (or its IRB),
lawsuits involving experimental treatments are on the rise. Other ethically questionable research
protocols have been subject to professional and public criticism but remain unlitigated. See, e.g., Marla
Cone, Critics Question Ethics oj Pollutant Testing on Humans, L.A. TiMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at A4. In
this study, funded by the aerospace corporation Lockheed Martin, on perchlorate (a rocket fuel
component) that apparently had leeched into drinking water wells in California, healthy volunteers were
paid $1,000 to take pills daily for six months that contained perchlorate at levels 83 times higher than in
the contaminated well water; the research participants were monitored for adverse effects. The study
apparently was designed to persuade those responsible for setting national drinking water contamination
standards that certain perchlorate levels in drinking water do not pose an unacceptable hazard. See id.
148 See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 746 (speculating that plaintiffs' lack of understanding about the
role of IRBs in research, or concerns about establishing causation, may reduce the likelihood of lawsuits
against IRBs). No court has yet found individual IRB members liable for injuries to research subjects,
though several suits have been filed naming individual members in the complaint. See, e.g., Kershaw v.
Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16 (N.D. 1989) (affirming dismissal of claims against IRB members, hospital,
and doctors in an informed consent case); Complaint, Guckin v. Nagle, 2002 WL 32151766 (Pa. Ct.
Com. PI. 2002)( No. 001425), available at 2002 WL 32151766 (alleging that IRB members were
negligent in approving the study as designed, in approving the informed consent document, and in
failing to monitor the consent process and the ongoing trial). Lawsuits naming individuallRB members
would necessitate an individualized inquiry into each member's compliance with the applicable
standard of care. See Linda M. Bordas, Note, Tort Liability ojInstitutional Review Boards, 87 W. VA.
L. REV. 137, 148-49 (1984) (discussing the "diversity of expertise of members within a single IRB,"
and speculating that "[a]n IRB member whose expertise is in the same field as the investigator whose
protocol is being reviewed ... could be held liable for information which he knew, or should have
known, in light of his special skill or knowledge"); see also John A. Robertson, The Law ojInstitutional
Review Boards, 26 UCLA L. REV. 484, 533-34 (1979) (discussing the liability of individual IRB
members).
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Finding a Duty ofCare and Defining Its Scope

Under general tort principles, a court first must conclude that the defendant
owes a duty of care to the plaintiff before inquiring into the question of the
defendant's negligence. The existence of a duty of care usually depends on some
kind of direct relationship between plaintiff and defendant. Thus, absent some
relationship with a patient, courts will not impose a duty of care on hospital
employees. 149
Lawsuits against individual researchers offer the easiest avenue for
recognizing a tort-based duty of care. In some cases, a researcher who provides
medical interventions to an individual in the context of a research protocol also has
a doctor-patient relationship with that individual, and thus owes the patient-subject
a duty of care in providing both standard therapies and experimental treatments. ISO
Even without a therapeutic relationship, a court could conclude that a clinical
investigator owes a duty of care to a research subject based on a fiduciary
relationship between the two parties. IS I Because the subject looks to the
investigator as an expert and places his trust in the investigator's expertise, the
duty of care in this case would appear to include not only an obligation to act

149 For example, in Clarke v. Hoek, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845 (Ct. App. 1985), the plaintiff claimed that the
defendant physician was negligent when he failed to intercede to prevent malpractice while proctoring a
surgical procedure, which was done as part of the hospital's procedure to evaluate a surgeon for staff
privileges. The court affirmed summary judgment for the defendant, explaining that his role was
merely that of an observer, that he had no doctor-patient relationship with the plaintiff, and that his
presence during the surgery served a separate purpose. /d. at 850.
150 In cases dealing with informed consent in research, the plaintiff has received an experimental
therapy, perhaps in combination with standard therapies, as a patient rather than as a participant
enrolled in a formal research protocol. See, e.g., Estrada v. Jaques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 254 (N.c. Ct. App.
1984) (reversing summary judgment granted to surgeons who allegedly had failed to obtain informed
consent from the plaintiff prior to performing experimental surgery to repair an aneurysm, and
observing that health care providers who offer experimental treatments to their patients must exercise
reasonable care under the circumstances, including informing the patient of the experimental nature of
the proposed intervention); see also Noah, supra note 56, at 375-76 (discussing Estrada and similar
cases).
151 See Roger L. Jansson, Comment, Researcher Liability for Negligence in Human Subject
Research: Informed Consent and Researcher Malpractice Actions, 78 WASH. L. REV. 229, 241-43
(2003) (describing the special relationship between researchers and subjects, and arguing that it should
serve as the foundation for a researcher duty of care); cf Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir.
1992) (imposing an affirmative duty of care on a surrogacy broker based on the special relationship
between broker and surrogate); Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 484-85 (Cal.
1990) (explaining that "a physician who treats a patient in whom he also has a research interest has
potentially conflicting loyalties," and concluding that the researcher in the case owed a fiduciary duty of
care to the patient that included disclosure of his personal interests in the research that might affect his
medical jUdgment). Some courts have recognized that a researcher who provides a medical intervention
to a patient-subject as part of a protocol is not functioning as the patient's physician but, despite this
conclusion, have held the researcher responsible for injuries to the patient-subject arising from the
research intervention. See, e.g., Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (N.Y. App.
Div.1982).
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reasonably under the circumstances but also a duty to take whatever steps are
necessary to protect the subject's best interests.
Even in the absence of either a doctor-patient or an investigator-subject
relationship, a court might decide that a researcher working in a hospital-directed
research protocol has a duty to conform to the legal standard of reasonable
conduct. For example, one court held that a researcher heading a hospital's
retrospective study of radiation therapy safety had a duty to warn the plaintiff, a
former hospital radiation therapy patient, of an increased risk of cancer, despite the
absence of any direct relationship between the plaintiff and defendant. 152 As a
practical matter, however, some researchers-Ph.D. candidates and post-doctoral
fellows in particular-may not carry liability insurance and may lack extensive
personal assets, so injured research subjects may wish to look higher up the chain
of research oversight for a more promising defendant.
Holding IRBs, and the institutions that house them, responsible in tort for
injuries to research subjects would stretch the boundaries of conventional tort
doctrine still further. As with other traditional negligence actions, courts first
would have to determine, as a matter of law, whether IRBs and the institutions in
which they operate owe a duty of care to research participants that might support a
finding of liability. In cases where courts conclude that such a duty exists, they
must then define its scope and consider whether the IRB breached this duty of care.
How might a court justifY a conclusion that an IRB-a relatively distant entity
with no direct relationship to research subjects-owes a duty of care to these
individuals? Courts typically consider a variety of factors in deciding whether a
duty of care exists in a particular context. 153 Although no contractual relationship
exists between an IRB and subjects of research conducted by an unrelated
investigator, the subjects are intended third-party beneficiaries of the agreements
between the institution, the board, and the researcher. 154 In the research setting, a

Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Found., 74 F. Supp. 2d 803, 805-07 (N.D. III. 1999).
See, e.g., Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968) (suggesting considerations such as
"the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, ... the closeness of the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered, ... [and) the policy of preventing future harm"); Jaworski v. Kiernan,
696 A.2d 332, 336-37 (Conn. 1997) (considering factors beyond forseeablity, including expectations of
participants, in detennining the duty of care owed to co-participants in recreational sports competition);
Largosa v. Ford Motor Co., 708 N.E. 2d 1219, 1221 (III. App. Ct. 1999) (considering several factors
affecting the duty of care a business operator in close proximity to the highway owes to motorist);
Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 625 A. 2d 1110, 1116 (N.J. 1993) (using a fairness test to detennine
the duty of care owed by realtors to attendees of open house).
154 Cf Hand v. Tavera, 864 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (describing a triangular relationship
between patient, health plan, and plan physician, and concluding that the plan physician owed the
patient a duty of care despite the lack of direct contact between him and the patient); Lori A. Alvino,
Note, Who's Watching the Watchdogs? Responding to the Erosion of Research Ethics by Enforcing
Promises, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 893, 921-23 (2003) (advocating contract-based lawsuits on the theory
that research subjects are intended beneficiaries of an IRB's Federal Wide Assurance agreement to
adhere to federal regulations ).
152

153
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court might reason that the IRB voluntarily has undertaken the task of protecting
research subjects (even if they do not know this) and in fact exists solely for that
purpose; that it has undertaken to protect an identifiable and limited class of
individuals (future enrollees in the study); and that the protected group reasonably
relies on that IRB to provide responsible research oversight. 155
In addition, public policy arguments support the imposition of a duty of care
on IRBs. Although institutions typically furnish necessary medical care to treat
research subject injuries free of charge, the current regulatory system permits
institutions to refuse to provide financial compensation for injuries incurred during
research procedures. That fact, combined with the reality that some researchers are
likely to be judgment-proof, while their institutions have significant resources and
derive financial rewards from the research, supports an argument that IRBs and/or
the institutions that house them should provide appropriate compensation. 156
Courts also might consider the fact that most IRBs are "local" boards, familiar with
the particular conditions of the institution in which the research is conducted, and
that IRBs therefore have the best opportunity to supervise and control research
conduct. Finally, the deterrent function of tort liability may provide the strongest
justification for holding IRBs to a duty of care. 157 Research injury litigation
threatens IRBs and the institutions that house them with significant damage
judgments, the loss of public trust, and the loss of research funding dollars. The

155 Of course, this quasi-contract argument is somewhat problematic given that many research
subjects do not understand the distinction between standard therapy and experimental treatment, may
not recognize that they have enrolled in a research protocol, and may never have heard of the IRB. But
at least some participants understand that research is subject to oversight and trust the process to protect
them. With respect to commercial IRBs, patients do not receive standard or experimental therapies
from the institution in which the IRB is housed. Therefore, the duty, if it exists, must rest solely on the
notion that the commercial IRB has specifically undertaken to protect an identifiable class of
prospective research subjects and that the class of protected subjects in some way relies on this
protection.
156 See Wendy K. Mariner, Compensation for Research Injuries, in 2 WOMEN AND HEALTH
RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES 113 (Anna
C..Mastroianni et aI., eds. 1994) (arguing in favor of providing compensation to all injured research
participants through a workers' compensation type of system in addition to permitting individual
negligence actions); Bernard R. Adams & Marilyn Shea-Stonum, Toward A Theory of Control of
Medical Experimentation with Human Subjects: The Role of Compensation, 25 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
604,637-47 (1975) (arguing for the establishment ofa system of research injury compensation modeled
after workers' compensation laws).
157 Some commentators express skepticism that tort liability provides any great level of deterrence to
malpractice. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377, 397-402 (1994); but cf Mary R. Anderlik & Nanette Elster,
Lawsuits Against IREs: Accountability or Incongruity?, 29 J. L. Med. & Ethics 220, 225 (2001)
(observing that lawsuits against IRBs "[are] a perfectly ordinary means for ensuring that people and
institutions meet their responsibilities" and that "given the slow pace of the response to
recommendations from . . . critics of the IRB system, lawsuits may be one of the few ways of
expediting the needed changes, as fear can often be a motivating force"); Michelle M. Mello & Troyen
A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L.
REv. 1595,1603-18 (2002).
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possibility of liability for research injuries may encourage IRBs and institutions to
invest more resources-in the form of money and human support-in order to avoid
such losses.
In other contexts, courts have concluded that a duty of care exists even when
a defendant is one or more steps removed from the plaintiff. For example, courts
routinely have recognized that hospitals may owe a duty of care to patients to
supervise physicians conducting activities within their facilities. Patients can, for
example, sue hospitals when their credentialing committees do a poor job of
selecting and then monitoring the quality of care delivered by physicians with staff
privileges,158 which resembles decisions by IRBs to review and approve the
proposed research protocols of researchers at an institution. 159 Similarly, the
hospital's duty of care with respect to staff privileges includes an obligation to
investigate reports of substandard care or misconduct,160 which resembles an IRB's

158 See, e,g"
Darling v, Charleston Cmty, Mem'l. Hosp" 211 N,E,2d 253, 257 (Ill. 1965)
(recognizing that hospital licensing regulations and private accreditation standards may be used to
define the hospital's duty of care to its patients); Albain v, Flower Hosp" 553 N,E,2d 1038, 1046-47
(Ohio 1990) (holding that hospitals have a qualified duty of care in granting staff privileges and
retaining only competent physicians, but explaining that hospitals need not "constantly supervise and
second-guess the activities of its physicians, beyond the duty to remove a known incompetent");
Strubhart v, Perry Mem'l. Hosp. Trust Auth., 903 P.2d 263, 276 (Okla. 1995) (holding that "the
doctrine should generally be limited to imposing a duty of ordinary care on hospitals to ensure that: (I)
only competent physicians are granted staff privileges, and (2) once staff privileges have been granted
to a competent physician the hospital takes reasonable steps to ensure patient safety when it knows or
should know the staff physician has engaged in a pattern of incompetent behavior"); Johnson v.
Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 175 (Wis. 1981) (holding that "the hospital's failure to
exercise that degree of care, skill and judgment that is exercised by the average hospital in approving an
applicant's request for privileges is negligence" but that "[t]his is not to say that hospitals are insurers
of the competence of their medical staff, for a hospital will not be negligent if it exercises the noted
standard of care in selecting its statT'); see generally H. Ward Classen, Hospital Liability for
Independent Contractors: Where Do We Go From Here?, 40 ARK. L. REv. 469 (1987) (investigating
the doctrine of vicarious liability and the independent contractor exception); Martin C. McWilliams, Jr.
& Hamilton E. Russell, Ill, Hospital Liability for Torts of Independent Contractor Physicians, 47 S.c.
L. REv. 431 (1996) (reviewing the national movement toward increased hospital liability for
independent contractor malpractice); David H. Rutchik, Note, The Emerging Trend of Corporate
Liability: Courts' Uneven Treatment of Hospital Standards Leaves Hospitals Uncertain and Exposed,
47 VAND. L. REv. 535 (1994); but cf Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Technology and
Informed Consent: Computers and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 31 IND. L. REv. 10 19, 1040 (1998)
(observing that "[i]t may only be a matter of time . . . until the accumulation of legislative,
accreditation, hospital by-law and other requirements motivate all hospitals to take on much the same
direct responsibility to patients regarding informed consent ... [as they have] assumed concerning
clinical practice").
159 Courts have recognized that modem hospitals include "an amalgam of many individuals not all of
whom are licensed medical practitioners ... [, and that] at times a hospital functions far beyond the
narrow sphere of medical practice." Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 415 N.E.2d 390, 395 (Ill.
1980).
160 Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335, 343 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (finding it reasonably probable
that the negligent surgical procedure would not have been undertaken had the hospital taken action
against the doctor who the hospital knew or should have known was incompetent); Insinga v. LaBella,
543 So. 2d 209, 214 (Fla. 1989) (imposing duty on hospitals to select and retain competent staff
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obligation to engage in periodic monitoring of ongoing research. Interestingly,
securing informed consent, which is at the core of efforts to hold IRBs
accountable, is not typically included in this expanded duty ofhospitals.1 61
Cases outside of the health care context also support the imposition of a duty
of care based on various types of special relationships. Recent corporate scandals
have generated a surge of interest in appropriate accounting standards, including
the obligations of accountants to third parties who rely on audits when making
investment decisions. Some commentators have argued in favor of recognizing the
existence of a duty of care from accountants to third-party shareholders,162 which
provides support for a parallel IRB duty of care to third-party research subjects.
Courts have adopted a variety of approaches to the question of liability of an
accountant to a third-party investor or shareholder. 163 Although traditionally courts

physicians, and commenting that "[t]his view is justified because the hospital is in a superior position to
supervise and monitor physician performance and is, consequently, the only entity that can realistically
provide quality control"); Corleto v. Shore Mem'!. Hosp., 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div ..
1975) (hospital can be held negligent for improperly investigating an applying physician's competence
or for failing to take action against physicians on staff after potential problems with medical practice
became apparent); Campbell v. Pitt County. Mem'!. Hosp., 352 S.E.2d 902, 907-09 (N.C. Ct. App.
1987) (holding hospital liable for failure to establish effective mechanism for prompt reporting of
situation creating threat to patients' health); Strubhart, 903 P.2d 263. When hospitals make staff
privilege decisions about physicians, some courts have recognized that hospitals owe a duty of care to
future patients because the granting of privileges represents a certification that the physician will
provide safe, non-negligent care to prospective patients. See, e.g., Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581, 586
(Pa. 1997).
161 See, e.g.. Ward v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of Am., 963 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1998) (holding
hospital not liable for physicians' failure to obtain informed consent because physicians were
independent contractors selected by patient); Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 477-79 (Conn. 1990)
(holding that a hospital had no duty to obtain patient's informed consent for surgery to be performed by
a non-employee physician); Smith v. Gaynor, 591 A.2d 834, 835 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that
a hospital does not have a duty to obtain patient's informed consent for surgery unless attending
physician is an employee or agent of the hospital).
162 See. e.g., Roger J. Buffington, A Proposed Standard of Common Law Liability for the Public
Accounting Profession, 5 S. CAL. iNTERDlSC. L.J. 485 (1997); Jay M. Feinman, Liability ofAccountants
for Negligent Auditing: Doctrine, Policy, and Ideology, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 17 (2003) (surveying
different state approaches to auditor liability and noting that the question of liability to third parties
remains unresolved in many jurisdictions); Melissa Harrison, The Assault on the Liability of Outside
Professionals: Are Lawyers and Accountants Off the Hook?, 65 U. CIN. L. REv. 473 (1997) (concluding
that outside professionals largely do not face liability for actions of corporate clients); Frank Partnoy,
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79 WASH. U. L.Q.
491 (2001) (proposing a modified strict liability regime whereby banking, accounting, and law firms as
gatekeepers would be strictly liable for any securities fraud damages paid by their clients pursuant to
settlement or judgment).
163 See Christine M. Guerci, Annotation, Liability of Independent Accountant to Investors or
Shareholders, 48 A.L.R.5th 389 (1997 & Supp. 2003). In these cases, courts have looked to the
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), along with other industry standards, in defining the standard of care. See Jodi B. Scherl,
Evolution of Auditor Liability to Noncontractual Third Parties: Balancing the Equities and Weighing
the Consequences, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 255, 259-61 (1994). Traditionally, the accountant who complies
in good faith with the GAAS and GAAP standards satisfies the general duty of care. See id. at 262; see
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required privity of contract, or a client relationship between the accountant and the
investor,l64 some courts have considered claims that investors or shareholders who
rely on an accountant's audits or reports may recover damages, despite the lack of
a client relationship or privity with the accountant, where there is fraud or gross
negligence. 165 Under this theory of accountant liability, a shareholder could sue
not only the corporation that misled him, but also the accountant that provided
reports that facilitated or supported the misleading claims. Courts reasonably
might accept similar rationales to address concerns about the lack of a direct
relationship between IRBs and research subjects.
It is important, however, to consider the consequences of expanded IRB
liability on medical innovation and health care. As growing numbers of human
subjects participate in clinical research, and as clinical trials become a more
common vehicle for delivering medical care, research-related injuries will increase,
as will the stakes in research oversight. Some argue that the threat of tort liability
could paralyze IRBs and could have a significant chilling effect on clinical
research. 166 IRBs also may respond to the increased risk of liability by demanding
that researchers comply with unnecessarily restrictive measures, just as physicians
sometimes practice "defensive medicine" to prevent lawsuits. 167 The imposition of
liability on IRBs in order to compensate individual research participants for

also SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir. 1979); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l
Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847, 851 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Simon, 425 F.2d 796, (2d Cir. 1969).
164 See, e.g., Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745, 767 (Cal. 1992) (rejecting claims against an
accounting firm brought by third parties who foreseeably relied on the audit, and concluding that the
traditional requirement of privity was appropriate, but acknowledging that third parties who are
"specific intended beneficiaries" of an audit who are known to the auditor may recover on a theory of
negligent misrepresenation).
165 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977) (recognizing liability to third parties for
negligence if information is provided "for the guidance of a third party," or for the use of a class of
individuals of which the third party is a member and was justifiably relied upon in a type of transaction
in which the accountant's representations were intended to have an effect); see also Security Pac. Bus.
Credit v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 597 N.E.2d 1080, 1083-86 (N.Y. 1992) (discussing how much
contact between a third party and an auditor is sufficient to sustain a claim of liability, and concluding
that a single or isolated contact with a third party represents an insufficient basis on which to bring such
a claim); Guerci, supra note 163, at 404 n.7.
166 See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture ofGovernment Regulation ofMedical Products, 82 VA.
L. REV. 1753, 1847 (1996) ("[G]iving IRBs greater responsibility might well make their members more
cautious. This will surely be true until the question of their potential liability for injuries suffered by
trial subjects is resolved."); see also Richard A. Epstein, Legal Liability for Medical Innovation, 8
CARDOZO L. REv. 1139, 1156 (1987) (suggesting that tort actions "for injuries sustained because of
departures from the experimental design" may be appropriate but that "it is mischievous, or worse, to
look behind the experimental design after the fact when the outcomes are bad, as they often will be"
because "the gains from experimental work can easily be dissipated by lawsuits that depend upon
second-guessing the myriad difficult choices necessary for any experimental design").
167 See Robertson, supra note 148, at 535.
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injuries may not justify the societal consequences of a research slowdown,168 but
this question deserves fuller consideration.
The scant research injury case law includes suits against clinical researchers,
hospitals, and IRBs, but it provides only superficial discussion about the existence
of an IRB or institutional duty of care to research subjects. Although a few courts
already have reached the conclusion that an IRB duty of care exists, the opinions
tend to start with a discussion of IRB negligence in failing to protect a research
subject from injuries and then work backwards to announce, or more often simply
assume, the existence of a duty of care.
Courts ordinarily impose on physicians the general duty to obtain informed
consent from his or her patients. A number of courts have declined to assign a
separate duty of care to hospitals when a physician fails to obtain patient consent,
particularly when the physicians are not employees,169 and this includes failures to
secure consent to experimental interventions. 17o A few courts, however, have held

168 In recognition of these concerns, the Maryland legislature enacted a statute requiring researchers
to conduct their research in compliance with federal regulations. The law also requires IRBs to make
their meeting records available for public scrutiny. MD CODE ANN., HEALTH GEN. § 13-2001 - 04
(Supp. 2003); H.B. 917, 2002 Leg., 416th Sess. (Md. 2002); see also David Nitkin, Senate OKs Bill to
Tighten Rules on Human Research; Governor Expected to Sign Legislation, BALT. SUN, Apr. 6, 2002,
at BI (reporting on the Maryland General Assembly's move to tighten regulations for experiments
involving human subjects), available at 2002 WL 6955100; Matthew Mosk, Research Shield
Discussed in Maryland, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2001, at B7 (explaining that the legislature considered
the compliance defense in response to the Grimes decision, which some legal experts argue "threaten[sJ
to undermine legitimate medical research"). Congress has granted tort immunity to persons serving on
IRB-like panels, such as Professional Stardards Review Organizations (PSROs). 42 U.S.C. § 1320c
6(b) (2000); see also Kwoun v. Southeast Mo. Profl Stds. Org., 811 F.2d 401, 412 (8th Cir. 1987);
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.c. §§ 11111-11152 (2000). Just as public hospitals and
their employees are subject to suit, IRBs in public institutions would not receive any special protection
from tort suits, unless they are deemed to be engaging in a discretionary policymaking function. See,
e.g., Kan. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 81-139 (1981); Va. Code Ann. §8.01-44.1 (2000) (providing immunity
from suit for individual IRB members). And of course, many IRBs exist in private institutions or as
freestanding bodies.
169 See, e.g., Ward v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes Soc'y of Am., Inc., 963 P.2d 1031, 1034 (Alaska
1998) (hospital had no duty to obtain informed consent for blood transfusion ordered by patient's
physician); Krane v. St. Anthony Hosp. Sys., 738 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (explaining that
even where an employee surgical nurse was negligent, "[iJt is the surgeon, and not the hospital, who has
the technical knowledge and training necessary to advise each patient of the risks of the surgery" and
that "the hospital does not know the patient's medical history, nor the details of the particular surgery to
be performed"); Petriello v. Kalman, 576 A.2d 474, 477-78 (Conn. 1990) (exonerating the hospital even
though an employee nurse had violated the institution's policy of ensuring signature of a consent form
prior to surgery); Lincoln v. Gupta, 370 N.W.2d 312, 318 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (private physician, not
hospital, had duty to warn patient of the risks of cardiac catheterization); Cox v. Haworth, 283 S.E.2d
392,394-96 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that hospital had no duty to obtain informed consent from
patient for a myelogram when the procedure was performed by a non-employee physician).
170 See, e.g., Femrite v. Abbott Northwestern Hosp., 568 N. W.2d 535, 543 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(holding that it is the physician's responsibility, not the hospital's, to obtain informed consent in the
context of experimental treatments or clinical trials); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296, 301 (N.Y.
1967) (concluding that "the hospital ... should not share in the responsibility to advise patients of the
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that institutions participating in clinical trials may share legal responsibility for
informed consent lapses. When an institution undertakes to specify consent
requirements for research performed under an IRB's supervision, courts have
concluded that the institution can be held responsible for ensuring that the consent
is meaningful and complete. 171
Where regulations are designed to provide special protection for a class of
persons who are not otherwise able to protect themselves, courts sometimes will
imply a duty of care based on these regulations. In In one case, the plaintiff was
injured by an intraocular lens implanted in his eye as part of an investigational
protocol to determine the product's safety.173 The surgeon never informed the
patient that the device was experimental or that the surgery comprised part of a
research protocol to test the safety and effectiveness of the device. Although the
appellate court recognized that, under the state's common law, the physician rather
than the hospital ordinarily has the duty to obtain consent for a medical procedure,
the court noted that:
the facts of this case are quite different for we are not here addressing
the duty owed by a physician to a patient but rather a duty owed by the
hospital to the patient. In this instance, the hospital, as a participant in a
clinical investigation . . . specifically assumed a duty to ensure that
informed consent was obtained by any patient participating in the
study. 174
Interestingly, the court used the federal regulations governing IRBs to imply a duty
running to patients that did not otherwise exist at common law,175 even though the

novelty and risks attendant on the procedure"-in this case a highly experimental surgical procedure};
Stewart v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 736 N.E.2d 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that investigator
and institution may have failed to satisi)' their common law duty to secure informed consent
notwithstanding the IRB's apparent approval of the consent form}.
171 See, e.g., Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1220-21 (III. App. Ct. 1995) (finding that by
becoming a participating institution in the study, the hospital is charged with assuring the adequacy and
effectiveness of the informed consent obtained); Friter v. Iolab Corp., 607 A.2d 1111, 1113 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (holding that "the hospital, as a participant in a clinical investigation for the FDA, specifically
assumed a duty to ensure that an informed consent was obtained"); Weiss v. Solomon, 1989 R.J.Q. 731
(Can.) (holding IRB liable for failing to ensure adequate consent and for failing to limit the selection of
subjects appropriately); cf Bryant v. HCA Health Servs. of No. Tenn., 15 S.W.3d 804, 810-11 (Tenn.
2000) (explaining that "a hospital ... may assume an independent legal duty to obtain the informed
consent of a patient undergoing a procedure that is part of an investigational study monitored by the
FDA").
172 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874A (\977).
173 See Friter, 607 A.2d, at 1111.
174Id. at 1113.
175 ld. at 1114 (noting that, "under applicable federal regulations, . . . [the hospital] had an
affirmative duty to 'assure that the rights of human subjects are properly protected, that legally effective
informed consent is obtained, and that the methods of obtaining consent properly informs the human
subject of the significant aspects of the study"'). A few courts use federal requirements to trigger a duty
under state law that otherwise does not exist, but this is a fairly unusual approach. See Lars Noah,
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regulations do not themselves provide an express or implied right of action. 176 In a
similar case, another court held that a hospital and its IRB could be liable for
failure to obtain proper informed consent prior to the implantation of an
experimental intraocular lens, because the hospital was a participant in research
subject to federal regulations requiring such consent. 177
Finally, although they do not create a private right of action under federal
law, the human subjects protection regulations appear to contemplate the existence
of a common law duty of care from IRBs to research sUbjects. The informed
consent rules provide in part that no exculpatory language may be used in an
attempt to "waive any of the subject's legal rights" or to "release the investigator,
the sponsor, the institution, or its agents from liability for negligence.,,178 The
regulation thereby presumes that someone other than the investigator-namely, the
institution or its IRB-could be liable in negligence for injury to a research subject.
Indeed, even without such a regulatory prohibition, courts probably would refuse
to enforce such exculpatory language. 179
Another recent decision provides more explicit support for the trend of
judicial recognition of an IRB duty of care. In Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger

Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L.
REV. 141, 167-68 (1997) (discussing the consequences of such an approach in the context ofa different
FDA requirement).
176 See Kershaw v. Reichert, 445 N.W.2d 16, 17 (N.D. 1989) (concluding that the "FDA's
regulations adopted pursuant to the FDCA did not authorize a private action against hospitals,
institutional review committees, or doctors" for injuries arising out of unsuccessful experimental
procedures); see also Bailey v. Johnson, 48 F.3d 965, 967-68 (6th Cir. 1995); Brinkman v. Shiley, Inc.,
732 F. Supp. 33, 35 (M.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d Cir. 1989); James M. Beck & John A.
Valentine, Challenging the Validity of FDCA-Based Causes of Action in the Tort Context: The
Orthopedic Bone Screw Experience, 55 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 389 (2000).
177 See Kus v. Shennan Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214, 1220-21 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (explaining that, "[b)y
becoming a participating institution in this particular study, Shennan hospital was charged with
assuring that 'legally effective infonned consent' was obtained prior to the experimental surgery," and
concluding that the federal regulations governing infonned consent and continuing review in research
involving experimental devices imposed a duty on the hospital "to ensure that the fonn its IRB had
promulgated was being used" and that, therefore, "a hospital, as well as a physician, may be liable for
claims arising from the lack of infonned consent"). But see Kershaw, 445 N. W.2d at 17 (affinning
dismissal of claims against IRB members, hospital, and doctors in a case alleging negligent failure to
obtain infonned consent prior to implanting intraocular lenses).
178
21 C.F.R. § 50.20 (2003); 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2003); see also Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d
779,787 (Wash. 1996) (refusing to enforce an exculpatory clause in a case of non-therapeutic research).
179 See, e.g., Tunkl v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 446-47 (Cal. I 963)(holding a hospital
patient contract which required the patient to release the hospital from liability for future negligence
invalid); Hartsell v. Ft. Sanders Reg'l Med. Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding
that a signed consent fonn defeated a battery claim, but allowing plaintiff's medical malpractice claim
to proceed); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282 S.E.2d 903, 905 (Ga. 1981) (holding that a licensed
dentist's attempt to relieve himself ofthe duty of reasonable care by contract is invalid as against public
policy); Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
the hospital's exculpatory agreement invalid as against public policy), see also infra notes 245-248 and
accompanying text (discussing assumption of risk).
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Institute, Inc.,180 Maryland's highest court concluded that an institution, its IRB,

and the Plowed a duty of care to research participants based on the nature of the
relationship and the seriousness of the potential hann in the absence of due care. 181
Plaintiffs sued the Johns Hopkins IRB, alleging negligent review and approval of a
non-therapeutic research protocol designed to detennine whether incomplete lead
paint abatement in housing occupied by children successfully reduced systemic
lead levels in the children's blood. 182 At least two children who participated in the
study allegedly suffered injuries from lead exposure.1 83
The court, relying on the standards in the federal research rules and the
ethical duties of clinical investigators as detailed in the Nuremberg Code, noted
that "the special relationship between research entities and human subjects used in
the research will almost always impose duties,,,184 including, in this case, duties to
notify and warn the participants promptly about the presence of lead in order to
prevent exposure and to infonn the participants fully about the risks of
participation. 18s Commentators have correctly criticized the court for its overbroad
approach to the legal questions presented and for its extreme rhetoric in comparing
the lead paint research protocol with historical research atrocities such as the Nazi
experiments and the Tuskegee Syphilis Study; 186 however for the reasons
discussed earlier, the court's recognition of an IRB duty of care in tort has some
merit.
Assuming that IRBs have a tort-based duty to protect research subjects, how
far does it extend? Courts must calibrate the scope of the duty appropriately in
order to address competing concerns about the effects of imposing such a duty on
IRBs. The paucity of litigation against IRBs to this point leaves the question of the
appropriate standard of care unresolved. Theoretically, courts simply could apply

180

782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
at 842-43 (noting that the duty included an obligation to inform the participants in a timely
manner of the results of the research and of the potential risks and harms of participating). For a recent
discussion of the researcher and IRB duty of care, see Diane E. Hoffmann & Karen H. Rothenberg,
Whose Duty Is It Anyway?: The Kennedy Krieger Opinion and Its Implications for Public Health
Research, 6 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 109, 111-14 (2003) (describing the legal basis for a
researcher's duty of care).
182 The researchers encouraged or required landlords participating in the study to rent the properties
to families with children, and the protocol required the children to remain on the premises for two full
years in order to complete all of the required measurements. See Grimes, 782 A.2d at 811-13 (noting
that "it was anticipated that the children, who were the human subjects in the program, would, or at
least might, accumulate lead in their blood from the dust, thus helping the researchers to determine the
extent to which the various partial abatement methods worked," and comparing this study design to the
old practice of sending canaries into coal mines to detect the presence of poisonous gases).
183/d. at 818.
1841d. at 817.
1851d. at 835-37.
186 See Hoffmann & Rothenberg, supra note 181, at 124-25 (describing the opinion's "one-sided and
arguably exaggerated fact presentation").
181 Id.
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a general standard of negligence-namely, an obligation to act reasonably under the
circumstances. Because such an open-ended duty might impose unacceptable
constraints on the progress of research, however, courts should attempt to place
some more precise limitations on the scope of the duty.
One possible approach to narrowing the extent of an IRB's duty in tort would
treat the federal regulations as fully defining the standard of care, meaning that a
violation of a regulation would constitute negligence while compliance would
provide a defense to liability.187 The human subjects protection regulations tend to
emphasize elements of structure and procedure, however, leaving the more
complex scientific and ethical matters largely to the discretion of boards.
Therefore, failures to abide by the regulations will not invariably establish
negligence if the rules do not directly relate to questions of safety. 188 Moreover,
the open-ended character of the regulations regarding matters of ethical
interpretation, such as the propriety of placebo-controls,189 or the payment of
subjects for participation,190 makes defining the scope of the IRB's duty solely by
reference to regulations an unattractive option.
In the alternative, courts could evaluate whether an IRB's conduct conforms
to customary practice, much as they do in medical negligence cases. In
malpractice litigation, physicians usually need only demonstrate that they have
complied with customary medical practice. 191 Under this approach, proof of
compliance with IRB custom would be dispositive on the question of whether a
particular board acted appropriately.192 An injured research participant potentially
could offer expert testimony, however, arguing that the prevailing custom among
IRBs is substandard in some respect and should be more protective of research

187 For a discussion about the relative merits of a regulatory compliance defense in a related context,
see Lars Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit ofSymmetry in Products Liability, 88
GEO. L.J. 2147 (2000).
188 See infra notes 206-207 and accompanying text.
189 See infra notes 252-260 and accompanying text.
190 See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
191 See, Holt v. Godsil, 447 So. 2d 191, 192-93 (Ala. 1984); Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872-73
(Miss. 1985); Senesac v. Assoc. in Obstetrics & Gynecology, 449 A.2d 900, 902-03 (Vt. 1982).
Nevertheless, noncompliance with custom sometimes will be excused in cases where a respectable
minority of physicians behave differently. See, DiFilippo v. Preston, 173 A.2d 333, 337 (Del. 1961);
D' Angelis v. Zakuto, 556 A.2d 431, 436 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). Courts generally require expert
testimony to define customary medical practice. See, Bell v. Hart, 516 So. 2d 562, 570 (Ala. 1987);
Cox v. Dela Cruz, 406 A.2d 620, 622 (Me. 1979); Lundgren v. Eustermann, 370 N.W.2d. 877, 880
(Minn. 1985); Harris v. Robert C. Groth, M.D., Inc., 663 P.2d 113, 118-19 (Wash. 1983); Vassos v.
Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1288 (Wyo. 1983).
192 Conversely, the plaintiff could offer expert testimony to demonstrate that the defendant IRB
failed to comply with the customary conduct regarding, for example, the frequency of continuing
review or the evaluation of complex trial design issues.
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This gambit occasionally succeeds in the medical malpractice

In addition, under medical malpractice principles, physicians sometimes can
invoke a "resource-based caveat" to a national standard of care. 194 IREs also may
attempt to apply this principle, arguing that inadequate manpower and institutional
support prevented the board from fully exercising its supervisory duty for ongoing
protocols or from reviewing new protocols as thoroughly as it might under better
circumstances, but this explanation may very well fail to persuade ajury.195
The use of a medical malpractice type of customary standard also would pose
other problems. Although the federal regulations provide some guidance about
appropriate IRE operations, as these local boards have proliferated, many have
developed different methods of operation that nevertheless comply with general
regulatory procedures. In some instances, courts might find it nearly impossible to
describe customary practice among IREs because no nationwide practice has yet
emerged. 196 Moreover, the genuine uncertainty inherent in research involving new

193 See United Blood Servs. v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509, 520-26 (Colo. 1992) (holding that it should
be a question of fact for the jury whether professional blood screening standards to detect the AIDS
virus were adequate); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974) (holding that the customary
practice of delayed screening for glaucoma was inadequate given the simplicity and low cost of the test
and the consequences of not screening); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996)
("[S]hould customary medical practice fail to keep pace with developments and advances in medical
science, adherence to custom might constitute a failure to exercise ordinary care."); see also Philip O.
Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise ofDeference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 163, 188 (2000).
194 See, e.g., Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 872-73 (Miss. 1985) (explaining that the duty of care
should be defined "based upon the adept use of such medical facilities, services, equipment and options
as are reasonably available," but adding that in some circumstances health care providers may have a
duty to transfer the patient to a better-equipped facility); see also Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care
Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L.
REv. 1219, 1230-32 (1997) (suggesting that the malpractice standard of care is sufficiently elastic to
cover services provided in managed care systems that impose cost-containment constraints on
physicians). Similarly, IRBs must do the best they can with available resources for review, but they
may have a duty, in certain cases, to call in special experts to assist in the review of particularly
complex research, or to transfer their supervisory obligations to an IRB with adequate resources to
review and supervise an unusually large multi-center trial.
195 Courts generally have limited the "resource-based caveat" to claims against individual
practitioners rather than institutions: hospitals must have "minimum facilities and support systems to
treat the range of problems and side effects that accompany procedures they offer." BARRY R. FURROW
ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 7-3(a) (2000); see also Hernandez v. Smith, 552 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1977)
(finding an obstetrical clinic that lacked equipment to perform caesarean sections liable for failing to
provide minimal support facilities); Horton v. Niagara Falls Mem'l. Med. Ctr., 380 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App.
Div. 1976) (rejecting short staffing as a defense to a finding of liability for an injury to a patient). An
injured research subject might make a similar claim against an institution that provides inadequate
support for its IRB.
196 And, because different IRBs review varying proportions of research in a variety of medical
disciplines, comparing the operations of one 10caliRB to another may amount to comparing apples with
oranges. Cf Epstein, supra note 166, at 1154-55 (observing that "it is possible to develop a set of
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medical technologies makes it difficult even for individual IRBs to develop a
pattern or technique of review that rises to the level of custom. 197 A particular
IRB's approach to questions such as the appropriateness ofa proposed trial design,
the use of placebo controls, or some other hotly debated ethical question in
research, may leave courts with little guidance as to what is customary and,
therefore, open the door to court-based standard setting, which itself could vary
substantially.
Ideally, courts would adopt a third approach to define the contours of the IRB
duty of care. Because actual customary practice remains inadequate, courts instead
should describe the scope of the duty in terms of the aspirational standards set out
in ethical guidelines such as the Nuremberg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki,
layered onto the basic regulatory requirements. 198 The international research
community created these guidelines through a thoughtful, collaborative approach,
using the collective experience of scientists and ethicists, and they command
significant respect among experts on clinical research ethics. Such an approach
would create a higher standard of care than a simple regulatory compliance
approach, while at the same time avoiding the adverse consequences of an open
ended general negligence standard.
As with the existence of a duty of care for IRBs, recent developments in
corporate hospital liability law provide interesting parallels that may help to define
the scope of the board's duty. The steady increase in hospital regulatory activity,
through the development of hospital bylaws and private accreditation standards,
has further refined the concept of institutional liability. Several courts have held
that quasi-regulatory standards such as those of the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Health Care Organizations (JCAHO) can be used as evidence of
the standard of care to which the hospital should be held. 199 The human subjects
protection regulations, together with the self-regulatory aspects of the ethical
codes, should provide similar guideposts for courts as they review IRB conduct.

metacustoms which are designed to deal with those particular gaps in knowledge, but these rules will
have far less bite than specific directives about the use of given products or treatments").
197 Cf James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued
Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 1382, 1389-94 (1994)
(discussing how the proliferation of new technologies in medicine undermines the common standard of
medical practice and makes it more difficult to define the medical standard of care in a malpractice
action).
198 See supra notes 30-35 and accompanying text.
199 See Jackson v. Power, 743 P.2d 1376, 1382-83 (Alaska 1987) (finding the source of the hospital's
nondelegable duty to ensure the proper operation of its emergency rooms in JCAHO standards relating
to the maintenance of emergency rooms); Johnson v. Mountainside Hosp., 571 A.2d 318, 324 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (admitting portions of the JCAHO accreditation manual for hospitals into
evidence); Blanton v. Moses H. Cone Mem'!. Hosp., 354 S.E.2d 455, 458 (N.c. 1987) (holding that the
failure ofa hospital to enforce JCAHO standards constituted "some evidence" of negligence).
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A few courts already have considered the propriety of relying on guidance
from ethical codes in evaluating the conduct of clinical research. One court, in
evaluating a tort claim for brain damage during simulated deep dive experiments in
a hyperbaric chamber, concluded, based in part on ethical standards in the
Nuremburg Code, that the researchers had not adequately disclosed the risks of the
experiment. 200 A few other courts have discussed with approval ethics codes as
sources of guidance on the scope of research duties in evaluating informed consent
claims in research. 201 At least one court, however, has affirmed a trial court's
refusal to admit the Belmont Report into evidence to document appropriate
research conduct as part of a plaintiff's claim that the treating hospital subjected
him to a medical experiment without his consent. 202 In any event, it seems likely
that enterprising plaintiffs' lawyers will continue to explore novel causes of action,
including claims based on dignitary harms and constitutional rights, that rely in
part on the ethical standards set out in these codes of research conduct. 203
In theory, ethical codes and statements can provide some useful additional
guidance to courts, beyond that available in the federal regulations, in defining the
nature and scope of the IRB duty of care. The application of such standards
nevertheless will present certain challenges-submitting such complex ethical
issues to a jury, for instance, raises a host of concerns. Juries will likely struggle to

200 Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1470-72 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (describing the
Nuremberg Code as "persuasive guidance on an appropriate standard of care" in the non-therapeutic
experimentation context), ajJ'd, 829 F.2d 1340, 1343 (4th Cir. 1987).
201 See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807,849 (Md. 2001) (holding that the
"breach of obligations imposed on researchers by the Nuremburg Code might well support actions
sounding in negligence in such cases as those at issue here"). A concurring judge in Grimes expressed
concern that the opinion ranged well beyond the scope of the questions presented to the court and
refused to join the majority in adopting the Nuremberg Code into state law. See id. at 858-61 (Raker, J.,
concurring in judgment).
202 See Ancheffv. Hartford Hosp., 799 A.2d 1067, 1079-80 (Conn. 2002) (concluding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Belmont Report would "unduly arouse [the
jury's] emotions").
203 One recent federal lawsuit alleges that clinical researchers and others associated with the
melanoma vaccine trial at Oklahoma University Health Sciences Center breached the plaintiffs' "right
to be treated with dignity." See Complaint for Dawanna Robertson et aI., Robertson v. McGee, (N.D.
Okla. 2001) (No. 01-CV-60), available at 2002 WL 535045.; see also Milford, supra note 29, at AI3
(describing several lawsuits alleging new theories of liability, including "the claim that volunteers'
rights to dignity include the right to be told the risks and benefits of an experiment; the right to an
ethical experiment in which the benefits outweigh the risks; the right to be fully apprised of conflicts of
interest (including financial stakes); and the right to be assured that the research is valid and valuable").
Plaintiffs' lawyers based these claims on both the Nuremburg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki,
although neither of the passages from these two ethical statements, as excerpted in the complaint,
explicitly announces such a right. See Complaint for Dawanna Robertson et aI., Robertson v. McGee,
(N.D. Okla. 2001) (No. 01-CV-60), available at 2002 WL 535045. The suit was recently dismissed for
lack of federal court jurisdiction. See Robertson v. McGee, 2002 WL 535045 (N.D. Okla. 2002).
Professor Jay Katz has suggested that the definition of "harm" in research should include "not only
physical harm but also dignitary harm inflicted whenever subjects remain uninformed or inadequately
apprised of the purposes and nature of the research project." Katz, supra note 31, at 404 n.9.
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apply abstract philosophical principles such as autonomy and beneficence when
evaluating claims of research misconduct. 204 In addition, where there is a genuine
ethical controversy about the appropriateness of an IRB's decision to approve a
particular study design, for example, the outcome of the case ultimately may
depend on the dueling opinions of ethics experts whose assessment of customary
IRB conduct may be drawn, inappropriately, from their limited local
experiences. 205 The appropriate role of ethical codes and statements such as the
Declaration of Helsinki, the Nuremberg Code, and the Belmont Report, in the
judicial evaluation of an IRB's conduct will continue to evolve, but courts should
continue to pay attention to the ethical principles embodied in these guidelines.
B.

Examining Different Types ofBreach

Assuming that IRBs owe a tort-based duty of care to research participants, the
more interesting question revolves around the process of establishing a breach of
this duty. As existing case law and pending litigation demonstrate, claims of
breach exist along a spectrum of complexity. At one extreme, blatant violations of
the federal regulations may serve as evidence of breach of the standard of care. At
the other end of the spectrum, plaintiffs may pursue far more complex claims,
suggesting that IRBs breach the standard of care when they fail to exercise sound
ethical judgment, notwithstanding compliance with the explicit requirements of the
regulations. Some of the variations on breach presented in the latter half of this
Part suggest that, if courts allow these sorts of lawsuits to proceed, they will
struggle to establish some qualifications or outer boundaries on a duty of care for
IRBs.
Once an injured plaintiff has established some common law duty running
from the defendant IRB to the plaintiff, a board's violation of an explicit regulation
governing human research can serve as evidence of negligence in most
jurisdictions. It is less clear whether federal research regulations resemble classic
safety regulations sufficiently to support a conclusion that any violation constitutes

204 See Ancheff, 799 A.2d at 1079-80 (opining that the admission of the Belmont Report into
evidence would "tend to confuse the issues and mislead the jury" by inviting the jury to "engage in a
highly abstract and philosophical level of inquiry into such subjects as respect for the autonomy of
persons, ... the concept of beneficence, and the various theories ofjustice").
205 On the complexities of expert testimony on bioethics matters, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Expert
Testimony by Ethicists: What Should Be the Norm?, 76 TEMP. L. REv. 91, 99-100 (2003) (describing the
current controversy over admitting bioethics testimony into evidence); Bethany Spielman & George
Agich, The Future of Bioethics Testimony: Guidelines for Determining Qualifications, Reliability, and
Helpfulness, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1043 (1999); see also Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bioethicists Find
Themselves the Ones Being Scrutinized, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2001, at AI (quoting professor of law and
medical ethics Alta Charo, who explains that "anybody can stand up and claim to be an ethicist-there is
no licensing, there is no accreditation").
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negligence per se. 206 Many of the research regulations focus on IRB process and
function rather than directly on research subject safety. To the extent that some
IRB regulations resemble standards of procedure, rather than traditional safety
regulations such as traffic laws, courts may hesitate to conclude that a board's
deviation from the rules amounts to negligence per se. Nevertheless, when an
injured plaintiff introduces evidence that an IRB or researcher committed an
unexcused violation of an applicable human subjects protection regulation, such
evidence certainly may prove helpful in making a case against a board. 207
Not surprisingly, much of the existing research injury litigation focuses on
explicit regulatory violations by the investigator, the IRB, or both, and recently
filed lawsuits alleging negligence in research abound with examples of regulatory
noncompliance. 208 Given the pattern of widespread infractions discussed in Part II,
a plaintiff's lawyer will have little difficulty finding one or more arguable failures
to comply in any particular case. For example, despite the explicit regulatory
requirement that consent forms disclose which procedures in the research are
"experimental,,,209 IRBs have approved protocols in which the consent forms
inappropriately omit this and other essential information. 210 One court held the

206 In most jurisdictions, the unexcused violation of a relevant safety statute or regulation constitutes
negligence per se. See, e.g., Lowe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.2d 1373, 1380 (5th Cir. 1980). In some
jurisdictions, violations of safety regulations create a rebuttable presumption or provide some evidence
of negligence. See, e.g., Sheridan v. United States, 969 F.2d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that under
Maryland law, violation of statute or regulation is not negligence per se, but is only evidence of
negligence); see also Paul Sherman, Use of Federal Statutes in State Negligence Per Se Actions, 13
WHITTIER L. REv. 831,877-83 (1992) (providing an overview of different state approaches). In the
context of FDA regulations governing the approval and marketing of prescription drugs and medical
devices, for example, violations of the regulations may constitute negligence per se. See, e.g., Stanton
v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 565 (3d Cir. 1983); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. Eutsler, 276
F.2d 455, 461 (4th Cir. 1960); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967).
207 See Robertson, supra note 148, at 531 (discussing the role of research regulations in defining an
IRB standard of care against which courts may measure IRB conduct).
208 See Sherman, Silverstein, Kohl, Rose & Podolsky, CLINICAL TRIALS LITIGATION, available at
http://www.sskrplaw.com/gene/ (last visited July I, 2004) (providing links to complaints and other
preliminary documents in a dozen pending or settled lawsuits alleging negligent research practices).
209
45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a) (2003).
210 Johns Hopkins University's IRB approved research with a consent form lacking this information
in the protocol that led to the death of Ellen Roche. The FDA inspected Johns Hopkins' Bayview
Medical Center after her death in the hexamethonium study, and it reported that:
[t]he consent form failed to identifY that research procedures involving inhalation of
hexamethonium bromide were experimental. For example, the consent form provided that
'hexamethonium is a medication that has been used during surgery, as a part of anesthesia.'
The subjects were not informed that hexamethonium bromide had never been approved to be
administered by inhalation and that this route of administration was experimental.
FDA, FORM 483, FEI No. 1119912, INSPECTIONAL OBSERVATIONS 3 (Sept. 7, 2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ora/frequentl483slbayviewirb483.html(last visited July I, 2004) [hereinafter FDA
Hopkins Inspection Form]. The inspection form also noted that the IRB failed to follow appropriate full
board review procedures in dealing with the research protocol as recommended by FDA guidelines on

224

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LA W & POLICY

[VOL.

7:2:175

NIH vicariously liable for the negligent failure of its employees to obtain informed
consent and for negligent deviation from an IRB-approved protocol, both clear
regulatory violations. 211 IRBs also have received warnings for violating the
regulatory recusal provision by allowing members with interests in various studies
under review to remain in the room and vote,212 although a plaintiff might find it
more difficult to prove a causal connection between non-compliance with this
particular regulatory requirement and an injury that ultimately occurred. 213
Even if the IRB conscientiously adheres to its regulatory mandate, it must
depend to some degree on the care and candor of each researcher who conducts an
approved protocol. Unfortunately, the IRB's trust sometimes appears to be
misplaced. In one case, an investigator modified an IRB-approved informed
consent form, deleting all references to the experimental nature of a device being
used in an investigational eye surgery. The plaintiff was injured and sued, alleging
that the surgeon and the IRB violated the federal research regulations dealing with
informed consent. 214 Recognizing the IRB's responsibility for failing to monitor
the investigator's compliance with informed consent and protocol requirements,
the court concluded that, where the hospital undertakes the responsibility of
informing patient-subjects of the experimental nature of their procedures and
assumes the regulatory responsibility of monitoring the research as it proceeds, it is
appropriate to hold the hospital as well as the physician-investigator liable in
negligence for injuries arising from the lack of informed consent. 215 In a different
case of intervening researcher misconduct, however, the court allowed the

IRB operations. See id. (noting a "[f]ailure to review research at fully convened IRB meetings at which
a majority of IRB members are present . , . [and that] [a]1I of the protocols, including protocol
renewals, amendments, expedited reviews, and adverse events, approved by the subcommittee, are
approved by a single block vote at the end of fully convened meetings of the IRB"). Other consent
forms improperly omit information about risks of study procedures. See Stein brook, supra note 11, at
629 (describing OHRP's criticism of IRBs supervising two large multi-center clinical trials for
"approving informed-consent documents that inadequately described the purpose of the research, the
nature of the experimental design, and the risks-most notably, death").
211 Tivoli v. United States, 1996 WL 1056005 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
212
45 e.F.R. § 46.107(e); see also FDA Hopkins Inspection Form, supra note 210, at 4 (explaining
that, during several meetings at which IRB members had conflicts of interest in studies under review,
the minutes documented that the members abstained from voting, but there was no evidence of these
abstentions on the aUdiotapes of the meetings).
213 In the case ofIRB liability, courts will require plaintiffs to prove a causal link between the alleged
IRB negligence or non-compliance and the injury. Unless the court determines that the IRB's
negligence was a substantial factor leading to the plaintiff's injury, it appears unlikely that a supervising
IRB will be found legally responsible. See Robert J. Katerberg, Institutional Review Boards, Research
on Children, and Informed Consent of Parents: Walking the Tightrope Between Encouraging Vital
Experimentation and Protecting Subjects' Rights, 24 J.e. & U.L. 545, 574 (1998); see also Bordas,
supra note 148, at 149.
214 Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 1214,1218 (III. App. Ct. 1995).
215Id. at 1218-21 (finding that, if the IRB had audited the investigator's medical records during the
I It, years prior to the plaintiff's experimental surgery, it would have discovered that the investigator was
using a modified consent form that omitted the fact that the device was investigational).
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defendant IRB to claim that it was unaware of, and thus unable to prevent, the
researcher's negligent actions that ultimately caused the plaintiffs injuries.z '6
IRBs are generally well aware, however, that investigators require supervision.
Once an IRB makes the judgment that the risks and benefits associated with
proposed research are acceptable and approves a protocol, the researcher
essentially promises to abide by the approved procedures. In another errant
investigator case, a court denied a hospital's motion for summary judgment where
the plaintiff was injured after undergoing laser eye surgery on both eyes, in
violation of the approved protocol. 217 The opinion referred to the hospital and its
IRB interchangeably in discussing potential liability for the plaintifrs injury.
Under the assumption that the hospital owed the plaintiff a duty of care in the
conduct of research protocols, the court noted deficiencies in the IRB's review, in
particular the fact that the board appeared to have accepted without discussion the
principal investigator's assurances that the risks of the single-eye experimental
surgery were acceptable. 218 The court observed that, although the protocol clearly
did not permit the inclusion of subjects with the plaintiffs type of eye problem, she
underwent the operation anyway, "apparently under the auspices of the protocol"
and that the departures from the protocol guidelines "could be seen as examples of
negligent, or even reckless, conduct.,,219 The regulations require each IRB to
solicit reports of protocol deviations from investigators in order to facilitate the
board's role as a research monitor,220 but the court in this case appears willing to
hold the IRB responsible for the negative outcome of protocol deviations even
when the PI failed to report them. 22I
Some IRB members appear to be under the misguided impression that
"following the rules" (for example, ensuring that every subject signs a consent
form and receives a copy or that every ongoing protocol receives an annual review)
protects the board from liability in the event that a research subject suffers an

216 Hamby v. Univ. of Kentucky Med. Ctr., 844 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that
the jUly had detennined that the researcher's deviation from the protocol did not cause the plaintiff's
injury, which rendered moot the question of the institution's independent negligence, and suggesting
that it would be inappropriate to hold the medical center responsible unless there was evidence that the
institution had actual knowledge of the protocol deviation); see also Bordas, supra note 148, at 149.
217 Gregg v. Kane, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14269 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (denying defendant hospital's
motion for summary judgment). The protocol governing the experimental procedures prohibited
operations on fellow eyes and on patients with a high degree of myopia. Id. at *2-4.
218 Id. at *9 ("[N]either the IRB statement granting unconditional approval nor the minutes of IRB
meetings discussing the protocol contain any indication that [an independent] risk assessment was
done.").
2191d. at *10. In discussing the allegations, the court also noted the IRB's responsibility for ensuring
that research subjects give infonned consent according to the standards set out in the federal
regulations. ld. at * 11-12. After the subsequent trial, however, the jury found in favor of the hospital
and its IRB. Gregg v. Kane, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8437 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
220 See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
221 See Gregg, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14269, at * 10.
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injury. Unlike some regulatory schemes designed to set out the optimal standard
of care for a particular activity, the human subjects protection regulations were
drafted in an open-ended fashion that not only invites but requires IREs to exercise
considerable judgment. 222 In other words, the regulations only set out minimum
standards for the protection of humans who participate in research, and compliance
with research regulations seldom should serve as conclusive evidence that an IRE
has exercised due care. 223
An IRE not only must act within the scope of existing regulatory guidance, it
also must act reasonably under the circumstances. If the relevant regulations
provide inadequate guidance on a particular question, the board must exercise its
judgment in a non-negligent fashion. 224 Therefore, in some circumstances, despite
an IRE's compliance with the minimal standards set out in the regulations, a court
may conclude that a reasonable board would have taken additional protective
measures under the circumstances. The examples that follow illustrate just a few
of the many ways in which an IRE could commit "bioethical malpractice."
Because of the degree of judgment inherent in the review of new research
protocols and the supervision of ongoing clinical trials, an injured research subject
could argue that an IRE's decision to approve a protocol (or the supervision
accorded it once approved) constituted an error in judgment, despite literal
compliance with the federal regulations. In fact, attempts to comply with explicit
regulatory requirements may lead an IRE astray. The Johns Hopkins IRE's
characterization of benefit in the proposed lead abatement research protocol, as
described in the Grimes decision, illustrates this type of error. In a scathing
opinion, Maryland's highest court criticized the Hopkins IRE for suggesting that
the investigators change the characterization of prospective benefit in the consent
fonn to include a claim that all participants, including the healthy controls

222 In contrast, the regulations governing the approval and marketing of new pharmaceuticals
represent an attempt to define the optimal safety standards for these products. See Noah, supra note
187, at 2152.
223 See Noah, supra note 187 at 2151 ("Courts routinely note that government standards establish
only 'minimum' requirements, which a jury can decide a reasonable person should have exceeded under
the circumstances."). Courts usually treat government regulations as establishing only minimum
requirements for conduct. See. e.g.. Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1543 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (explaining that "federal legislation has traditionally occupied a limited role as the floor of safe
conduct"). Even in the context of more comprehensive regulatory schemes, however, compliance with
regulations typically provides no defense. "[M]ost jurisdictions consider proof of compliance with an
applicable government safety standard at best as some relevant evidence when assessing allegations that
a product is defective or that the defendant's conduct was negligent." Noah, supra note 187, at 2151;
see also Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 746 (11th Cir. 1986); Plenger v. Alza Corp., 13
Cal. Rptr. 2d 811, 819 n.7 (Cl. App. 1992); Savina v. Sterling Drug, 795 P.2d 915, 931 (Kan. 1990);
Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 625 A.2d 1066, 1070 (N.J. 1993). The FDA or HHS could issue a rule to
preempt state common law claims, but they have not done so to date.
224 See Noah, supra note 187, at 2151-52 (describing the development of the common law rule
against recognizing a regulatory compliance defense to liability).
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proposed in the protocol, would benefit from participation, in order to bring the
study into compliance with federal regulations dealing with research on children. 225
The court concluded that the IRB's decision to approve the research protocol was
negligent not only for its failure to comply with regulations, but also for its more
general abdication of responsibility to review "the potential safety and the health
hazard impact of a research project.,,226
Not surprisingly, much of the prior litigation dealing with injuries in research
has included claims of negligent failure to obtain informed consent or related
claims that the plaintiff did not realize that the treatment was investigational. 227
Other research injury claims allege that the subject was not informed of a particular

225 See Grimes v. Kennedy-Krieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807, 844 (Md. 2001). The court criticized the
IRS's efforts to bring the proposed research into compliance with these standards. Jd. at 814. Where
the risk of a pediatric research plan is greater than minimal, the regulations state that the anticipated
benefit to the subjects must justify the risk and that "[t]he relation of the anticipated benefit to the risk
[must be] at least as favorable to the subjects as that presented by available alternative approaches." 45
C.F.R. § 46.405(b) (2003). For research without anticipated therapeutic benefit to the pediatric
subjects, the regulations permit approval only if the research plan meets the following criteria: (I) the
research presents only a "minor" increase over minimal risk to the subjects; (2) the pediatric subjects
would likely undergo the procedures involved in the research while receiving standard care for their
condition; and (3) the interventions or procedures are likely to yield generalizable knowledge about the
subject's disorder or condition that is vitally important. Id. at § 46.406. Remarkably, the consent form
did not identify any risks associated with the study procedures.
226 Grimes, 782 A.2d at 813 (discussing in detail the IRB's negligent review of the research, and
chastising the board for "instead suggesting to the researchers a way to miscast the characteristics of the
study in order to avoid the responsibility inherent in nontherapeutic research involving children"). See
Complaint for Dawanna Robertson et aI., Robertson v. McGee, (N.D. Okla. 2001) (No. 01-CV-60),
available at 2002 WL 535045 (alleging that "[a]n IRB has the responsibility to review and approve all
aspects of a human clinical trial including the design of the protocol, the qualifications of the
investigator, the informed consent document, the selection process of participants, the balance of risks
and benefits, and the conduct of the trial"). As one commentator has observed, the direct versus
indirect benefit analysis in research protocols can pose real challenges for IRBs. See Hazel Glenn Beh,
The Role ofInstitutional Review Boards in Protecting Human Subjects: Are We Really Ready to Fix a
Broken System?, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REv. I, 11-12 (2002). In the Grimes protocol, some children
benefited directly from study interventions, while others only stood to benefit indirectly, if at all.
Children who were already occupying lead-contaminated housing that underwent abatement pursuant to
the protocol arguably received a more direct benefit than those in control groups whose homes
underwent no repair. All children received the benefit of blood lead-level monitoring, but this benefit
resulted from inclusion in the study rather than directly from the studied intervention (the lead
abatement strategies). See id. The federal regulations do not provide detailed guidance to IRBs in
assessing prospective benefit, and, not surprisingly, many IRBs find it difficult to identify which
procedures offer the prospect of direct as opposed to indirect benefit. Nevertheless, this distinction is
critical because IRSs should refrain from "justifying the risks of procedures that are designed solely to
answer the research questions based on the likelihood that another procedure in the protocol is likely to
provide a benefit." Id. at 12 (citing NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, ETHICAL AND POLICY
ISSUES IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 77 (2001».
227 See, e.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1974); Sexton v. United States, 644 F. Supp. 755
(D.D.C. 1986), affd, 832 F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 717
(N.D. III. 1978), aff'd, 727 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1984); Gaston v. Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 350 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1978); Estrada v. Jacques, 321 S.E.2d 240, 254 (N .C. Ct. App. 1984).
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risk, which then materialized and caused hann. The infonned consent regulations
contain a variety of explicit requirements that IREs generally enforce by evaluating
a sample consent fonn, but the actual consent process offers ample opportunity for
negligence by the researcher, unless carefully monitored by the board. As
explained above, the regulations require investigators to provide a wide range of
infonnation to research subjects,228 and to ensure that the research subject
understands the infonnation and has an opportunity to ask questions,229 but the
existing consent process may prove inadequate in the research context. 230
No one would suggest that the regulations preclude IRBs from requiring
investigators to provide additional infonnation, or to ensure by other means in
other ways, in addition to the written consent fonn, that the research subjects
genuinely understand the risks and benefits of participation in a particular trial. A
court might conclude, on this basis, that an IRB has failed in its duty to protect
research subjects when it approves a protocol with a consent fonn and procedure
that is incomplete, given the risks of procedures for the particular protocol, or
when it fails to adequately supervise adequately the investigator's compliance with
infonned consent requirements due to a lack of resources or lack of concern, or
when it fails to impose additional consent safeguards when a particular trial (or
population of prospective subjects) appears to demand it.231
As a practical matter, IRBs certainly have the resources and the clout to insist
on additional infonnation in the consent fonn, but boards will find it more difficult
to monitor how this infonnation gets transmitted to prospective research
participants. The therapeutic misconception provides an example of a problematic
situation in which an IRE may lack control over the consent process. Because
prospective subjects may fail to appreciate the non-therapeutic nature of much
research and instead may enroll in research expecting medical benefit, the IRB has
an obligation to correct such common misimpressions by ensuring that the
infonned consent process accurately describes the potential for individual benefit
so that patients can make a meaningful decision about participation.

See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2003) (requiring that the investigator seek consent "only under
circumstances that provide the prospective subject or the representative sufficient opportunity to
consider whether or not to participate").
230 See Epstein, supra note 166, at 1155 (explaining that "the doctrine of informed consent is under
far greater pressure [in the research context], first, because of the persistent conflicts of interest between
the physician's experiment and the patient's well-being, and, second, greater uncertainty means that
there is much more that should be said about the problems").
231 In discussing informed consent standards in the research context, some courts and commentators
have argued that certain factors unique to the research setting, including greater uncertainty about the
risks and therapeutic benefit of experimental interventions, and concerns about conflicts of interest,
support heightened consent requirements compared with the customary approach in standard medical
care. See Noah, supra note 56, at 370-71 (concluding, however, that the research context does not
differ significantly enough from the standard treatment context to justif'y radically different
requirements for consent).
228
229
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Unfortunately, written explanations alone may prove unavailing, but resource
constraints mean that the board may have little option but to focus on the
completeness and readability of the consent fonn, leaving the investigators to
ensure that participants actually understand the speCUlative prospect, if any, of
therapeutic benefit.
The regulations also leave to researchers and IREs the task of making
judgments about complex scientific matters with significant ethical implications,
such as trial design.232 The randomized controlled trial (ReT) represents the "gold
standard" of clinical investigation. 233 In general, new drugs and therapies undergo
three phases of clinical testing after the completion of in vitro and animal studies.
In the case of novel therapies, investigators may require several Phase II studies to
evaluate technical feasibility questions, in addition to efficacy, before proceeding
to Phase III trials that actually test the efficacy of investigational therapies in larger
numbers of subjects who suffer from the targeted medical condition?34
The promise of novel, useful scientific infonnation provides part of the
justification for subjecting trial participants to the risks of experimental therapies.
How, then, should IREs assess the ethical merits of these rigorous, hypothesis
testing investigations compared to observational or pilot studies which do not
necessarily demonstrate efficacy but instead generate hypotheses and may uncover

232 See Antman et aI., supra note 55, at 762. Clinical trial design has increased significantly in the
degree of complexity in recent years, often employing multiple arms and studying numerous and
sometimes surrogate endpoints. See Michael S. Lauer & Eric J. Topol, Clinical Trials-Multiple
Treatments, Multiple End Points, and Multiple Lessons, 289 JAMA 2575, 2576 (2003). More complex
study designs pose additional challenges in data analysis, and IRBs should consider these issues in
evaluating the potential usefulness and reliability of the data.
233 Ulrich Abel & Armin Koch, The Role of Randomization in Clinical Studies: Myths and Beliefs,
52 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 487, 487 (1999); see also Stuart J. Pocock & Diana R. Elboume,
Randomized Trials or Observational Tribulations?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1907, 1907-08 (2000)
(advocating continued emphasis on RCTs, in part because in observational studies the treatment is
selected for the particular patient and this selection bias may create cumulative outcome differences that
are not a result of the treatment itself). But see Kjell Benson & Arthur J. Hartz, A Comparison of
Observational Studies and Randomized, Controlled Trials, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1878 (2000)
(concluding that observational studies and RCTs were equally useful in accurately assessing the
treatment effects of a wide variety of therapies); John Concato et aI., Randomized, Controlled Trials,
Observational Studies, and the Hierarchy of Research Designs, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1887, 1890-91
(2000).
234 See LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY: CASES
AND MATERIALS 137-52 (2002) (discussing the various phases of drug development). In Phase I, a
small number of healthy volunteers participate in a study to measure toxicity and to determine
appropriate dosing. In Phase II, a somewhat larger number of individuals with the targeted disease or
condition test the drug for efficacy and risks associated with its use. Finally, in Phase III, a large
population of individuals with the targeted disease, along with a control group of some sort, test the
product's safety and efficacy. Id. at 145-46.
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side-effects?235 Scientists continue to debate whether poorly designed clinical
trials can still generate useful scientific infonnation,236 and IRBs must make
difficult tradeoffs between rigorously designed RCTs and ethical concerns about
patient protection. 237 Boards may find that consideration of these sorts of trial
design distinctions further complicates the already fonnidable task of weighing
risk and benefit to subjects, yet a court could conclude that failure to do so
constitutes negligence.
For this reason, even when early studies successfully resolve questions of
appropriate research procedure and support assertions of safety and therapeutic
efficacy, the IRB should evaluate the proposed design of any follow-up trials in
order to detennine whether they can produce useful data.238 IRBs should include
in their preliminary review a careful evaluation of study design issues, such as
statistical power, in deciding whether to approve proposed research protocols,
recognizing that it may be inappropriate to subject study participants to the risks of
research in underpowered or otherwise poorly-designed trials.239 Many IRBs
probably fail to consider these questions; even those IRBs that choose to tackle
such complex biostatistical questions still may struggle to make rational, consistent

235 Similarly, the FDA sometimes authorizes so-called "Treatment INDs," which involve an open
protocol or compassionate use of an investigational product, subject to IRB supervision, in part because
of their hypothesis-generating value. ld. at 194-95.
236 See Scott D. Halpern et aI., The Continuing Unethical Conduct of Underpowered Clinical Trials,
288 JAMA 358, 359-60 (2002); see also Benjamin Freedman & Stanley H. Shapiro, Ethics and
Statistics in Clinical Research: Towards a More Comprehensive Examination, 42 J. STAT. PLANNING &
INFERENCE 233 (1994) (evaluating issues of research ethics including the basis for a study's estimation
of sample size and its adoption of eligibility criteria that may compromise the effectiveness of human
subject's research); Noah, supra note 56, at 400-02. On the other hand, even an RCT that enrolls
insufficient numbers of patients to produce statistically significant results, or that lacks adequate
controls, may nevertheless generate useful hypotheses, especially concerning safety information.
237 Apart from the placebo controls debate, researchers also struggle with the question of whether
and when to unblind double-blinded trials based on unpromising preliminary data.
238 See Antman et aI., supra note 55, at 762 (discussing problems with, and risks of, a small
enrollment RCT of neuronal transplantation surgery for Parkinson's disease patients that failed to
demonstrate a statistically significant difference between those patients who were randomized to the
surgery arm of the protocol and the controls). Poorly designed trials, even if not inherently risky, are
only ethically justified if they will produce scientifically valid data, and courts have occasionally
expressed a willingness to second-guess the FDA's approval of a product based on study design
concerns. In one drug design defect case, the court allowed a jury to conclude, based on expert
testimony, that the FDA erred in approving a drug based on methodologically-flawed clinical trials.
See, e.g., Tobin v. Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir. 1993).
239 See Halpern et aI., supra note 236 (concluding that arguments in support of underpowered trials
are flawed in most cases, and describing two limited situations in which underpowered research may be
ethically appropriate). Sometimes the lack of sufficient statistical power results from inadequate
funding to enroll and follow sufficient patients to produce a definitive result. See Antman et aI., supra
note 55, at 762-63. At least one pending lawsuit alleges that the IRB was negligent in approving the
design of the study in which the plaintiff was injured. See Complaint, Guckin v. Nagle, 2002 WL
32151766 (Pa. Ct. Com. PI. 2002) (No. 001425), available at 2002 WL 32151766 (naming as
defendants the PI, hospital, IRB members, and medical device manufacturer).
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decisions, particularly when those boards lack members with relevant expertise. It
remains to be seen whether a court would ever go so far as to recognize a claim
that a plaintiff injured in a statistically underpowered trial should never have been
subjected to the risk of participation in such a study.
As explained above, IRBs also have an ethical and regulatory obligation to
refuse approval of research that poses an inappropriate level of risk to human
participants, but making such judgments can present a difficult challenge in some
circumstances. In evaluating proposals for therapeutic research, the IRE must
ensure that the study in fact has sufficient prospect of direct benefit to patient
subjects to justify its risks. 240 The regulations create two categories of risk-"no
more than minimal risk" and "greater than minimal risk.,,241 Different IREs may
disagree at a basic level about what sorts of interventions belong in one or the other
of these categories. The regulations do not provide a laundry list of which
interventions present no more than a minimal risk. Moreover, as one commentator
has observed, the "research regulations do not clearly describe ... how to balance
the risks against the potential benefits for the subjects and against the knowledge
the research may produce.,,242
Overburdened, undertrained IRBs tend to focus the bulk of their initial review
efforts on matters of consent, giving short shrift to the risk-benefit calculus. A
more structured approach to the analysis of prospective benefit than described in
the regulations may assist IRBs in making the risk-benefit call. 243 Although the
researcher's protocol may settle an important scientific question, the very nature of
research suggests that participation in such a protocol may not be the best way to
advance a participant's medical interests. In one recent trial comparing fluid
management approaches for intensive care patients with acute respiratory distress
syndrome, the OHRP halted the trial because of concerns that patients in one arm
were not receiving the best current standard care. Despite the fact that the NIH
funded study had undergone multiple levels of review that raised concern about the
study's scientific design, the study was allowed to proceed until the OHRP

240

Nancy M.P. King, Defining and Describing Benefit Appropriately in Clinical Trials, 28 J.L. MED.

& ETHICS 332, 333 (2000).
241 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(i) (2003) (defining "minimal risk"). See also supra notes 49-56 and

accompanying text (discussing IRB risk-benefit balancing).
242 Jason H.T. Karlawish, Research Involving Cognitive/y Impaired Adults, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1389, 1390 (2003) (describing a study comparing two different ventilator tidal volumes in which each
alternative involved serious risks to the subject and both alternatives posed greater than minimal risks,
and explaining that, although participation in the trial offered prospective benefits, it would be difficult
for an IRB to assess which risks were justified by those benefits because the research also included
procedures that were not intended to provide any benefit to study participants).
243 See King, supra note 240, at 332-33 (suggesting that IRBs categorize benefit into "direct" benefit
(actually arising from the treatment under study), "collateral" benefit (from being a research subject
even if one does not receive the experimental treatment, including the benefit of regular medical
examinations), and "aspirational" benefit (to society or future patients)).
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intervened. 244 These sorts of scenarios can open the door to claims of negligent
IRE judgment.
Even if a research subject receives unambiguous and complete information
about the risks of participation, the subject may later allege, with the benefit of
hindsight, that the risks of participation were too high. Particularly in the case of
non-therapeutic research, an injured subject may attempt to argue that the IRB
should never have provided him or her with the opportunity to take such a risk. In
the context of non-therapeutic research, however, courts have recognized that
where a subject voluntarily and knowingly chooses to participate, the defendant
may argue assumption of risk.245 In Whitlock v. Duke University, for example, a
plaintiff claimed to have suffered organic brain injury in a simulated deep-dive
research protocol. 246 The court dismissed the plaintiff's negligent failure to warn
claims, noting that the plaintiff had sought out the opportunity to participate in the
dive experiments in order to further his career and that the consent form included a
warning about both known and unknown risks.247 Nevertheless, one can imagine a
non-therapeutic research protocol that so egregiously risks harm to participants that
courts would choose not to allow an assumption of risk defense on the part of
either the researcher or the board.248

244 Jeffrey M. Drazen, Controlling Research Trials, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1377, 1377-79 (2003)
(arguing, however, that in the case of NIH-sponsored trials, OHRP should limit its role to inappropriate
conduct of approved trials and leave study design questions to NIH). Where the research objective
improperly compromises the prospective subjects' best interests, courts implicitly have recognized that
this type of ethical conflict of interest can justifY an action in battery against a hospital. See Mink v.
Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 716-18 (N.D. III. 1978) (describing the experimental
administration of DES to pregnant women without their knowledge or consent, and allowing a battery
claim against the hospital), affd 727 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Richard S. Saver, Critical
Care Research and Informed Consent, 75 N.C. L. REv. 205, 226 & n.72 (1996) (discussing the
implications of the Mink decision).
245 In some routine medical malpractice cases, courts also have recognized assumption of risk as a
valid defense. See. e.g., Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060. 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (concluding that a patient
"may expressly assume the risk of malpractice and dissolve the physician's duty to treat a patient
according to the medical community's accepted standards"); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 995-96
(2d Cir. 1987) (allowing an express assumption of risk defense, and explaining that there is "no reason
why a patient should not be allowed to make an informed decision to go outside currently approved
medical methods in search of an unconventional treatment").
246 Whitlock v. Duke University, 637 F. Supp. 1463, 1466 (M.D.N.C. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 1340
(4th Cir. 1987); see also Vodopest v. MacGregor, 913 P.2d 779, 786-87 (Wash. 1996) (allowing
plaintiffs negligent informed consent claim to proceed, and refusing to enforce an exculpatory clause
contained in the consent form, where plaintiff suffered injuries in a high altitude breathing experiment).
247 See Whitlock, 637 F. Supp. at 1467-68; cf Karp v. Cooley, 349 F. Supp. 827, 835 (S.D. Tex.
1972) (explaining that the consent form dealing with the implantation of an artificial heart contained
detailed information of risks, and directing a verdict for the surgeon on the issue of informed consent),
affd,493 F.2d 408, 419-23 (5th Cir. 1974).
248 For example, one could argue that the hexamethonium inhalation experiments at Johns Hopkins
University should never have received approval and that the plaintiff's consent in the case was
immaterial given the non-therapeutic nature of the research and the serious, knowable risks of injury to
participants. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
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Ideally, IRBs also ought to consider how the source and amount of the
study's funding and the intended use of the study's data affect questions of its
scientific merit. Industry-funded studies designed to obtain marketing pennission
from the FDA for an additional medical indication, or to justifY claims of equality
or superiority to a competitor product, deserve careful scrutiny in order to
detennine whether the trial design is scientifically sound and whether it is ethically
appropriate to expose human subjects to the risks ofparticipation. 249 For instance,
in 1999, Bristol-Myers Squibb designed and funded a clinical trial (with the rather
optimistic acronym "PROVE IT") to demonstrate that, although Lipitor®
(atorvastatin calcium) lowers cholesterol more than Pravachol® (prevastatin), the
two products are equally effective in preventing heart attack and death. Critics of
the study argued that the study lacked the statistical power-both in numbers of
patients enrolled and in length of enrollment-to discover real differences in clinical
endpoints between the two products, and that the industry sponsor deliberately
designed it this way.250 Research subjects who suffer injury in such a study might
successfully claim that the supervising board ought never to have subjected them
to the risks of participation, including an unnecessary risk of disease exacerbation
or adverse events. 251
Where there is genuine controversy over an ethical question, one IRB may
decide to penn it a research plan that a different board would view as unapprovable,
and this sort of judgment could open the door to a judicial detennination of
negligence. For example, the clinical research community has hotly debated the
ethics of placebo controls in clinical trials.252 When a researcher designs a trial to
test the relative effectiveness and safety of two different treatments for the same

249 See Franklin G. Miller & Andrew F. Shorr, Ethical Assessment of Industry-Sponsored Clinical
Trials: A Case Analysis, 121 CHEST 1337, 1338-39 (2002) (providing an example of a placebo
controlled study that was apparently "designed to showcase the sponsor's newer drug"); see also
Bodenheimer, supra note 119, at 1541 (discussing the myriad ways in which industry sponsors can
design clinical trials to produce desired results); Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, Drug Makers
Design Studies with Eye to Competitive Edge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2000, at AI.
250 See Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 249 (quoting one critic who opined that "[t]he PROVE IT trial
is a particularly extreme example of a study designed purely for marketing, rather than scientific
purposes"); see also Gina Kolata, Study of Two Cholesterol Drugs Finds One Halts Heart Disease,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2003, at AI (describing study results that demonstrated Lipitor's superior
effectiveness in halting atherosclerosis; in response, the competitor product's manufacturer pointed out
that the study failed to demonstrate improved clinical outcomes in patients taking Lipitor).
251 See Miller & Shorr, supra note 249, at 1341.
252 See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Franklin G. Miller, The Ethics ofPlacebo-Controlled Trials
- A Middle Ground, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 915 (2001) (arguing that placebo-controlled trials are
permissible when proven therapies exist but only if certain ethical and methodologic criteria are met);
Benjamin Freedman et aI., Placebo Orthodoxy in Clinical Research II: Ethical. Legal. and Regulatory
Myths. 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 252 (1996) (challenging a number of common beliefs concerning the
value of placebo controls); Sharona Hoffinan, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible
Research or Unethical Practice?, 33 CONN. L. REV. 449 (2001) (describing and discussing the
competing arguments).
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condition, the genuine uncertainty as to the relative merits of the two treatments is
known as "equipoise.,,253 Commentators have noted that equipoise is an ethical
necessity in order to justifY the risks to human subjects in clinical research of this
kind. 254 Unfortunately, a trial comparing an active experimental medication to a
placebo, while providing equipoise, may unnecessarily deprive those participants
who are randomized to the placebo of active therapy, increasing the risk that their
condition will worsen.255 To further complicate the debate, placebo controls
generally permit the gathering of statistically significant data using fewer human
participants overall (thereby subjecting fewer individuals to the risks of the
research). Nevertheless, many ethicists agree that placebo-controlled studies are
only appropriate when evaluating drugs or other interventions to treat conditions
for which there is no known effective treatment. 256

253 Benjamin Djulbegovic & Mike Clarke, Scientific and Ethical Issues in Equivalence Trials, 285
JAMA 1206, 1206 (2001) (describing the varying degrees of scientific uncertainty or equipoise).
254 Benjamin Freedman, Equipoise and the Ethics ofClinical Research, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 141,
141 (1987); see also Don Marquis, How to Resolve an Ethical Dilemma Concerning Randomized
Clinical Trials, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1999) (describing the conflict that physicians experience
when recommending that their patients enroll in randomized, placebo-controlled clinical trials); Stuart
L. Nightingale, Challenges in Human Subject Protection, 50 FOOD & DRUG LJ. 493, 498-99 (1995).
255 Of course, this ethical argument assumes that active therapy is always better than placebo, but this
assumption is not necessarily correct. Theoretically, the active agent being tested may prove to be so
toxic that the placebo group is relieved to have been randomized into that arm. More generally, experts
have recognized that subjects enrolled in clinical trials apparently achieve better outcomes than patients
with the same condition who receive treatment from physicians, whether they receive the experimental
treatment or a placebo control. See John D. Lantos, Editorial, The 'Inclusion Benefit' in Clinical Trials,
134 J. PEDIATRICS 130, 130 (1999) ("A number of explanations have been offered for the apparent
benefit of RCT participation, including selection bias, placebo effects, and adherence to well-defined
protocols [for other aspects of disease management]."). At other times, placebos may prove to be as
efficacious as active therapy. See Shankar Vedantam, Against Depression, a Sugar Pill Is Hard to
Beat, WASH. POST, May 7, 2002, at Al (describing a recent analysis of96 antidepressant clinical trials
that concluded that placebos worked as well as the study drug in a majority of the trials surveyed). In
one recent trial, the herbal remedy St. John's Wort worked for 24% of depressed patients in the study,
while the prescription drug Zoloft® proved efficacious for 25% of patients, but the placebo worked for a
whopping 32%. Id. But see John C. Bailar, The Powerful Placebo and the Wizard of Oz, 344 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1630 (2001) (reporting on several studies which found little evidence that placebos had
powerful clinical effects); Asbjom Hrobjartsson & Peter C. Gotzsche, Is the Placebo Powerless? An
Analysis ofClinical Trials Comparing Placebo with No Treatment, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1594 (200 I)
(concluding that placebos generally had little effect, though they produced possible benefits for the
treatment of pain).
256 Miller & Shorr, supra note 249, at 1339 (noting that placebo controls also might be ethically
appropriate in trials dealing with conditions known to have high rates of placebo response). Although
the term "placebo" usually refers to an inert substance used in comparison with an active medication,
placebo controls are not limited to drug trials. Some IRBs have approved research involving placebo or
"sham" surgery, which has prompted sharp debate in the biomedical community. See, e.g., Thomas B.
Freeman et aI., Use of Placebo Surgery in Controlled Trials of a Cellular-Based Therapy for
Parkinson's Disease, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 988 (1999); Sam Homg & Franklin G. Miller, Is Placebo
Surgery Unethical?, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 137 (2002) (discussing a placebo-controlled trial of
arthroscopic knee surgery, and addressing the competing arguments more generally); Ruth Macklin,
The Ethical Problems with Sham Surgery in Clinical Research, 341 NEW ENG. J. MED. 992 (1999).
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In contrast, when effective alternatives to the studied therapy exist, even for
treating a relatively mild medical condition, ethicists (and many IRB members)
argue that placebo-controlled studies subject participants to unnecessary and
avoidable risks.257 Although the arguments in favor of limiting the use of placebo
controls appear compelling, pharmaceutical manufacturers continue to push for
their use because placebos often permit a clearer assessment of the studied drug's
safety and efficacy,258 which is essential for obtaining premarket approval from the
FDA. Z59 IRBs must take care to avoid allowing these sorts of influences to distort
their evaluation of study design questions.
Nevertheless, under existing regulations, IRBs may choose to approve
placebo-controlled studies in some circumstances, as long as the risks to subjects
are minimized "[b]y using procedures which are consistent with sound research
design and which do not unnecessarily expose subjects to risk."z60 Where the only
available active control is not particularly effective, or where the underlying
disease is not life-threatening, some boards may conclude that a placebo control is
ethically permissible in order to yield statistically valid results. In other cases, an

257 Miller & Shorr, supra note 249, at 1339 (explaining that a placebo controlled trial of an asthma
study would be ethically inappropriate, not only because the placebo response for asthma therapies is
low, but also because such trials would involve withdrawing asthma patients from highly effective
standard therapies such as inhaled corticosteroids, which can exacerbate symptoms); see also C.
Michael Stein & Theodore Pincus, Placebo-Controlled Studies in Rheumatoid Arthritis: Ethical Issues,
353 LANCET 400, 400-0 I (1999) (explaining that placebo controls in trials designed to study therapies
for chronic diseases like rheumatoid arthritis and hypertension may place subjects at risk of poor
disease control and irreversible damage). The recently revised Declaration of Helsinki takes the
position that placebo controls are never ethically appropriate where an efficacious therapy is known to
exist, though the question remains subject to debate. See Susan Okie, Health Officials Debate Ethics of
Placebo Use, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000, at A3 (noting that no one defends placebo controls where
established therapies exist to treat serious and measurable conditions such as infections, diabetes and
cancer); see also Timothy S. Jost, The Globalization of Health Law: The Case of Permissibility of
Placebo-Based Research, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 175 (2000) (evaluating the negative effect of the
globalization of health law on placebo-controlled human subjects research); David J. Kupfer & Ellen
Frank, Placebo in Clinical Trials for Depression: Complexity and Necessity, 287 JAMA 1853 (2002)
(examining results from two studies on the use of placebo-controlled clinical trials for major depression,
and noting the extensive problems with such trials); Robert Temple & Susan S. Ellenberg, Placebo
Controlled Trials and Active-Control Trials in the Evaluation ofNew Treatments: Ethical and Scientific
Issues, 133 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 455 (2000) (concluding that the acceptability of placebo
controlled trials should be determined by whether the patient will be harmed by deferral of therapy).
258 AMA, COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFF., CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: THE USE OF
PLACEBO CONTROLS IN CLINICAL TRIALS, OPINION No. E-2.075 (J 996), available at http://www.ama
assn.orglamalpub/category/8424.html (last updated June 22, 2002).
259 See NOAH & NOAH, supra note 234, at 159. The FDA agrees with this argument, recognizing
that placebo controls are only appropriate where no efficacious standard therapy exists. 53 Fed. Reg.
41,516,41,519-21 (1988). The agency's regulations require, however, that investigators design trials to
generate valid scientific results. 21 C.F.R. §§ 56.111 (a)(2), 312.22(a) (2003).
260 45 C.F.R. § 46.1 I I(a)( I) (2003). Many IRBs ask researchers to provide an ethical, as opposed to
a scientific, reason for using a placebo control. Researchers frequently fail to appreciate the ethical
concerns surrounding placebo use and focus instead on the scientific desirability of placebo-controlled
trials.
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IRB might decide, quite rationally, to approve a placebo-controlled study because
comparison of a study drug against an active control may not yield. statistically
significant data where the differences in the mode of action between the study drug
and the only available active control are very subtle. Such a judgment still puts an
IRB at risk of liability, however; the regulations do not expressly forbid placebo
controls, but a court could disagree with a board's judgment in a particular case.
Consider this intriguing, though never-litigated, example of potential
"bioethical malpractice" by an IRB. Suppose an investigator proposes to conduct a
double-blind RCT of a new drug for hypertension. According to her proposed
protocol, half of the patients will be randomized to the experimental study
medication; one-quarter to an approved medication for hypertension (the "active
control"); and one-quarter to a placebo .. The introductory section of the informed
consent form explains to participants that the purpose of the study is to evaluate a
new, apparently safer and more effective therapy for hypertension. The consent
form also explains in the "procedures" section that one-quarter of the patients will
receive a placebo (and that a placebo is "like a sugar pill"), and the form mentions
that one risk of participation is "worsening hypertension if the experimental
medication does not work for you."
After analyzing the study results from the first two months, the PI suspects,
based on the benefits and side effects that the patients experience, that the study
medication works significantly more safely and effectively than the standard
medication. She also notices that many of the participants who were randomized
to the placebo arm now have uncontrolled hypertension. The study sponsor, a
large pharmaceutical company, provided her with funding to conduct the study for
six months and it wants the full six months' worth of data in order to maximize its
chances of receiving marketing permission from the FDA. She wonders whether
she should notify the IRB or halt the research. Should the IRB have approved this
study in the first place? If a study participant in the placebo arm suffers a stroke as
a result of uncontrolled blood pressure, should the IRB face tort liability? Most
IRBs probably would have corrected the flawed consent, and most probably would
have expressed concern about the use of a placebo arm in these circumstances, but
how many IRBs would have anticipated the questions posed by the interim data?
To date, no research subject has sued an IRB or clinical investigator for
approving or conducting a trial with an inappropriate placebo control.
Theoretically, however, a subject could sue an IRB, claiming that, although the
investigator fully informed him or her of the risks of participating in a placebo
controlled clinical trial, the board was negligent in approving the protocol as
designed. A plaintiff randomized into the placebo arm of the study whose disease
progressed while receiving no active treatment could argue that the study design
was flawed, despite the fact that the regulations permit placebo-controlled clinical
trials. On the other hand, a patient who suffers an injury while participating in a
study comparing an experimental agent to an active control might allege that the
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IRB was negligent in approving a study design that lacks scientific utility because
it is unlikely to produce statistically significant differences between the two test
articles and that, therefore, the risks of perfonning the research were unacceptable.
An injured research subject also might assert that an IRE was negligent in
failing to provide continuing review of the research on a semi-annual or quarterly
basis rather than annually, if the protocol presents unusual risks requiring closer
supervision. 261 To the extent that an IRB relies on the extra supervision of a
DSMB in initially approving a protocol, but fails to follow up with the committee
or fails to process adverse event reports promptly, the IRB may be liable in
negligence for the results of its lax oversight. 262 The IRB's duty to monitor
ongoing research clearly includes the need to make judgments about when to stop a
protocol if interim data suggest previously unforeseen risks. Interim data analysis
improves the safety of this type of research, and IRBs must respond quickly to
emerging infonnation in order to avoid exposing new enrollees to unnecessary
risks. 263 IRBs, relying on their own interim review or reports from a DSMB, must
balance concerns about unnecessary exposure to risk (if the trial is halted "too
late") against prematurely abandoning promising research in cases where early
adverse events tum out to be random statistical variations. 264
One recent example of a controversy involving data monitoring and the
decision to halt an ongoing clinical trial for safety reasons may prove instructive. 265

261 Recall that the federal regulations require annual review at a minimum, but certainly permit more
frequent reconsideration of an active protocol. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.1 09(e) (2003); supra notes 76-97 and
accompanying text (discussing regulatory requirements for continuing review).
262 Cf Herson, supra note 80, at 557-58 (suggesting that DSMBs also face potential liability for
"errors and omissions in the decisions/recommendations they make during the course of the clinical
trial").
263 Kyra l. Becker & David L. Tirschwell, Ensuring Patient Safety in Clinical Trialsfor Treatment of
Acute Stroke, 286 lAMA 2718, 2718 (2001) (explaining that, in one large trial, 328 additional patients
enrolled during the time it took to complete interim analysis of data on the first 300 enrollees).
264 Id. at 2718.
Although the ostensible third party beneficiaries of research to develop a new
treatment would not have standing to complain that an IRB caused them injury by refusing to approve
research supporting the licensing of the treatment, it is easier to imagine claims that an IRB was
negligent in approving research in which the prospective benefit to participants did not justifY the risks.
265 Occasionally, study sponsors also will call a halt to ongoing research for financial reasons. In a
large, randomized, double-blind study to compare a new formulation of a calcium channel blocker with
standard therapies for hypertension, the data failed to demonstrate equivalence between the therapies
after accruing 32% of the target data. The sponsor opted to terminate the trial two years early because
of "business considerations." See Bruce M. Psaty & Drummond Rennie, Stopping Medical Research to
Save Money: A Broken Pact with Researchers and Patients, 289 lAMA 2128 (2003) (also describing
other examples of research halted for commercial reasons alone).
Human subjects committee approval of the protocol is predicated on a sample size and length
of follow-up adequate to test the study's hypothesis.. " The participants in [the study 1were
not only deprived of personal benefit from the completed trial, but also the social benefit of
genuine scientific contributions from an adequately powered study .... What the company
apparently treated as a simple commercial matter rendered the original promise to participate

238

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LA W & POLICY

[VOL. 7:2: 175

The so-called "super aspirin" trials were a series of studies designed to evaluate the
effectiveness of a new class of anti-clotting drugs in preventing heart attacks and
strokes. The sponsoring companies hoped that these very expensive drugs would
prove significantly more effective than aspirin in preventing blood clots and their
associated adverse health effects. In five large studies testing four slightly
different versions of the drug, the study participants taking super aspirin
experienced significantly higher death rates.z 66 In the fifth study, which enrolled
9,200 patients around the world, the death rate for enrollees taking the study
medication was notably higher than that of subjects taking the placebo. 267 Each of
the previous four trials had produced similar conclusions-the combined data from
the five trials demonstrated that super aspirin not only failed to prevent death
among patients with heart disease but actually increased the risk of death by thirty
six percent. 268
Given that the data from the four previous studies suggested serious problems
with this class of medications, should the IRB even have approved the fifth study?
Each successive research proposal should include all of the data from the
preceding studies, so at what point should the reviewing IRB have refused to
approve further research? A participant in the fifth study, randomized to the super
aspirin arm before suffering a cardiac arrest, reasonably might argue that the
supervising IRB was negligent in allowing the research to proceed, or should have
included in the informed consent form specific information about the increased
death rates of study participants in the preceding trials. Technically, each of the
studies employed a slightly different chemical entity from the same class of drugs,
so a researcher might argue that data from a prior study are not relevant to studies
that follow, but a reasonable interpretation of the informed consent regulations
suggests that disclosure of prior related study results is ethically and legally
required in cases like these.
These sorts of situations recur with disturbing regularity. In 2001, the
sponsors and an independent DSMB suspended another trial of a novel therapy to
treat stroke after the study medication failed to produce any measurable
improvements in outcomes and the two groups receiving different doses of the

in research that contributes substantively to medical knowledge impotent, useless, or
fraudulent.
Id. at 2129-30. Of course, IRBs cannot foresee such developments and therefore cannot take them into
account in the initial process of weighing risk and benefit.
266 A Furor over "Super-Aspirin." NEWSDAY, Jan. 30,2001, at CS.
2671d. (noting that the death rate for patients on the study drug was 2.7% versus 2.0% for patients
receiving placebo, resulting in 30 additional deaths among patients on the study drug arm).
268 After the data from the fifth study became available, the PI called for an immediate cessation of
the research. Id. (adding that many of the unexpected deaths apparently were due to cardiac arrests
triggered by blood clots, which super-aspirin was intended to prevent). Stay tuned for a large c1ass
action lawsuit.
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study medication experienced higher death rates than those receiving placebo. 269
More recently, researchers called a halt to a massive study of hormone replacement
therapy in post-menopausal women after the data demonstrated measurable
increases in the risk of breast cancer and heart disease.270
Courts must recognize that research protocols are designed to discover
unknown information about the safety and efficacy of a particular therapy, and that
the very nature of research suggests that reviewing boards must assess the risks and
Although
scientific value of the research without complete information.
retrospective analysis of data may demonstrate that an IRB should have halted
research earlier, or never approved it in the first place, courts should not permit
hindsight to serve as the sole basis for a negligence claim against a reviewing
board. Instead, the negligence inquiry should focus on the appropriateness of the
IRB's judgments based on what was reasonably knowable at the time of
approval. 271 Only if the IRB fails to require or adequately incorporate all available
information in its decisionmaking process-or fails to respond to interim data
should the board be held responsible for injuries to participants.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Previous commentators have proposed a variety of regulatory reforms to
improve the safety of clinical research.272 Some have advocated a radical
restructuring of the existing regulatory system governing human subjects research,

269 See Gregory W. Albers et aI., Aptiganel Hydrochloride in Acute Ischemic Stroke: A Randomized
Controlled Trial, 286 JAMA 2673 (2001) (noting that the death rate among those receiving the high
dose of the study drug was 26.3%, compared with 19.2% among those in the placebo group).
270 See Gina Kolata, Study is Halted Over Rise Seen in Cancer Risk. N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at AI.
The same question also recently arose for men in the context of a massive study of a prostate cancer
prevention therapy. See Abigail Zuger, A Big Study Yields Big Questions, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 213,
213 (2003) (describing the decision to halt a study of a prostate cancer inhibitor when it became
apparent that "the drug did indeed significantly reduce the prevalence of prostate cancer but did so at a
disturbing price: the possibility that if cancer is detected, it may be of a higher pathological grade").
271 Courts generally will not impose a duty to warn of unknowable risks associated with drugs or
other medical technologies. Cj Klisch v. MeritCare Med. Group, Inc. 134 F.3d 1356, 1359 (8th Cir.
1998); Mallett v. Pirkey, 466 P.2d 466, 470 (Colo. 1970); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 116
(Iowa 1986); Tanuz v. Carlberg, 921 P.2d 309, 315 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988).
272 See. e.g., Michael Baram, Making Clinical Trials Safer for Human Subjects, 27 AM. J.L. & MED.
253 (200 I) (paying particular attention to safety issues in clinical trials of biotechnology and gene
therapies); Jesse A. Goldner, An Overview of Legal Controls on Human Experimentation and the
Regulatory Implications of Taking Professor Katz Seriously, 38 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 63,104-12 (1993)
(discussing non-tort mechanisms for improving IRB performance and accountability); Jonathan Moreno
et aI., Updating Protections for Human Subjects Involved in Research, 280 JAMA 1951 (1998)
(emphasizing the need for better protection of vulnerable popUlations, and suggesting ways to improve
IRB efficiency); Woodward, supra note 32, at 1949-52; see also INST. OF MED., RESPONSIBLE
RESEARCH: A SYSTEMS ApPROACH TO PROTECTING RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS (2003), available at
www.nap.edulexecsumml030908488I.html (last visited July 1,2004).
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recommending, for example, that Congress create an independent Human Subjects
Protection Agency with complete rulemaking and adjudicatory authority over all
human research.273 Such a centralized system of research oversight would make it
possible to publish IRB decisions in difficult cases in a process analogous to
common law, which would in turn establish some consistency in the resolution of
close questions that are currently left to the discretion of individual IRBS.274
Others urge caution, however, in considering additional layers of regulatory
safeguards for clinical research, noting that research is by definition a risky
undertaking, and suggesting instead that clinical investigators redouble their efforts
to use sound scientific design for their protocols, avoid conflicts of interest, and
obtain full informed consent from participants. 275 Short of creating an entirely new
agency, OHRP desperately needs additional resources to enforce existing
regulatory requirements,276 and local IRBs require improved institutional support
and staffing. 277 Commentators also strongly advocate improved, mandatory
education of clinical investigators and IRB members in order to reduce the risk of
errors that might harm research subjects. 278 These sorts of reforms undoubtedly
will produce incremental improvement in the system of research protections but

273 See George J. Annas, Regs Ignored in Research, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at A20; Wendy K.
Mariner, Human Subjects, NAT'L L.J., May 13,2002, at A25 (calling for a wholly independent "federal
agency to regulate all research with human subjects" whether publicly or privately funded); see also
Marc Kaufman, Clinical Trial Sanctions Urged: HHS Plans to Tighten Controls to Protect Patients in
Tests, WASH. POST, May 24, 2000, at A2 (reporting that the Clinton administration asked Congress to
authorize fines of up to $250,000 against individual scientists who violate research regulations and fines
of up to $1 million against non-compliant institutions, and that HHS wants to improve IRB training and
direct monitoring of patients during in-progress clinical trials). Legislation designed to fill gaps in the
existing regulatory scheme has been proposed but not yet enacted. See, e.g., Human Research Subject
Protections Act of 2000, H.R. 4605, 106th Congo (2000) (proposing to extend federal regulations to all
research involving human subjects, whether or not federally-funded, including research conducted by
private companies and individuals).
274 See Coleman, supra note 47; Katz, supra note 65, at 39-40 (observing that the lack of a
centralized policy-formulating board leaves these "painful decisions" to the "low visibility handiwork
of 10caIIRBs"). But see Noah, supra note 46 (doubting that such a system would work).
275 Arthur Caplan & David Magnus, Overregulating Research, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 1999, at 31;
Mosk, supra note 168, at 87 (discussing concerns about the potential chilling effect of liability on
medical research, and describing legislation under consideration in Maryland that offers immunity from
suits for medical researchers who comply with federal regulations); see also Elliot Foucar, Letter to
Editor, How Much Oversight is Necessary to Protect Human Subjects?, 287 JAMA 716, 717 (2002)
(arguing that over-regulation "imposes a legal 'tax' on research, similar to the highly inefficient tort tax
imposed on clinical medicine").
276 At present, OHRP employs only forty-seven people, including only five investigators. In 2001,
OHRP investigated only one percent of unexpected adverse event reports-approximately 100 incidents
and investigated on site in only four of those cases. See Kranish, supra note 25, at A I. Overall,
however, FDA and OHRP have stepped up enforcement of federal human subjects protections since the
issuance of the 1998 reports. See HHS Status Report, supra note 8, at 9.
277 See Hoffman, supra note 76, at 748-53.
278 See, e.g., Gary B. Ellis, Keeping Research Subjects out ofHarm's Way, 282 JAMA 1963, 1963
64 (1999); Moreno et aI., supra note 272, at 1955-56.
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may do little to change the underlying culture of medical research which, for too
long, has placed the demands of science above the needs of the individual patient.
A variety of changes in the human research "machine," including overwork,
lack of expertise and training, and greater conflicts of interest, pose formidable
challenges to the protection of human subjects and likely will serve as a basis for a
proliferation of negligence claims against IRBs and the institutions that house
them. This litigation trend is not necessarily cause for hand-wringing. Although
IRBs strive to protect human research subjects from harm and are largely
successful in their efforts, these boards labor under less than ideal circumstances
that contribute to a tendency towards shortcuts and misjudgments. The regulations
serve as a starting point for resolving difficult ethical and scientific problems in
proposed research, but truly effective human subjects protection requires IRBs to
exceed the minimal regulatory requirements for the protection of research subjects.
This endeavor will require more financial and institutional support, better
training, and more specialized expertise. Institutions also must work to foster a
cooperative mindset between clinical researchers and the supervising IRB, helping
researchers to view the board as a partner in clinical investigations-an entity that
can help to assure the highest ethical standards and thereby protect the value and
validity of the scientific results-rather than as an obstacle to successful research.
Increased regulatory surveillance and guidance also may help to enhance IRB
performance. Courts certainly ought to be attentive to concerns about broad
expansion of IRB duties of care. Realistically, however, holding IRBs accountable
in negligence for the injuries that result from their shortcomings will serve as an
efficient catalyst for meaningful improvement to the system of human subjects
protections.

